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ABSTRACT
This dissertation develops empirical models that account for worker interactions, managerial
selectivity, and technical inefficiency in the production process.
The first chapter, entitled “Stochastic Frontier Models with Network Selectivity," develops
a model where workers produce output through peer-effect networks, while managerial
selectivity of workers affects worker inefficiency. The intuition behind this model is that
managers may consider optimal combinations of workers to produce the best results, and this
selectivity in the worker network may affect worker productivity.
The second chapter, entitled “Network Competition and Team Chemistry in the NBA,"
models simultaneous interactions between multiple networks where agents cooperate with
peers within their own networks but compete with non-peers from other networks. This paper
presents the first econometric model to consider multiple peer networks where workers are
engaged in simultaneous competition around a single outcome variable.
Lastly, the third chapter, entitled “Adaptive LASSO for Stochastic Frontier Models with
Many Efficient Firms," develops a procedure to select a subset of maximally efficient firms
in the sample of interest. In this model, firm inefficiency is measured as a distance from an
estimated optimal production level, and I apply the LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and
Selection Operator, Tibshirani, 1996) to identify a subset of firms whose inefficiencies are
estimated as exactly zero. This methodology can be applied to any classification problem
where our interest is to identify a subset of best (worst) individuals among a large number of
candidates.
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Chapter 1
Stochastic Frontier Models with Network
Selectivity
We allow for worker-level inefficiency that is correlated with the manager’s selection equation
in the network production function model of Horrace, Liu and Patacchini (2016), which
transforms labor into productive output through peer-effect networks selected by the manager.
The proposed specification is a "composed error" version of their model where managerial
selectivity works through the worker-level inefficiency term instead of the noise term. The new
specification captures both worker-level inefficiency and the manager’s ability to efficiently
select teams to produce output. As the correlation between the manager’s selection equation
and worker inefficiency goes to zero, our parametric model reduces to the normal-exponential
stochastic frontier model of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) with peer-effects. As the
variance of worker inefficiency goes to zero, the manager’s choices become random. A brief
application to the NBA is provided.
1
21.1 Introduction
Horrace, Liu and Patacchini (2016) develop a network production model where a manager
selects workers into teams (peer-effect networks) and where the productivity of each worker
affects the productivities of teammates and vice versa. This induces a production function
selection bias that can be corrected by augmenting the production equation with a poly-
chotomous team selection equation. Estimation of the model is at the worker-level within a
single firm and proceeds as a two-stage process. The first stage models the manager’s optimal
team choice, based on the aggregate performance of each possible team that she can create
from the pool of workers. In this model a potential team with better aggregate performance
(output) has a higher probability of being selected by the manager in the first-stage. This
yields a selection bias term (a positive inverse Mill’s ratio) that is used as a correction in
estimation of the second-stage production function. Depending on the sign of the correlation
between the selection equation error and the production function error, optimal managerial
choice may either increase or decrease output. Horrace et. al. (2016) claim that this bias term
can be interpreted as managerial inefficiency.
However, the source of variability in the production function is at the worker-level, so we
would like to consider models that also account for worker-level inefficiency (as opposed to
only managerial inefficiency), and propose a network production specification with a composed
error: a two-sided component that represents statistical noise and a one-sided component
that represents worker inefficiency and can only subtract from the worker’s (and the team’s)
productivity. In our model the manager may have information on the inefficiency draws of
individual workers and makes her choices based on this knowledge, so any bias induced in
the model is strictly though the worker inefficiency component. In a world where production
is based on a composed error it is not unreasonable to suspect that the manager only has
information on one of the components.
3Another distinctive feature of our model is that the effect of the manager’s selection on the
productivities of the workers is in one direction: positive. In Horrace et al. (2016), depending
on the sign of the correlation between the selection errors and the production errors, the
manager’s choices can have either positive or negative effects on worker performance, and their
model accommodates the (perhaps) unrealistic situation where the expected performance
of an optimally selected team of workers is lower than a feasible alternative. That is, the
probability of a lineup being selected may be high, even though its expected performance is
low. The proposed specification ensures that manager’s choices are consistent with the goal
of maximizing output at the cost of restricting the magnitude of the correlation between the
selection equation and the production function, as we shall see.
Kumbhakar et al. (2009) and Greene (2010) deal with the sample selection issue in the
stochastic frontier framework, however, Kumbhakar et al. (2009) specify a model where
choices are binary (over production technologies) and where there is no spatial production
component. Our specification involves a polychotomous choice (over potential worker teams)
within peer-effect networks. Greene (2010) also has no spatial production component and
assumes the selection bias works through the random noise, not inefficiency. Recently, Glass,
Kenjegalievay, Sickles and Weyman-Jones (2016) and Glass, Kenjegalievay aand Sickles (2016)
propose a spatial autoregressive (SAR) stochastic frontier model for panel data, but the
weight matrix for the spatial dependency in their models is assumed to be exogenous. In the
present framework the network is endogenous due to manager selectivity (and not worker
selectivity), however, it is plausibly exogenous once we condition on the manager’s choices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econometric
specification and the estimation approaches of our peer-effect stochastic frontier model
with selectivity, and Section 3 provides an empirical exercise, using data from the National
Basketball Association. Section 4 concludes.
41.2 Model and Estimation
1.2.1 Econometric model
Horrace, Liu and Patacchini (2016), hereafter HLP, consider a single firm1 where a manager
has a choice set of worker groups at time t, At = {1...s...}, that he can assign to a project,
and she chooses a group of workers, s in At if only if,
d∗st > max
j 6=s,j∈At
d∗jt where d
∗
jt = Zjtγ + ξjt (1.1)
where Zjt is a deterministic factor and ξjt is a scalar random innovation with zero mean and
unit variance. Equation (1.1) is the manager’s selection equation, and it will be parameterized
in terms of group-level data in the sequel. For now define ∗st = maxj 6=s,j∈At d∗jt − d∗st with
distribution F ∗st , so group s is chosen if only if ∗st < 0.2 We augment the HLP network
production function with a one-sided inefficiency term. Let ust be an Nt-dimensional, worker-
level inefficiency vector with typical element uist > 0, then our proposed model is:
Yst = λWstYst + X1,stβ1 + x2,stβ21Nt + vst − ust , (1.2)
where Yst is an Nt-dimensional output vector for the chosen group of workers, λ is a scalar
peer-effect parameter, Wst is a weight matrix for the peer-effect (an Nt×Nt matrix with zeros
on diagonal3), X1,st is an Nt × k matrix of worker-varying variables, x2,st is a scalar worker-
invariant variable, and 1Nt is an Nt×1 vector of ones. The vst is an iid Nt-dimensional random
vector representing statistical noise. Theoretical justification of the production function in
equation (1.2) is presented in HLP, so we do not discuss it here. We make the following
assumptions.
1Horrace, Jung and Sanders, 2017, generalize the HLP model to multiple firms in direct competition.
2If Zjt is random then F ∗st is conditional on Zjt .
3A widely used example is the group averaging weight matrix, W ∗st =
1
Nt−1 (1Nt 1
′
Nt
− INt )
5Assumption 1.2.1 Wst , X1,st and x2,st are exogenous to vst and ust .
Assumption 1.2.2 The elements of vst are distributed iidN(0,σ2v ), and the elements of ust
are iid exponentially distributed with probability density g(uist) = 1σu e
− uist
σu and distribution
function G (uist) = 1− e
uist
σu . The error components are independent.
Assumption 1.2.1 is standard, and HLP provide conditioning arguments to establish exogeneity
of the weight matrix. In essence, endogeneity of the weight matrix is not a result of unobserved
worker behaviors; it is due to managerial selection, which can be corrected if the manager’s
choices are observed. Assumption 1.2.2 follows Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) for the
normal-exponential stochastic frontier model. While HLP allow statistical dependency between
∗st and vst , we assume the following.
Assumption 1.2.3 The ∗st are independent of vst but dependent on uist such that ∗st and
uist are jointly distributed H(∗st , uist ; ρ) with Pearson correlation ρ and marginal distributions
G (uist) and F ∗st(∗st).
In our model managerial selection works through worker-level inefficiency. That is, the
production function is stochastic through vst , but the manager may know something about
worker inefficiency, so he makes work group selections based on this knowledge. Following
Dahl (2002), Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2007), and HLP, we need the following
for identification of the parameters in equation (1.2).
Assumption 1.2.4 The joint distribution of ∗st and uist , H(∗st , uist ; ρ), does not depend on
Zjt .
Managerial selection of worker groups precludes identification of the parameters in the network
production function of equation (1.2). HLP propose a two-step estimation procedure in the
style of Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983), where in the first step the probability that a given
group s is selected in time t is modeled as a function of a set of exogenous group-level
6explanatory variables. In the second step, the estimates from the first step are used to
construct a single index (e.g., an inverse Mill’s ratio in Heckman, 1979), which gets added to
the right-hand side of equation (1.2) to adjust the specification for selection bias. HLP follow
Lee (1983) and reduce the dimensionality of the selection bias with the scalar transformation
Jst(·) ≡ F−1(F ∗st(·)) of ∗st , and we do the same. While HLP select the inverse of the standard
normal for F−1, we select the inverse of the exponential distribution with unit variance. Then,
Jst(
∗
st) is an exponential random variable with unit variance by construction. For notational
simplicity, define st ≡ Jst(∗st) and δst ≡ Jst(0), then the probability of group s being selected
in time t is given by P(st < δst |{Zjt}j∈At) = F (δst), where δst is a Nt-dimension vector of
exogenous variables that inform the manager’s selection decision.
With this transformation, H(∗st , uist ; ρ) could be specified as some bivariate exponential
distribution, BE (st , uist ; ρ), whose marginal distributions are F (st) and G (uist). Frechet
(1951) has shown that given two exponential distributions, there exist infinitely many bivariate
exponential distributions with those given marginals. Hence, there exists a fundamental
identification issue in constructing a bivariate exponential distribution from F and G . However,
using restrictions on their statistical independence, Gumbel (1960) proposes a Type I bivariate
exponential family of distributions based on two exponential marginals that do not suffer
from this issue.4 Therefore, we also assume the following.
Assumption 1.2.5 The joint distribution of ∗st and uist , is a Gumbel Type I bivariate
exponential:
H(st , uist ; ρ(α)) = 1− e−
uist
σu − e−st + e− uistσu − ασu uistst−st for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (1.3)
4There are other classes of bivariate exponential distributions which possess this uniqueness property, and
we leave exploration of these parametric alternatives to future research. One could also explore inducing
cross-equation correlation with a copula.
7Then the probability density is,
h(st , uist ; ρ(α)) =
1
σu
e−
uist
σu
− α
σu
uistst−st
[
(1 +
α
σu
uist)(1 + αst)− α
]
, (1.4)
whose marginals are F and G .
The Pearson correlation ρ is a monotonically deceasing function of α, which controls the
level of dependence between st and uist with α = 0 corresponding to the independent case.
Therefore, once we know α, then we know ρ(α), uniquely. In particular, ρ(0) = 0 and
ρ(1) = −0.4837. In other words, selecting this particular bivariate exponential requires that
the Pearson correlation between st and uist be negative and not exceed 0.4837 in magnitude.
While Assumption 1.2.5 restricts α and ρ(α), the negative ρ(α) restricts the effect of the
manger’s selection on output to be positive, as long a α 6= 0. That is, the expectation of
worker-level inefficiency will decrease as the probability of a given group being selected
increases. In other words, as the manager makes more effort to select a better group according
to her choice rule, the outcome from the group will improve on average.5 This is not a feature
of the Horrace, Liu and Patacchini (2016) model, where more managerial effort can lead to
less output. This is an important contribution of our paper.
The effect of manager selection on worker-level inefficiency can be seen from the expectation
of u conditional on the manger’s selection, which is,
E (uist |st < δst) = σu
Pst
[1− 1
κst
e−δst ] where Pst = 1− e−δst and κst = 1 + αδst (1.5)
See the derivation in Appendix A. From (1.5), we can verify that limα_0E (uist |st < δst) = σu
which implies that if there’s no correlation, this model reduces to the stochastic frontier
model of Aigner et al (1977) with exponential one-sided error and peer-effects. We can also
5A less restrictive bound is −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 0, but to the best of our knowledge, there is no such bivariate
exponential distribution with exponential marginals. Distributions with the bound of 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 exist but
they may not be consistent with our model.
8Figure 1.1: (a) Bivariate exponential distribution of u and ; (b) E (uist |st < δst) by the value
of α when σu = 1
show that E (uist |st < δst) is a monotonic decreasing function of δst (if α 6= 0) such that
limδst_∞E (uist |st < δst) = σu, which implies, if the probability of a given group being selected
is higher, inefficiency is more likely to be small. Figure 1.1 (a) plots the bivariate exponential
distribution of uist and st with σu = 1 and α = 0.7, and Figure 1.1 (b) contains plots of
E (uist |st < δst) for various values of α when σu = 1.
1.2.2 Estimation of the Stochastic Frontier
Following Aigner et al (1977), the likelihood of the composed error, µist = vist−uist , conditional
on st < δst , is based on the "signal to noise" re-parameterization of the conditional density,
h(µist |st < δst) =
∫ ∞
0
h(uist ,µist |st < δst)du
=
1
σuPst
[
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− σv
σu
)
e
µist
σu
+
σ2v
2σ2u − κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstσv
σu
)
e
κstµist
σu
+
κ2stσ
2
v
2σ2u
]
=
η
σvPst
[
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− η
)
e
µistη
σv
+ 1
2
η2 − κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstη
)
e
κstµistη
σv
+
κ2stη
2
2
]
(1.6)
9where η = σv
σu
. See the derivation in Appendix A. Then, the log-likelihood function is,
lnL =
∑
t
∑
i∈s
ln h(st < δst)h(µist |st < δst) =
∑
t
Nt ln
η
σv
+
∑
t
ln |INt − λWst |
+
∑
t
∑
i∈s
ln
[
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− η
)
e
µistη
σv
+ 1
2
η2 − κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstη
)
e
κstµistη
σv
+
κ2stη
2
2
] (1.7)
where wst,ij is the ij th element in Wst . |INt − λWst | is the determinant of the Jacobian of the
transformation from µist to yist , which is undertaken in a standard spatial model to account
the endogeneity of the spatial lag of the dependent variable (Anselin, 1988; Elhorst, 2010).
To make the estimation feasible we substitute and µˆist = yist − λ
∑
j wst,ijyjst − xstβ for µist
in the likelihood and maximize it. There are a number of ways to implement the maximum
likelihood estimation of (1.7) but, to simplify the estimation, we consider a two-step approach
here and provide another possible three-step approach in Appendix A.
1.2.3 A Two-Step Approach
Our two-step estimation approach is as follows.
Step 1: With specification (1.1), if we assume ξst is independently and identically Gumbel
distributed, then γ can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood below (McFadden,
1974),
lnL1 =
∑
t
(
Zstγ − ln
∑
j∈At
eZjtγ
)
+ C (1.8)
where C is the constant which does not depend on the γ. From this conditional logit estimator,
γˆ, we can calculate the probability of the group s being chosen as Pˆst = e
Zst γˆ∑
j∈At e
Zjt γˆ
. Then we
can compute δˆst = F−1(Pˆst) where F−1 is the inverse of the exponential distribution with
unit variance, which will be F−1(x) = −ln(1− x).
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Step 2: Maximize the log-likelihood in (1.7) to get λˆ, βˆ1, βˆ2, ηˆ, σˆv , and αˆ.6 Because we use
multiple step estimation, we use the Murphy and Topel (2002) correction to adjust standard
errors. We provide relevant derivatives of the log-likelihood for the production function and
selection equation in Appendix A.
1.2.4 Estimation of Individual Inefficiencies
Next, we can estimate worker inefficiency as E (uist |µist , st < δst), following Jondrow et al.
(1982). That is, the conditional mean function is given by,
E (uist |µist , st < δst) =
∫ ∞
0
u
h(uist ,µist , st < δst)
h(µist , st < δst)
du =
∫ ∞
0
u
h(uist ,µist |st < δst)
h(µist |st < δst) du
=
Aist
Aist − Bist
(
Λist + σv
[
φ(−Λist/σv)
Φ(Λist/σv)
])
− Bist
Aist − Bist
(
Λ∗ist + σv
[
φ(−Λ∗ist/σv)
Φ(Λ∗ist/σv)
])
where Aist = Φ
(
Λist/σv
)
e
µist
σu
+
σ2v
2σ2u , Bist =
κst
eδst
Φ
(
Λ∗ist/σv
)
e
κstµist
σu
+
κ2stσ
2
v
2σ2u
Λist = −µist − σ
2
v
σu
and Λ∗ist = −µist −
κstσ
2
v
σu
.
(1.9)
See the derivation in Appendix A. As previously stated, as α goes to zero or δst goes to
infinity, this conditional expectation goes to σu, implying that there is no selection bias
induced by the manager, and her choices have no effect on worker performance. Estimation
proceeds by plugging likelihood estimates of the variance components into equation (1.9).
6In order to reduce the number of parameters we need to estimate, we may replace the β1 with the
consistent estimator of β1 conditional on λ which is βˆ1 = (X
′
1QX1)
−1X
′
1Q(Y − λWY ), where Q is the within
transformation matrix, and X1 and Y are the matrices containing all the observations over t.
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1.3 Empirical Application
1.3.1 Data and Variables
We apply our network stochastic frontier model to NBA data for three teams over the 82-game
2015-2016 regular season: the Detroit Pistons (DET), the Denver Nuggets (DEN) and the
Atlanta Hawks (ATL). The data were purchased and downloaded from BigDataBall.com.
The three teams are from different divisions (Central, Northwest and Southeast divisions,
respectively). In recent years, they have all been ranked at or near the median NBA team
in terms of their Rating Percentage Index (RPI) which measures the overall strength of
teams based on win percentage, opponent win percentage, and win percentage of opponents’
opponents.7 Our data and specification are designed to mimic HLP analysis of the Syracuse
Men’s Basketball team, but for a few exceptions.
Following HLP, we define a time period, t, in a given game as the interval between two
consecutive substitutions by either team. With this definition our data initially contain 1,450
time periods for Detroit, 1,520 periods for Denver and 2,068 periods for Atlanta. Over an 82
regular game NBA season, this is an average period duration of 2.82, 2.76 and 2.15 minutes
per period, respectively. Compare these averages to 2.46 minutes per period for the 2011-12
Syracuse University Men’s Basketball team (and their opponents) as analyzed in HLP, and it
seems that NBA coaches make substitutions as frequently as NCAA coaches. Following HLP,
we drop time periods that are less than 30 seconds in length, and also drop overtime periods.
After dropping the periods we are left with 1,165 time periods for DET, 1,205 time periods
for DEN, and 1,571 time periods for ATL over the course of the season.8 With five active
7The RPI for NBA is obtained from ESPN: http : //www .espn.com/nba/stats/rpi//year/2016. Our
purpose is to demonstrate the empirical importance of the proposed model, so we do not estimate a model
for every NBA team. See Horrace, Jung and Sanders (2017, working paper) for a league-wide analysis of
these data.
8HLP also drop the time periods if the number of player types in any given active lineup of the periods is
less than 2 where “types" are the player types such as Guards or Forwards . We found that this would remove
a significant number of time periods in our case, so we did not drop those periods in our analysis.
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players per team on the court at all times this leads to 5,825, 6,025 and 7,845 observations,
respectively.
We use the "same-type" peer-effect weight matrix considered in HLP, where "types" are the
player types: Guards or Forwards , with Forwards including centers. That is, the same-type
weight matrix is W , where W0 = [w0,ij ] is an adjacency matrix with w0,ij = 1 if the i th and
j th players are both guards or forwards. Then row-normalize W0 so that W 1N = 1N . This
network specification assumes that each individual is affected only by the same type of agents
in his network (exclusion restrictions).9 These exclusion restrictions allow us to use the 3-step
estimation procedure discussed in Appendix A. For details about the relationship between
topology of weight matrix and the estimation procedure, see Appendix A.
For example, let’s assume the lineup for DET is [F , F , G , F , G ]′ where F = forward and
G = guard . Then, the same-type peer-effect weight matrix is given by:
W =
 0
1
2
0 1
2
0
1
2
0 0 1
2
0
0 0 0 0 1
1
2
1
2
0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0

We use two output measures that are slightly different than those in HLP. The first is NBA
player efficiency based on the work of sports economist, David Berri: yist = (0.064 ∗ 3PTist +
0.032 ∗ 2PTist + 0.017 ∗ FTist + 0.034 ∗ REBist + 0.033 ∗ STList + 0.020 ∗ BLKist − 0.034 ∗
MFGist − 0.015 ∗MFTist − 0.034 ∗TOist)/Minsist , where 3PTist , 2PTist and FTist are 3-point
field goals made, 2-points field goals made, and free throws made (respectively), REBist is
rebounds, ASTist is assists, STList is steals, BLKist is blocked shots, MFGist is missed field
goals, MFTist is missed free throws, TOist is turn overs, and Minsist is minutes played by
player i in line-up s in period t. This statistics is one of the more popular metrics used
9HLP use both same- and cross-type weight matrices. The different-type weight matrix is W d , where
W d0 = [w0,ij ] is an adjacency matrix with w0,ij = 1 if the i th and j th players are a guard and a forward (or
vice versa). Then row-normalize W d0 so that W d1N = 1N . However, they noticed that including both weight
matrices into the model at the same time may lead to a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we only include
the same type weight matrix in this exercise.
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to measure the value of an NBA player’s production.10 HLP use a similar metric, but the
weights assigned to each element of their statistic are different. Unfortunately, both the HLP
and Berri efficiency measures can frequently produce yist = 0, when the duration of t is
small. That is, not every player can be productive in every 30-second interval, and many of
these zeros can lead to likelihood function instability. Therefore, we also experiment with a
cumulative version of player efficiency, measured from the start of the game, instead of in
an individual time period. This cumulative measure smooths the variability of productivity
when an active player moves from a highly productive period to a non-productive period.
The rest of the variables in the analysis and the production function specification are identical
to HLP, and this is by design. The player-varying exogenous variables in the outcome equation
(X1,ist) are Experienceist and Fatigueist . Experienceist is minutes played from the start of the
game to the end of period t-1, and Fatigueist is minutes continuously played until the end
of period t-1. The player-invariant exogenous variables (x2,tsi) are the RPI of the opposing
team from the end of the previous season, Home, an indicator variable for a home game, and
2ndHalf , an indicator variable equal to 1 if t is in the second half.
The exogenous variables in the selection equation (Zst) are lineup-level aggregations of
variables from the production equation. Lineup − Efficiencyst is the sum of the yist of lineup
s from the start of the game until the end of period t-1. Lineup − Experiencest is the sum of
minutes played by the lineup at the end of period t-1. Lineup− Fatiguest is the total minutes
continuously played by the lineup at the end of period t-1. Lineup − Foulsst is the total fouls
by the lineup at the end of period t-1. One − Substitutionst is a dummy equal to 1, if one
player was substituted to achieve the current lineup. Two − Substitutionst is a dummy equal
to 1, if two players were substituted to achieve the lineup at time t. We included player
dummies to control for player-specific heterogeneity.
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables are presented in Table 1.1. The first two
10See http://wagesofwins.com/how-to-calculate-wins-produced/.
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columns of the table contains the variable name and a brief definition, receptively. The rest
of the table presents the means, standard deviations and extrema for each team and variable.
For example, the average player Efficiency is 0.0052, 0.0052 and 0.0059 for DET, DEN and
ATL, respectively. Not surprisingly, at the end of the season ATL had the best win percentage
among the three teams (ATL: 0.585, DET: 0.537, and DEN 0.402). Therefore, average
player efficiency seems to be positively correlated with wins in this sample. These results are
true of the Cumulative Efficiency measure too, with cumulative efficiency being higher on
average than the average of the per period marginal efficiency (Efficiency). Compare 0.0052
to 0.0057 (DET), 0.0052 to 0.0057 (DEN) and 0.0059 to 0.0062 (ATL). We can also see that
the standard deviation is everywhere lower for the cumulative measure, as expected. Both the
Experience and Fatigue variables are lowest on average for Atlanta, implying that the Atlanta
coach tends to make substitutions more frequently than both Detroit and Denver. Strength
of schedule as measured by RPI seems to be about the same across the three teams, but
remember that this is a static variable measured once at the end of last season for each team.
The last 4 variables in Table 1.1 are "per lineup" averages across the different lineups used by
each team. Since there are exactly five active players in any period, the lineup averages tend
to be about 5 times larger than the “per player" averages. This is certainly the case when we
compare Efficiency (in the first row) to Lineup Efficiency (sixth row). This also appears to
be the case, if we compare experience and lineup experience or if we compare fatigue and
lineup fatigue for each team. Finally, the average number of fouls across lineups is between 4
and 5 for all three teams.
1.3.2 Estimation Results
Estimation results for the selection model are in Table 1.2, and the results are sensible.
For example, efficient lineups (the first variable in the table) have a higher probability of
being selected by the coaches, while lineups with larger number of fouls (Lineup Fouls)
16
and longer continuous play without rest (Lineup Fatigue) are less likely to be selected. In
case of the Lineup Experience variable, the Detroit coach picks experienced lineups with
higher probability (coefficients of 0.0135) but the Denver and the Atlanta coefficients are not
significant. Overall, the first stage selection results are compelling. We now turn to our main
results in Table 1.3.
Table 1.2: Estimation of the selection equation
Dep. var.: probability of lineup selection DET DEN ATL
Lineup efficiency 6.8142** 6.1258** 5.7481***
(Tstat) (2.560) (2.233 ) (2.661)
Lineup fouls -0.1312*** -0.2330*** -0.0509**
(-5.068) (-8.521) (-2.316)
Lineup experience 0.0135*** -0.0061 -0.0012
(4.199 ) (-1.517) (-0.371)
Lineup fatigue -0.1345*** -0.1460*** -0.1803***
(-19.444) (-19.619) (-22.896)
One Substitution 5.2378*** 7.1250*** 6.1627***
(28.603) (27.957) (35.703)
Two Substitution 2.7571*** 4.0893*** 3.5791***
(18.295) (19.184) (24.907)
Log-likelihood -1,882.78 -1,973.06 -2,938.02
Sample size 1,165 1,205 1,571
T statistic in parentheses
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
After a few preliminary estimations, we discovered that η = σv/σu is large in these data
(sometimes larger than 10). In other words, there is little player inefficiency on these teams.
In this case, the likelihood of (1.7) has trouble converging and is quite sensitive to outliers.
This makes sense because our model is basically shrinking the inefficiency estimate, σu, and
attributing part of it to a managerial selection effect, α. If inefficiency is too small in data,
then there’s nothing to shrink so the correlation parameter can’t be well-identified, which is
manifest as instability in the likelihood.
To minimize instability, we use the 3-step estimation procedure discussed in Appendix A.
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After estimating the selection equation, we use Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML)
estimation (Lee, 2007) to estimate λ and β1 and then use the likelihood (1.7) to estimate the
rest of the parameters in the outcome equation. In this procedure, we calculate the standard
errors for the parameters from the analytic forms in Appendix A.11
Table 1.3: Three step ML estimation of the outcome function
DET DEN ATL
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Peer-effects 0.0441*** 0.0297** -0.0219 -0.0011 0.0261** 0.0200**
(Tstat) (3.828) (2.316) (-0.465) (-0.096) (2.460) (2.332)
Experience -0.00002 0.00007** 0.00007 0.00014*** 0.00022*** 0.00022***
(-0.099) (2.395) (0.083) (4.448) (3.237) (7.472)
Fatigue 0.00017** 0.00014*** 0.00005 0.00007* -0.00002 0.00006
(2.202) (3.956) (0.099) (1.712) (-0.267) (1.329)
RPI -0.0089 -0.0039 -0.0096 -0.0120*** -0.0337*** -0.0185***
(-0.495) (-1.365) (-0.222) (-4.099) (-4.464) (-6.084)
Home 0.0014 0.0012*** 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005**
(1.611) (4.589) (0.089) (0.451) (0.444) (2.247)
2nd Half -0.0002 -0.0008** -0.0008 -0.0018*** -0.0022** -0.0026***
(-0.063) (-2.124) (-0.056) (-4.232) (-2.214) (-6.828)
η (= σv
σu
) 16.2392 2.3223*** 7.1804** 2.2514*** 3.1830*** 2.9764***
(0.062) (7.197) (2.112) (11.149) (4.586) (4.817)
σv 0.0217 0.0080 0.0214 0.0082 0.0225 0.0090
(13.295) (122.423) (55.237) (169.254) (137.667) (170.176)
α 0.3623 0.0000 0.4691 0.0006 0.0083 0.0054
(0.083) (0.000) (0.795) (0.006) (0.028) (0.021)
Player dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood 4,168.56 9,509.94 5,127.80 10,412.96 3,566.96 10,721.90
Sample size 5,825 5,825 6,025 6,025 7,845 7,845
Model 1 : y = efficiency, Model 2 : y = cumulative efficiency
T statistics in parentheses, and Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
The three-step ML estimation results for the outcome equation are in Table 1.3. Model 1
corresponds to the dependent variable in the outcome equation being "per period" efficiency,
while Model 2 is based on cumulative efficiency. The results may be summarized as follows.
PEER-EFFECT: Overall, the peer-effects for these teams are smaller than those reported
11In calculating the Hessian, we removed observations which produced explosive values in the Hessian. In
Model 1 for DET and DEN, we removed four and three observations, respectively, in this calculation. We
always applied the Murphy and Topel correction to our standard errors.
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in HLP for the Syracuse Men’s basketball team. Also, there is some heterogeneity in the
magnitude and the direction of the peer-effects across teams. In particular, DET and ATL
show significant and positive peer-effects in both model 1 and 2 while DEN shows a negative
but insignificant peer-effect in all cases.12 The insignificant results of DEN may be due to a
poorly specified model or it may truly tell us something about the nature of the different
teams. In particular the peer effects may be measures of “team chemistry," all things being
equal.
INEFFICIENCY: When we use cumulative efficiency for the outcome measure (Model 2), η
is significant for all three teams, which may be due to the fact that the cumulative measure
has lower overall variance, but the unexplained portion of the variance seems to be moved
into the inefficiency term, increasing the signal to noise ratio (decreasing η). For DET, Model
1 produces an insignificant η equal to 16.2392, but in Model 2 it is 2.3223 and significant.
In general the η estimate is relatively large across teams and models, implying that there
appears to be little player inefficiency in the data. When this turns out to be true, HLP may
be the preferred specification.13
COACHING EFFECT: In all cases, selection has no effect on outcomes. That is, α is always
insignificant. First, the production function and the selection equation used in this application
may simply be incorrect. The data may require a more sophisticated modeling approach
or richer data. Second, the optimization rule for coaching may not be to just minimize
instantaneous player inefficiency. Coaches may behave more strategically than our simple
model may allow. Third, we conducted a brief simulation study and found that is some cases
α is only weakly identified, which may explain the very small values of the estimates. When
there is no selection effect on the outcome equation, our model reduces to the exponential
12A sufficient condition for stationarity is that the peer-effects should be on the unit circle.
13As we used the 3 step approach with CML for the second step, the results for the first and the second
step between HLP and our model are the same. The estimation results using HLP model on this data can be
obtained by request.
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normal model of Aigner et al. (1977).14
1.4 Conclusions
We consider a stochastic production function model that extends the basic normal-exponential
model of Aigner et al. (1977) to incorporate worker peer-effect networks and managerial
selection that works through a time-varying worker inefficiency term. In this setting we have
allowed for correlation between the outcome and selection equations, using a Gumbel Type I
bivariate exponential distribution for the inefficiency component of the outcome equation
and the selection equation error. Our model is an improvement over the HLP model in the
sense that the one-sided selection error restricts the manager to worker networks that will
only decrease worker inefficiency and improve individual worker productivity. Managerial
selections can only increase output in our model, which is a theoretically appealing restriction.
One downside of the model is that the Pearson correlation between the outcome and the
selection equation cannot be too large, otherwise the model is not identified. However, this
is the cost we incur for adding a third variance parameter, α, to the already complicated
stochastic frontier model. In addition to presenting the theoretical model we detailed two
estimation approaches that are similar in spirit to those of HLP.
We apply the model to estimate peer-effects for three NBA teams from the 2015-16 regular
season. Our results were mixed, with some instability in the likelihood function. Nonetheless
some of the results, particularly on the peer-effects, are compelling. In our example, we limited
ourselves to the production function specification and network topology for college basketball
considered in HLP, except we selected a sightly different measure for player efficiency. This
may partly explain why our results were unstable: the NBA is a different game than the
14Using λˆ and βˆ1 from CML, we estimated the ALS-EN for β2, η, and σv and found that the estimates are
(almost) identical between the two models. The standard errors for those parameters calculated from the two
models are not that different except for η, which is due to the Murphy and Topel correction employed on
the variance-covariance matrix of our model (The standard error for η from our model is two or three times
bigger than the one from ALS-EN).
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NCAA, so perhaps future work should consider other specifications of and topologies in the
production function. Both the HLP model and the present model treat the strategy of the
opposing coach as exogenous (as measured by the opposing teams exogenous RPI). In most
network industries it may be reasonable to suspect the productive behavior of competitors
to be exogenous, but certainly not in sports where strategic reactions are commonplace.
Developing network production models that endogenize the strategy of the opposing team
would be an important contribution for researchers interested in the productivity of athletes
in competitive team sports. This is currently being explored by the authors.
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Chapter 2
Network Competition and Team Chemistry in
the NBA
We consider a heterogeneous social interaction model where agents interact with peers within
their own network but also interact with agents across other (non-peer) networks. To address
potential endogeneity in the networks, we assume that each network has a central planner
who makes strategic network decisions based on observable and unobservable characteristics
of the agents in her charge. The model forms a simultaneous equation system that can be
estimated by Quasi-Maximum Likelihood or Generalized Method of Moments. We apply a
restricted version of our model to data on NBA games, where agents are players, networks
are individual teams organized by coaches, and at any time a player only interacts with two
networks: their team and the opposing team. We find significant positive peer-effects (team
chemistry) in NBA games.
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2.1 Introduction
We consider a world with R independent networks where agents interact with peers within
their own network but also interact with non-peers from other networks, but in different ways.
For example, we can think of teams of individual agents that cooperate within their network
but compete across networks. Competition between two or more firm R&D alliances comes
to mind. A given firm may cooperate with an R&D ally to achieve an intellectual property
discovery, but firms across alliances compete. Airline alliances (e.g., SkyTeam, Star Alliance
and OneWorld) cooperate within their networks but compete across networks. In these
examples, multiple networks or teams may simultaneously compete, but in some instances,
such as sports, team competition is head-to-head. We restrict attention to models where an
agent’s single outcome (e.g., sales performance) is a function of the simultaneous outcomes
of their peers and competitors. In particular, we are not concerned with the case of Liu
(2014) or Cohen-Cole et al. (2017), where there is a single peer network (no competitors) with
multiple outcome variables (e.g., a single network of friends each of whom allocates effort to
simultaneous outcomes, such as labor and leisure hours). In the aforementioned examples,
within-network interaction is complementary and cross-network interaction is competitive;
however, our model allows for the converse to be true. For example, in sports competition a
team’s performance may be worsened or enhanced when they face a better team.
In these examples, social interaction decisions are likely to be guided by a central planner
for each network (e.g., a sales mananger), and the choices of the planner may induce what
Manski (1993) calls a correlated effect, where “individuals in the same group tend to behave
similarly because they... face similar institutional environments." The usual solution to the
correlated effects problem is to include a network-level fixed or random effect in the model
specification. However, if the network consists of labor inputs to a production process, then
the network itself may be endogenous in the same way that any production input may be
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simultaneously (and strategically) selected with output in a manager’s profit maximization
problem (Olley and Pakes, 1996). Following Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016), we augment
the outcome equation with a selection equation that models the decisions of the central
planners’ network choices. We consider both parametric (Lee, 1983) and semi-parametric
(Dahl, 2002) approaches to the selection problem. Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) consider
a network production function where a manager selects workers into a network to produce
output, but they ignore cross-network competition. In this sense, our paper is a generalization
of their study.
Social network interactions1 have been studied extensively in recent decades; however, si-
multaneous cross-network interactions remain relatively unexplored. A few papers model
simultaneous activity for a single network, and are multivariate extensions of the single equa-
tion Spatial Auto-Regressive (SAR) model of Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981) to simultaneously
determined outcome variables. For example, Kelejian and Prucha (2004) generalize the SAR
model to a simultaneous system. Baltagi and Deng (2015) extend the model to a panel
setting with random effects, while Cohen et al. (2017) extend it to a simultaneous system
with fixed effects. Yang and Lee (2017) study identification and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
(QLM) estimation of the model of Kelejian and Prucha (2004). Empirical implementation
of these types of simultaneous models include the effect of peer networks on migration and
housing prices (Jeanty et al., 2010); on migration, employment and income (Gebremariam
et al., 2011); on rents for studio, one-bedroom and two-bedroom apartments (Baltagi and
Bresson, 2011); on simultaneous fiscal policies (Allers and Elhorst, 2011); among others. All
these models are clearly related, but they don’t consider multiple peer networks that may be
engaged in simultaneous competition around a single outcome variable.
Aside from the applied econometric contributions mentioned above, another contribution of
the study is empirical in nature. We apply our model to the 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16
1See Manski (1993), Moffitt (2001), Lee (2007a), and Bramoulle et al (2009)
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NBA regular seasons to estimate within-network and cross-network peer-effects for each team
in the league. Team chemistry (team peer-effects) receives substantial attention as a factor
influencing team performance in business and sports. Unfortunately, the concept is notoriously
difficult to measure. Schrage (2014) discusses team chemistry measurement as ?the new holy
grail of performance analytics? in sport and business. McCaffery and Bickart (2013) estimate
team chemistry as a function of biological synchrony among players, and Kraus, Huang, and
Keltner (2010) find evidence that early-season, on-court tactile communication is a predictor
of later-season success at both the individual and team levels. Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini
(2016) develop a network production function model that estimates peer (on-court teammate)
network effects upon player productivity in men’s college basketball. Due to data limitations,
their peer-effects do not condition upon (confounding) effects from the network of on-court
competitors. The absence of competitor effects in their model introduces omitted variable bias,
and their peer-effects do not constitute (ceteris paribus) estimates of team-level chemistry.
We extend their peer-effect model to account for the strategic decisions and contemporaneous
play of the opposing team by augmenting it with a competitor network, leading to estimation
of a team’s “competitor-effect" in addition to its peer-effect. The interpretation of the team-
level peer-effect is the same, but, in our model, the effect conditions on both teams’ strategies
and abilities, making for a more reliable team-chemistry measure. We find that peer-effects
are generally positive for NBA teams and are moderately persistent across team-season but
that negative peer-effects occur.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econometric
specification and the estimation approaches, Section 3 provides the result of the empirical
exercise and Section 4 concludes.
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2.2 Model and estimation
2.2.1 Econometric model
Outcome funct i on : We have R networks (alliances, chains or teams), and each
network, r = 1, ..., R contains nr peers with N =
∑
r nr . Peers cooperate within their own
network but compete with members of the other networks. The time period, t, is suppressed
here. In the model that follows, all the data, weighting matrices, and the error term vary
with time, and all the parameters do not. The outcome function for the r th network is:
yr = λrrWrryr +
∑
k 6=i
λrkWrkyk + xrβr + ur , r = 1, ..., R, (2.1)
where yr is an nr ×1 outcome vector for the r th network, xr is a nr ×p exogenous input matrix,
and ur is an nr × 1 disturbance vector. Wrr is an nr × nr weight matrix for interaction within
the r th network, while Wrk for k 6= r is a nr × nk matrix for the effect from the k th network
to the r th network. We assume the matrices have network structure and are row-normalized,
so that λrr is the average within-network effect for the r th network, and λrk is the average
cross-network effect for k 6= r to the r th network. The term βr represents a vector of input
coefficients for the r th network. The existing literature assumes that λrk = 0 for all k 6= r 2.
We allow the within-network and cross-network effects to be positive or negative, but for
convenience we will refer to Wrr as the peer network and Wrk as the competitor network.
There are other interpretations of the model. For example, we can think of the index r as
representing distinct markets, where the networks might compete. If λrk 6= 0 for all r , k , then
all networks compete in all markets. If any network r does not compete in market k 6= r ,
then λrk = 0. In our application to the NBA, networks are individual teams, and in any
game there are only ever two networks at a time on the right-hand side of the model: the
2When λrk = 0 for all k 6= r , the model reduces to the Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) model.
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peer network and the opposing teams network. We can also think of the model being for a
single firm with different simultaneous projects r = 1, ..., R . In this case, there might only be
one manager making decisions for each project (network), but that presents no additional
difficulties in what follows.
Then, the outcome function of the system of R equations in a matrix form is
Y =
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrkGrkY + XB + U (2.2)
where Y = (y ′1, ..., y
′
R)
′
, X = Diag(x
′
1, ..., x
′
R)
′
, U = (u
′
1, ..., u
′
R)
′ and B = (β ′1, ..., β
′
R)
′ . Grk
is an N × N block matrix with R row blocks and R column blocks. The blocks in Grk are
all blocks of zeros except for r th row block in the k th column block position, which equals
Wrk . For example, if there are R = 2 networks, then G11 =
[
W11 0
0 0
]
, G22 =
[
0 0
0 W22
]
, G12 =[
0 W12
0 0
]
, and G21 =
[
0 0
W21 0
]
where 0 is a conformable matrix of zeros. If all the networks are
the same size nr = n, then Grk = grk ⊗Wrk , where grk is an R × R matrix of zeros except for
a ‘1’ in the r th row and k thcolumn. In our NBA application, all the networks are the same
size (5 × 5) with each row representing an active player. This representation is similar to
the higher-order SAR model of Lee and Liu (2010) but without autoregressive errors. We
assume that I −∑Rr=1∑Rk=1 λrkGrk is invertible so that the model is in equilibrium. Then,
the reduced form of equation (2.2) is Y = (I −∑Rr=1∑Rk=1 λrkGrk)−1(XB + U).
The model forms a simultaneous SAR equation system (or network model with heterogeneous
interaction effects) where the simultaneities are coming not only from the peer network but
also from the competitor networks. Therefore, this model can be viewed as an extension of a
single equation SAR model to a simultaneous system of multiple SAR equation models. Similar
simultaneous models exist in the literature, but these models are meant for simultaneous
outcome variables, rather than for a single outcome variable with simultaneous networks
in a competitive setting. Kelejian and Prucha (2004) generalize the single equation SAR
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model due to Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981) to a system of spatially interrelated cross sectional
equations, and they consider two stage least square (2SLS) and three stage least square (3SLS)
estimation methods. Baltagi and Deng (2015) extend their model to a panel setting with
random effects, while Cohen et al. (2017) extend it to a simultaneous equation network model
with network fixed effects. They both consider 3SLS to estimate their models. Yang and Lee
(2017) study identification and QML estimation for the model of Kelejian and Prucha (2004).
All of these models focus on the cases where the cross interaction effects work through a single
network or non-network structure, while our model contains R2 different network matrices,
allowing for a rich set of heterogeneous network interactions.3 For empirical studies using the
simultaneous SAR model, see Jeanty et al. (2010), Gebremariam et al. (2011), Baltagi and
Bresson (2011), or Allers and Elhorst (2011).
Horrace et al. (2016) considers a single-equation version of this model where R = 1, implying
no cross-network interactions. To understand the effect of ignoring the cross-networks, suppose
that the correct model has R = 2, but we estimate the R = 1 model. For simplicity, assume
that λ11 = λ22 = λ1, λ12 = λ21 = λ2, β1 = β2 = β, and let G ∗1 = G11 + G22, and G ∗2 = G12 +
G21. Suppose we assume that E (U|{Grk}, X ) = 0. Consider estimating the model omitting the
cross network effects using 2SLS with a set of instrumental variables Z = [G ∗1 X , X ] without
G ∗2 X . Then, θˆ = (λˆ1, βˆ)
′
= (M
′
PZM)
−1M
′
PZY where M = [G ∗1 Y , X ] and PZ = Z (Z
′
Z )−1Z
′ .
As the true model is Y = Mθ + λ2G ∗2 Y + U, we have θˆ = θ + (M
′
PZM)
−1M
′
PZ(λ2G
∗
2 Y +
U). So θˆ − θ = limN_∞(M¯ ′PZM¯)−1M¯ ′PZλ2G ∗2
(
I −∑2i=1 λiG ∗i )−1Xβ where M¯ = [G1(I −∑2
i=1 λiGi
)−1
Xβ, X ]. Therefore, as long as β 6= 0 and λ2 6= 0, the λ1 and β will be estimated
inconsistently.
3Kelejian and Prucha (2004) include a footnote that their model can be generalized to the case with
simultaneous weight matrices which are unique to each variable, however, this is still more restrictive than
our network interaction specification. Baltagi and Deng (2015) use two different weighting matrices for each
variable, but they don’t have the cross-network effects.
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B ia s due to s trateg i c i n t eract i on s : Our model has endogenous vari-
ables, Y on the right hand-side, which will be handled by standard spatial econometrics
techniques. In addition to this source of endogeneity, the managers’ strategic actions may
be correlated with the outcome. If this is the case, E (U|{Grk}, X ) 6= 0 in equation (2.2). To
address this issue, we set up a static game to formulate and correct the bias.4 We follow and
adapt the basic methodologies in the game theory literature for static games of incomplete
information with multiple equilibria. In particular, our arguments follow Bajari et al. (2010).5
Each network r has a network manager who takes actions from his finite and discrete choice
set of strategies, A = (1, ..., s, ...), on behalf of their members, and their decisions are based
on two types of state variables, (Z , er), where Z is a vector of observable state variables (i.e.,
market characteristics) which are common to all the networks, and er = (er(1), ..., er(s), ...)
is r ’s unobservable action-specific state variable.6 The game proceeds as follows: First, the
state variables, (Z , {er}Rr=1), are realized. Then, the network managers simultaneously choose
their actions from their choice set. Under the chosen action, networks produce single outcome,
Y .
Let the r th network manager’s additively separable payoff function be pir(sr , s−r , Z , er(s)) =
pi0r (sr , s−r , Z ) + er(s), where s−r = (s1, ..., sr−1, sr+1, ..., sR), the collection of all the network
managers’ decisions except r . We assume error terms {er(s)}Rr=1 are distributed iid across s
and network r with distributions {Ger (·)}Rr=1. We assume that Z , {pi0r (·)}Rr=1 and {Ger (·)}Rr=1
are common knowledge to the managers while the {er(s)} are private information. Then,
we can define r ’s information set as ηr = {Z , er , {pi0r (·)}Rr=1, {Ger (·)}Rr=1} and r ’s decision as
ρr(·) : ηr _ A. Under these settings, the conditional choice probability (CCP) of r choosing
4There may be other econometric remedies to address the endogeneity issue. Recently, two categories of
methodologies have been proposed to address the endogeneity in formation of spatial or network links: One is
(Bayesian) One step Full information approach by Goldsmith and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2016),
and the other is Multiple step Control Function approach by Qu and Lee (2015) and Horrace et al. (2016).
5Generalizing the following model to a dynamic game is left for future research.
6Time period, t, is suppressed here. Follow Bajari et al. (2010), without loss of generality we assume that
the strategies of the network managers are the same
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s ∈ A at a given realization of the Z is given by
δr(s|Z ) =
∫
1{ρr(ηr) = s}dGer (er) (2.3)
which can be interpreted as the beliefs formed by r ’s opponents regarding r ’s decision. Since
network manager r does not know the other managers’ decisions at the time of her decision,
her strategy is based on her expected payoff
piexr (s, Z , er(s)) =
∑
s−r
∏
k 6=r
δk(sk |Z )pir(s, s−r , Z ) + er(s) = ϕ(s, Z ) + er(s) (2.4)
We can see that the expected payoff function is similar to the standard random utility model.
The only difference is that the probability distributions over other managers’ actions are
affecting manager r ’s utility. Then, it is straightforward that s will be chosen for a given
realization of Z if only if
piexr (s, Z , er(s)) > max
s
′ 6=s
piexr (s
′
, Z , er(s
′
))⇔ ϕ(s, Z ) + er(s) > max
s
′ 6=s
ϕ(s
′
, Z ) + er(s
′
) (2.5)
for s, s ′ ∈ A. It follows immediately that δr(s|Z ) = Pr (maxs′ 6=s ϕ(s ′, Z )− ϕ(s, Z ) + er(s ′)−
er(s) < 0) in equilibrium (e.g. Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium).7
Formulation of the selection bias: We formulate the bias by assuming the error terms,
(ur , er), from the outcome equation and the payoff function (respectively) are statistically
dependent, a standard approach. If there’s a correlation between the two errors, the expectation
of ur conditional on the choice of strategy, s will not have a zero mean; that is,
E (ur |s) = E (ui |max
s
′ 6=si
ϕ(s
′
, Z )− ϕ(s, Z ) + er(s ′)− er(s) < 0) 6= 0 (2.6)
7In the game literature the focus is often to estimate the payoff function, and doing so requires additional
structure be imposed on the function. However, this is not the focus here, so additional structure is not
necessary.
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This correlation may exist when the two errors contain a common component, unobserved by
the econometrician (e.g., a network-strategy specific fixed effect in the outcome equation and
the strategy selection equation).
The bias in the outcome equation can be expressed parametrically or semi-parametrically
following Lee (1983) or Dahl (2002).
1. Lee’s approach: From (2.5), we see that strategy s will be chosen by manager r if
only if ∗r < 0, where ∗r = maxs′ 6=si ϕ(s
′
, Z ) − ϕ(s, Z ) + er(s ′) − er(s). ∗r is a new
random variable with a distribution of Fr . Following Lee (1983) and Horrace, Liu,
and Patacchini (2016), we can reduce the dimensionality of Fr by the transformation
Jr(·) ≡ Φ−1(Fr(·)), where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal CDF. Then, Jr(∗r )
becomes a standard normal random variable. For notational simplicity, let Jr(∗r ) ≡ r .
We further assume r and ur ,i for i = 1, ..., nr are i .i .d with a joint normal distribution,ur ,i
i
 = N (
0
0
,
 σ2u σ12
σ12 1
),
where ur ,i is the i th element of the vector ur . Then it can be shown that
E (ur |s) = E (ur |r < Jr(0), Z ) = −σ12φ(Φ
−1δr(s|Z ))
δr(s|Z ) ιnr (2.7)
where δr(sr |Z ) is the selection probability from (2.3) and ιnr is an nr -dimensional vector
of 1’s.
2. Dahl’s approach: Without a parametric distributional assumption on ur and r , we
make the index sufficiency assumption of Dahl (2002) such that
h(r , ur |{ϕ(s, Z )}s∈A) = h(r , ur |δr(s|Z )) (2.8)
where h(·, ·) is some bivariate distribution for ur and r . As Dahl points out, this
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assumes that the selection probability δr(s|Z ) exhausts all the information about the
behaviors of the two errors. Then, the bias will be given by E (ur |s) = ψr(δr(s|Z )),
where ψr(·) is an unknown function that can be estimated nonparametrically.
With these approaches, we can identify the bias in the outcome equation by rewriting (2.1)
as
yr = λrrWrryr +
∑
k 6=r
λr ,kWr ,kyk + xrβr + ar ιnr + u
∗
r (2.9)
where ar ιnr = E (ur |s) are network specific fixed-effects due to the strategic actions of the
network managers, and u∗r = ur −E (ur |s) with zero mean by construction, so the endogeneity
disappears in the outcome equations conditional on ar .8
2.2.2 Estimation
We have shown that the strategic bias can be reduced to a network specific fixed effect. If
our primary interest is just to estimate network effects, it is sufficient to use the within
transformation around each network to remove the network specific fixed effects, and, then,
apply QML or GMM to estimate the model. We will illustrate this case in this section.
However, if there are network invariant regressors (e.g., network specific characteristic) and
we are also interested in estimating the strategic bias, we have to consider one more step
as the within transformation eliminates them in the first step. We will briefly discuss the
estimation procedure for this case at the end of this section.9
Here, we focus on QML to estimate the model and provide a sketch of the GMM method
using the R = 2 networks case in the Appendix B.10 After accounting for the strategic bias,
8The conceptual foundations for correcting endogeneity in this way for a social interactions model can be
traced to a series of papers by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002, 2006).
9In our NBA application, we only estimate network peer-effects and marginal effects for network varying
regressors.
10One may also consider GS2SLS or GS3SLS to estimate the models (Kelejian and Prucha, 2004; Lee, 2003).
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the complete system is
Y =
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrkGrkY + XB + A + U
∗ (2.10)
where A = (a1ι
′
n1
, ..., aRι
′
nR
)
′ and U∗ = (u∗′1 , ..., u∗
′
R )
′ . To remove the bias term A and avoid
the incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948), we transform with projector
JQ = Diag(Q1, ..., QR) where Qr for r = 1, ..., R is the within transformation matrix,
Qr = Inr − 1nr ιnr ι
′
nr
. Then, as Qr ιnr = 0 and Qru∗r = Qrur , we have
JQY = JQ
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrkGrkY + JQXB + JQU (2.11)
Extensive study of identification conditions for network models and multivariate SAR models
can be found in Bramoulle et al (2009), Cohen et al (2017) and Yang and Lee (2017). In
Appendix B, we discuss identification conditions for (2.11). The identification condition will
be generally satisfied because we have multiple sets of network matrices and exogenous
regressors from each group, which produces enough variation to identify the coefficients in
our model.
We assume that each element ur ,i for i = 1, ..., nr is iid(0,σ2r ).11 We note that the disturbances,
Qrur , in (2.11) are linearly dependent because the variance matrix σ2r Qr is singular. Following
Lee et al. (2010a), we consider an equivalent but more effective transformation which
can eliminate the network fixed-effects while maintaining interdependency between the
However, in spite of the simplicity of the 2SLS methods, they have some limitations. As discussed in Lee (2001a)
and Lee (2007b), 2SLS and 3SLS are inefficient relative to the MLE, and also 2SLS may not be applicable
when all the exogenous regressors in a model are really irrelevant in explaining the endogenous variables. For
these reasons, we consider the QML and the GMM to estimate our models, which are computationally more
challenging but more efficient than the others because they exploit not only linear but also quadratic moment
conditions. This is especially effective when the linear moment conditions are weak (Lee et al, 2010b; Liu
and Lee, 2010). The two methods have different advantages: QML is most efficient when the error term is
normally distributed, but we have to determine the parameter space for the spatial interdependency, which
could be quite complex, and we have to evaluate the Jacobian determinant in the log-likelihood, which could
be intensive when the network matrices are dense. GMM, on the other hand, is generally less efficient than
the MLE but does not involve the problems.
11If we assume non-normality for the error terms, then MLE is Quasi-MLE
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disturbances. Let the orthonormal matrix of Qr be [Pr , ιnr/
√
nr ]. The columns in Pr are
eigenvectors of Qr corresponding to the eigenvalue one, such that P
′
r ιnr = 0, P
′
rPr = Inr−1 and
PrP
′
r = Qr . Then, premultiplying (2.10) by J
′
P = Diag(P
′
1, ..., P
′
R) leads to
J
′
PY = J
′
P
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrkGrkY + J
′
PXB + J
′
PU (2.12)
Let Y¯ = J ′PYm, X¯ = J
′
PX , U¯ = J
′
PU, G¯rk = J
′
PGrkJP . Due to J
′
PGrk = G¯rkJ
′
P ,12 then this
implies
Y¯ =
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrkG¯rkY¯ + X¯ B + U¯ (2.13)
Note that u¯r for r = 1, ..., R is now u¯r ∼ (0,σ2r Inr−1). Therefore, the likelihood function13 is
ln L(Λ, B, Σ) =−
R∑
r=1
nr − 1
2
ln(2piσ2r ) + ln |S¯(Λ)| −
R∑
r=1
¯r(θr)
′
¯r(θr)
2σ2r
(2.14)
where Λ = (Λ′1, ..., Λ
′
R)
′ with Λr = (λr ,1, ...,λr ,R), Σ = (σ21, ..., σ2R), S¯(Λ) = I−
∑R
r=1
∑R
k=1 λrkG¯rk ,
and ¯r(θr) = y¯r −
∑R
k=1 λrkW¯rk y¯k − x¯rβr where θr = (Λr , βr), and W¯rk and x¯r are de-
fined similarly as in (2.13). From Lemma B.3.1 in the Appendix B, we show ln |S¯(Λ)| =
− ln f (Λ) + ln |S(Λ)| where S(Λ) = I −∑Rr=1∑Rk=1 λrkGrk and f (Λ) is some function of Λ.
For example, when R = 2, f (Λ) = (1 − λ11)(1 − λ22) − λ12λ21 and when R = 3, f (Λ) =
(1−λ11)(1−λ22)(1−λ33)− (1−λ11)λ23λ32− (1−λ22)λ13λ31− (1−λ33)λ21λ12−λ13λ21λ32.
Using this result, we can evaluate the likelihood without Pr as
ln L(Λ, B, Σ) =−
R∑
r=1
nr − 1
2
ln(2piσ2r )− ln f (Λ) + ln |S(Λ)| −
R∑
r=1

′
r(θr)Qr r(θr)
2σ2r
(2.15)
where r(θr) = yr −
∑R
k=1 λrkWrkyk − xrβr . There are two things to note here. First, we need
to restrict the parameter space for Λ to guarantee that |S(Λ)| and f (Λ) are strictly positive so
12G¯rkJ
′
P = J
′
PGrkJQ = J
′
PGrk(I − diag(ιn1ι
′
n1
/n1, ..., ιnR ι
′
nR
/nR)) = J
′
PGrk because Grk is row-normalized so
J
′
PGrkdiag(ιn1ι
′
n1
/n1, ..., ιnR ι
′
nR
/nR) = 0.
13The likelihood is conditional likelihood because it is conditional on the sufficient statistic, the mean of yr .
Lee (2007a).
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that the likelihood is well defined. From Lee and Liu (2010), the parameter space for |S(Λ)|
is strictly positive, when
∑R
r=1
∑R
k=1 |λrk | < 1, as our network matrices are row-normalized.
However, Elhorst, Lacombe and Piras (2012) argue that this may be too restrictive, and
suggest a stationary-region search methodology for Λ that is potentially less so, while ensuring
a well-defined likelihood function. Second, it may be difficult to evaluate |S(Λ)|. The Ord
(1975) eigenvalue device may used to compute the determinant; however, it may only work
when the number of networks is small and all the network matrices are sparse. If the number
of networks is large, then GMM may be preferred to QML, as it avoids the computational
difficulties of evaluating the determinant.
To simplify estimation, we concentrate out B and Σ in (17). The QMLE of βr and σ2r , given
Λr is βˆr(Λr) = (x
′
rQrxr)
−1x
′
rQrµr(Λr) where µr(Λr) = yr −
∑R
k=1 λrkWrkyk , and
σˆr
2(Λr) =

′
r(θr)Qr r(θr)
nr − 1 =
µr(Λr)
′
[Qr −Qrxr(x ′rQrxr)−1x ′rQr ]µr(Λr)
nr − 1 .
(2.16)
Then the concentrated log-likelihood function in Λ is
ln Lc(Λ) = −
R∑
r=1
nr − 1
2
[ln(2pi) + 1]− ln f (Λ) + ln |S(Λ)| −
R∑
r=1
nr − 1
2
ln σˆr
2(Λr) (2.17)
Then the QMLE, Λˆ, is the maximizer of the likelihood, and the QMLE of B and Σ are βˆr(Λˆr)
and σˆr 2(Λˆr) for r = 1, ..., R, respectively. The asymptotic distribution for these estimators
can be derived from Lee et al. (2010a, Appendix B) with appropriate modifications.
Estimation of the strategic bias
The most disaggregate level of variability in this model is the individual worker-level, i =
1, ..., nr , and this is the variability that ultimately identifies the peer and competitor effects,
λrk . However, there may be columns in xr that vary at the network level (or higher), and
these columns will necessarily be eliminated by the within-network transformation of the
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data. If we are only interested in estimating the peer- and competitor-effects, this will be
fine.14 However, if we are interested in estimating the strategic bias caused by the network
managers (and the coefficients on network-varying exogenous variables), we need to consider
one more step as follows:
1. Estimate the selection probability δˆr(s|Z ) for i = r , ..., R using a nonparametric or
parametric model (kernel smoothing, local polynomial regression, or the logit model).15
2. Using Λˆ and Bˆ from (2.15), compute the residual υˆr = ι
′
nr
(yr−
∑R
k=1 λˆrkWrkyk−xr βˆr)/nr
for r = 1, ..., R. Let βr ,2 ⊆ βr be the coefficients on network-level varying regressors,
xr ,2 ⊆ xr . Then the bias and βr ,2 can be estimated from the OLS regression υˆr =
xr ,2βr ,2 +µ(δˆi ,m(s|Z)))+ξr where ξr is an i .i .d . error term and µ(δˆr(s|Z ))) is either given
by −σ12 φ(Φ−1(δˆr (s|Z)))δˆr (s|Z)) (Lee’s approach) or some nonparametric, single-index formulation
(based on Dahl’s approach). See Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) for an explanation
of Dahl’s approach in this context.
2.3 Empirical application
2.3.1 Empirical model and variables
In this section, we apply our network competition model to NBA data for 30 teams over
the 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-2016 regular seasons. The primitive play-by-play data were
purchased and downloaded from BigDataBall.com. We then formatted the data to the player-
period level, where a period represents any contiguous game period in which the same ten
players are on the court. This formatting is similar to that done in the calculation of the
player statistic real plus minus. We tabulate player box-score data to obtain wins produced
(see, e.g., Berri, 1999) at the time-period level. The league plays 1,230 regular-season games
14This is our approach in the empirical exercise in the next section.
15Alternatively, we can simply use the cell statistics discussed in Dahl (2002).
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per season (41 home games for each of 30 teams per regular season). Therefore, our data spans
3,690 regular-season games, consisting of roughly 30 time periods per game. This produces
112,204 time periods in which we observe the play of 10 players i at a time, producing a total
of 1,122,040 observations. In each game a coach typically has 15 players to fill a network of
five players at a time.16 Following Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016), we drop time periods
less than 30 seconds and overtime periods. This results in 83,334 time periods for the league,
which is equivalent to an average of about 926 periods per team-season.
Our outcome variable is wins produced, a continuous weighted average of individual player
offensive and defensive statistics that will be defined in what follows. Wins produced is highly
predictive of team success and is separable (i.e., measurable at the individual level). The
variable is a version of the outcome variable in Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) but with
different weights on the component statistics in the weighted average, as we shall see. We
calculate this outcome variable for each player in each period of the data. Overall, our data
and specification are designed to mimic the Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) analysis of
the Syracuse Men’s Basketball team.
PRODUCTION FUNCTION: With thirty teams in the league, there is scope for estimating
302 peer- and competitor-effects in our model. Unfortunately, the number of games between a
given pair of teams is small (three or four at maximum), so there is not enough head-to-head
data to estimate this many parameters. Consequently, we assume a given team’s cross-network
competitor-effects from the 29 other teams are the same. That is, for team r , λrk = λr for
k 6= r . Conceptually, our restriction on the cross-network competitor-effects is equivalent to
team r playing a season long game against all the other teams in the league, consisting of
subgames against individual teams (and coaches), and where at the end of each subgame, the
outcome variable, yrt is set to zero for each player. In other words, team r has a representative
16Understanding the effect of player injuries (or player ineligibility) on the coaches’ decisions is left for
future research. Sports injuries are analogous to worker absenteeism.
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opponent, k , and opposing teams take turns being that representative opponent. Consequently,
interpretation of the competitor-effect will be challenging, so we focus the analysis on the
within-network effects. The unique structure of competition in this setting, requires slightly
different notation than the more general model. The production function for team r and k in
period t of game s is
yrts = λrrWrrtsyrts + λrWrktsykts + xrtsβr + urts
ykts = λkkWkktsykts + λkWkrtsyrts + xktsβk + ukts
(2.18)
where yrts and ykts are the 5 × 1 outcome vector of team r ’s and team k ’s chosen lineup
in period t of game s, respectively, and Wrrts and Wkkts are the 5 × 5 zero diagonal and
row-normalized matrices for the within-network interactions, and Wrkts and Wkrts are similarly
defined matrices for cross-network interactions. The xrts and xkts are matrices of the player-
varying exogenous variables for team r and k ’s lineup in period t of game s , respectively.17.
The urts and ukts are 5 × 1 error term vectors, in which each element is assumed to be
iid N(0,σ2r ) and iid N(0,σ2k), respectively. Following the methodology in section 2.2.2, the
log-likelihood for the system of equations (2.18), denoted as ln Lts , is,
ln Lts =−
∑
h=r ,k
2 ln(2piσ2h)− ln fts + ln |Sts | −
∑
h=r ,k

′
hts(θh)Qhts(θh)
2σ2h
(2.19)
where fts = [(1− λrr)(1− λkk)− λrλk ], and Sts = I10− λrrGrrts − λrGrkts − λkGkrts − λkkGkkts
with Grrts =
[
Wrrts 0
0 0
]
, Grkts =
[
0 Wrkts
0 0
]
, Gkrts =
[
0 0
Wkrts 0
]
, Gkkts =
[
0 0
0 Wkkts
]
, Q = I5 − 15ι5ι
′
5,
rts(θr) = yrts − λrrWrrtsyrts − λrWrktsykts − xrtsβr with θr = (Λr , βr) and kts(θk) is given
similarly. The log-likelihood for entire season is just the sum of the likelihood in (2.19) over
all games, s , and time periods, t.
17As previously noted, the xrts may contain columns that vary at the network-level (or higher), but they
will be eliminated from the model with the within transformation. Their coefficients may be recovered in the
estimation of the coach’s strategic bias, but we ignore them in our analysis because we are only concerned
with estimating the peer- and competitor-effects, which are preserved under the within transformation.
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NETWORK: We use the same-type peer-effect weight matrix considered in Horrace, Liu, and
Patacchini (2016), where “types" are the player types: Guards or Forwards, with Forwards
including centers. That is, the same-type weight matrix is W , where W0 = [w0,ij ] is an
adjacency matrix with w0,ij = 1 if the i th and j th players are both guards or forwards. Then
row-normalize W0 so that W 1N = 1N . This network specification assumes that each individual
is affected only by the same type of agents in his network and the same type of agents from
opposing network (exclusion restrictions).18
For example, let’s assume the lineup for team r is [F , F , G , F , G ]′ and for team k is
[G , F , F , G , G ]
′ in period t of game s, where F=forward and G=guard; then, the network
matrices in equation (2.18) are given by
Wrrts =
 0
1
2
0 1
2
0
1
2
0 0 1
2
0
0 0 0 0 1
1
2
1
2
0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
, Wkkts =
 0 0 0
1
2
1
2
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1
2
0 0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
0
, Wrkts =

0 1
2
1
2
0 0
0 1
2
1
2
0 0
1
3
0 0 1
3
1
3
0 1
2
1
2
0 0
1
3
0 0 1
3
1
3
, Wkrts =

0 0 1
2
0 1
2
1
3
1
3
0 1
3
0
1
3
1
3
0 1
3
0
0 0 1
2
0 1
2
0 0 1
2
0 1
2

VARIABLES: We use the wins produced measure based on the work of sports economist David
Berri (Berri, 1999; Berri et al. 2006): yirts = (0.064∗3PTirts + 0.032∗2PTirts + 0.017∗FTirts +
0.034∗REBirts + 0.033∗STLirts + 0.020∗BLKirts−0.034∗MFGirts−0.015∗MFTirts−0.034∗
TOirts)/Minsirts , where 3PTirts , 2PTirts and FTirts are 3-point field goals made, 2-points field
goals made, and free throws made, respectively, REBirts is rebounds, STLirts is steals, BLKirts
is blocks, MFGirts is missed field goals, MFTirts is missed free throws, TOirts is turnovers,
and Minsirts is minutes played by player i of team r in period t of game s. Wins produced
per minute (or wins per minute) estimates a player’s marginal win productivity based upon
player-level variables related to team-winning. It represents a leading measure of NBA player
production.19 The player-varying exogenous input variables in the outcome equation (xrts) are
18Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) use both same- and cross-type weight matrices. The different-type
weight matrix is W d , where W d0 = [w0,ij ] is an adjacency matrix with w0,ij = 1 if the i th and j th players are a
guard and a forward (or vice versa). Then row-normalize W d0 so that W d1N = 1N . However, they noticed
that including both weight matrices into the model at the same time may lead to a multicollinearity problem.
Therefore, we only include the same type weight matrix in this exercise.
19See www.basketball-reference.com/about/bpm.html or wagesofwins.com/how-to-calculate-wins-produced/
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Experienceirts and Fatigueirts . Experienceirts is minutes played from the start of the game to
the end of period t-1, and Fatigueirts is minutes continuously played until the end of period t-1.
We also included player dummies to control for player-specific heterogeneity. The descriptive
statistics for the continuous variables are presented in the tables of Appendix B.
2.3.2 Estimation strategy
We estimated the model for each season after concentrating out B and Σ. However, optimizing
the entire log-likelihood with respect to 60 parameters for 30 teams at the same time may
not be efficient. So, we employed the estimation strategy below:
1. Preliminary estimation: We include the regressor for the cross team interaction,
such as Wrktsykts or Wkrtsyrts in (2.18), but do not account for the endogeneity from
the regressors. That is, we assume λr = λk = 0 in ln[(1 − λrr)(1 − λkk) − λrλk ] and
ln
∣∣I10 − λrrGrrts − λrGrkts − λkGkrts − λkkGkkts | of (2.19). Then, the entire log-likelihood
for 30 teams can be separated into each individual team’s log-likelihood.20 Then, we
can optimize each individual team’s log-likelihood separately to get initial estimates
for λhh and λh for h = 1, ..., 30. We denote the initial estimates as λˆprehh and λˆ
pre
h for
h = 1, ..., 30.
2. Updating: We update λˆprehh and λˆ
pre
h for h = 1, ..., 30 using the original entire log-
likelihood, but this update is carried out team-by-team. That is, we optimize the entire
log-likelihood w.r.t one of the teams’ Λ given all other teams’ Λ from the preliminary
estimation. We continue these updates from the first team to the last team (the order
for discussions of wins produced. The NBA scales this statistic to the game level by multiplying by 48 minutes
per game. It is typically reported at the player level but we report it the team level in Appendix B.
20If λr and λk are zero, it is obvious that ln
[
(1− λrr )(1− λkk)− λrλk
]
= ln(1− λrr ) + ln(1− λkk). This is
also true for ln
∣∣I10 − λrrGrrts − λrGrkts − λkGkrts − λkkGkkts | because it becomes a block diagonal matrix when
λr and λk are zero.
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is arbitrary).
3. Convergence: We iterate the set of updates for 30 teams until the difference in Λˆ
between two consecutive iterations is below some threshold.21
2.3.3 (Preliminary) Estimation results
We now present preliminary results, focusing only on the peer-effect estimates. (Estimation
results for the complete system will be added in a subsequent revision.) Estimation results
for the outcome equation can be found in Appendix B. We summarize the main results on
team-level peer-effects in Table 2.1.
Peer-effects measure team chemistry conditional on strategies, abilities and opposition and do
not measure team quality. Like a talented shooter can play well even with sub-optimal shot
selection, a talented team can perform well even given low peer-effects. Table 2.1 contains the
ranked peer-effects for 30 NBA teams in each of three seasons. Bounded on the unit-circle,
a peer-effect close to 1 (−1) indicates good (poor) conditional team chemistry, as player
performance is positively (negatively) linked to average teammate performance. Consider the
results in Table 2.1 on the 2013-14 season, where Utah (UTA) had the largest peer-effect
of 0.045. That is, when the team’s average “wins produced" increases, the team gains an
additional 4.5% by virtue of its good chemistry, conditional on coaching strategy and other
environmental and performance variables. In this sense the peer-effect is like an output
multiplier, and teams with large positive values benefit from their own team chemistry. In
the 2013-14 season Utah had an average wins produced per minute of 0.0049 with a standard
deviation of 0.0248. (See Appendix B, Table B.1) The distribution of this is in Figure 2.1. This
is the distribution over active Utah players for all time periods in the 2013-14 season. Utah’s
2013-14 “wins produced" is highly variable with a small mean, as the team a) played in 1,820
21In our exercise, we use a criterion of ||Λˆ− Λˆ0||2 < 10−8 where Λˆ is an estimate for Λ from the current
iteration and Λˆ0 is the estimate from the previous iteration.
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Table 2.1: Ranked Peer-Effects Based on Wins Produced by Season
2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
Rank Team Peer-effect Team Peer-effect Team Peer-effect
1 UTA 0.045*** IND 0.054*** CHI 0.065***
2 BOS 0.044*** PHX 0.033** SAS 0.052***
3 PHX 0.041*** UTA 0.032*** MIN 0.049***
4 WAS 0.031** PHI 0.023* MIL 0.046***
5 IND 0.027** MIN 0.020* MEM 0.045***
6 MIN 0.026** CLE 0.018 ORL 0.037***
7 DAL 0.022* WAS 0.018 BKN 0.035***
8 OKC 0.021* LAC 0.017 DET 0.030**
9 SAS 0.021* ORL 0.014 SAC 0.028**
10 TOR 0.020* SAC 0.011 POR 0.027**
11 BKN 0.019 SAS 0.009 BOS 0.022*
12 CLE 0.018 MEM 0.008 TOR 0.020*
13 PHI 0.017 BKN 0.007 UTA 0.016
14 NOP 0.017 NOP 0.006 CLE 0.015
15 DET 0.015 DEN 0.002 HOU 0.014
16 MIL 0.014 TOR 0.002 CHA 0.011
17 LAL 0.013 CHA 0.001 ATL 0.008
18 NYK 0.009 DAL 0.001 PHX 0.004
19 DEN 0.009 MIL 0.001 LAL 0.001
20 GSW 0.007 ATL 0.000 WAS 0.000
21 MEM 0.006 HOU -0.001 NYK 0.000
22 CHA 0.004 LAL -0.002 OKC -0.002
23 SAC 0.000 POR -0.003 LAC -0.005
24 HOU -0.002 CHI -0.004 MIA -0.007
25 ORL -0.004 MIA -0.005 NOP -0.011
26 ATL -0.005 DET -0.006 PHI -0.014
27 LAC -0.009 OKC -0.007 GSW -0.014
28 POR -0.010 GSW -0.022** DAL -0.016
29 CHI -0.017 NYK -0.025** IND -0.017
30 MIA -0.019* BOS -0.026** DEN -0.028**
* - significant at the 1% level. ** - significant at the 5% level.
*** - significant at the 10% level.
sampled time periods (about twice the sample average for a team-season) with an average
duration of 1.8 minutes during the season and b) did not win many games overall. Over short
spans, player, time-period level wins produced can be highly variable and sometimes quite
small (non-pivotal) due to many zeros in the box score. This is reflected in the figure, where
46
Figure 2.1: Wins Produced per Minute per Player for Utah Jazz, 2013-14
there are modes at “wins produced" of about −0.02, 0 and 0.02. During this season, Houston
and San Antonio were tied for the highest average wins produced of 0.0071. Were Utah able
to increase its average per period “wins produced" by 0.0022 to that of Houston, Utah’s
team chemistry would produce a slightly larger increase of 0.0022 ∗ 1.045) = 0.0023 to a
wins produced of 0.0072, ceteris paribus. In Table 2.1, most team-seasons (64 of 90) exhibit
positive estimated peer-effects, but negative peer-effects occur. Median team peer-effects
for each season are .015,.002, and .014. Significantly positive (negative) peer effects occur
for 19 (4) of 90 team-seasons (at the 0.05 significance level). Peers may inhibit each other’s
marginal win product in the present environment. However, most of the teams do not exhibit
significant team chemistry. In 89 of 90 team-seasons, peer-effect estimates are smaller than
those of Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016) in their analysis of Syracuse University Men’s
college basketball. This prevailing difference between sample peer-effects could be due to
random variation, difference of environment, or specification of competitor-effects within the
present study. If it is due to competitor effects, then it seems that ignoring them causes the
peer-effect to be biased.
Despite roster turnover, several teams exhibit persistence in peer-effect across seasons. Min-
nesota held a significantly positive peer-effect for each of the three sampled seasons. Boston,
San Antonio, Utah, and Phoenix held significantly positive peer-effects in two seasons. Based
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on Spearman’s rho, the Western Conference exhibits greater peer-effects persistence from
season-to-season. If ρij is the rank correlation of peer-effects between season i and season j
for all teams in a conference, then the Western conference had significant (at the 95% level)
correlations of ρ12 = ρ23 = 0.404, while the same statistics for the Easter conference were
ρ12 = 0.332 and ρ23 = −0.289, significant at the 95% and 90% levels, respectively.
As Schrage (2014) suggests, team peer-effects are the “holy grail" of productivity analysis in
sports. As we have observed, the measurement of peer-effects requires accounting for player
productivity at the period level, while simultaneously controlling for the contributions of
other players. Explaining variation in peer-effects across team-season also presents a challenge.
Oliver (2004) develops a four-factor model of average scoring differential (between a team
and their opponents). In this model the factors most highly correlated with average scoring
differential are a team’s shooting efficiency differential (against opponents), turnover rate
differential, rebounding rate differential, and free throw rate differential. The model is highly
explanatory of average score margin differentials in the NBA, while maintaining very low
levels of right hand side variable dependence (Oliver, 2004). We calculated each of these four
factors for each team-season in the data, and found that there is a negative and significant
relationship between our estimated peer-effects and the free trow rate differential for each
team, conditional on the other factors and team fixed-effects. 22 Even in our moderately-
sized sample, there is evidence that a higher free throw rate differential is a moderately
strong indicator of weaker peer-effects. What is the potential mechanism generating this
relationship? Teams that generate a high free throw rate tend to shoot more contested shots
(e.g., isolation-penetration or post entry shots). A high rate of contested shots is often an
indication that a team does not rely heavily on rapid, frequent ball movement (e.g., “weak
side reversals" and “penetration kicks to the corner") to generate open shots. Ball movement
is intended (by its very nature) to generate peer-effects by allocating the ball away from the
defense and toward open (relatively high-percentage) shots.
22Results available by request.
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2.4 Conclusion
We estimate peer-effects using a network production model that controls for competitor-effects,
strategy and overall team play and find evidence of (generally positive) peer-effects (team
chemistry). In so doing, we generalize the work of Horrace, Liu, and Patacchini (2016), who
develop a network production function model that estimates peer (teammate) effects upon
player productivity in college basketball. Their peer-effects do not condition upon competitor
effects, introducing omitted variable bias. Generalizing their model, we account for strategic
decisions and contemporaneous play of opposing team via a competitor network. We apply
this model to a three-year sample of NBA regular season game data. We estimate NBA team
peer-effects conditioning on both teams’ strategies and abilities, rendering a more reliable
team-chemistry measure. While generally positive, we find examples of significantly negative
peer-effects among NBA teams. We also find that team chemistry tends to persist from
year-to-year and that a team’s peer-effect is negatively related to its free throw rate differential
(which is one of the four primary factors of score margin production in basketball), and we
conjecture that teams with higher free throw rate differentials tend to take more contested
shoots and are less likely to “find the open man." Based on this, it may be interesting to
develop peer-effect weighting schemes based on passing and ball sharing. To do this we could
develop statistics based on how often two individual players pass the ball to one another.
However, this is left for future research.
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Chapter 3
Adaptive LASSO for Stochastic Frontiter
Models with Many Efficient Firms
The LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996) is applied to select a subset of maximally efficient firms in the
fixed-effect stochastic frontier model for panel data of Schmidt and Sickles (1981). Asymptotic
properties of the estimator are derived in this context. Under regularity conditions the LASSO
estimator exhibits the oracle property, and simulations suggest that it outperforms the least
squares dummy variable estimator in terms of the root mean squared error of the estimated
firm-level inefficiencies. An application of the LASSO to rice farm data suggests that the
resulting subset of maximally efficient firms is comparable to the efficiency subsets calculated
from the same data in Horrace and Schmidt (2000).
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3.1 Introduction
Current estimators of the stochastic frontier (SF) model yield point estimates of firm-level
efficiency, which (when ranked) imply that a single firm in the sample is most efficient. That
is, SF model estimators do not allow for efficiency ties, yet there may be several firms in
the sample tied for most efficient, and we would like to develop techniques to allow for
this scenario. Current approaches adopt two-step methodologies to identifying a subset of
efficient firms. In the first step, firm-level efficiencies (or equivalent measures) are estimated,
and in the second step an inference technique or selection criterion is used to determine
membership in a subset of most efficient firms. For example, in the parametric SF model of
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), there have been several papers to construct parametric
prediction intervals for the conditional mean efficiency estimates based on Jondrow, Lovell,
Materov and Schmidt (JLMS, 1982). Horrace and Schmidt (1996), Simar and Wilson (2010),
and Wheat, Greene and Smith (2014) estimate JLMS efficiency and then construct univariate
intervals that imply statistical indistinguishability of firms with the largest estimates. Horrace
(2005a) and Flores-Lagunes, Horrace, and Schnier (2007) extend this to multivariate intervals
that account for the multiplicity inherent in the ranked estimates. Using these intervals, they
develop selection procedures that produce a subset of most efficient firms at a pre-specified
error rate. Horrace and Schmidt (2000) develop multivariate intervals for the semi-parametric
SF model of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) for panel data. Despite the semi-parametric model,
their inference technique relies on a parametric assumption on the distribution of estimated
efficiencies.
More recently, Kumbhakar, Parmeter and Tsionas (2013) propose a zero inefficiency stochastic
frontier (ZISF) model for cross sectional data that produces a subset of firms in the sample
that are fully efficient. They estimate the probability of a firm falling into the zero inefficiency
regime using a latent class model, then use the probability to adjust (shrink) the individual
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inefficiency estimates to reflect the presence of both efficient and inefficient firms in the
sample. Using the parameter estimates, they compute individual posterior estimates of the
probability of being fully efficient, and then, with a pre-specified cut-off, they assign each firm
to the fully efficient regime or the inefficient regime. Unfortunately, Rho and Schmidt (2015)
discuss an identification issue in this model. They point out that if there is little inefficiency in
the sampled firms, it is hard to distinguish whether this is due to small variance of individual
efficiencies or due to a large proportion of fully efficient firms, which leads to an observational
equivalence in the likelihood function and a lack of identification of the model. Moreover,
the ZISF model suffers from the same issues as the previously mentioned techniques; 1) it
is parametric and 2) it is a 2-step procedure. We would like to develop models that are
semi-parametric and identify a subset of efficient firms in a single step.
We propose a new one-step, semi-parametric procedure for identifying latent membership in
a subset of efficient firms using LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator,
Tibshirani, 1996).1 Specifically, we develop estimation procedures which identify a subset of
marginal effects and firm-level inefficiencies as exactly zero. The proposed adaptive LASSO
estimation proceeds as least squared dummy variable (LSDV) estimation, but the object
function is augmented with two penalty terms: the adaptively weighted shrinkage L1 penalties
for the input coefficients and for the firm-level inefficiencies.2 Here, we estimate and penalize
the inefficiency terms directly. However, we show that this is equivalent to estimating the
firm-level fixed effects and then penalizing their differences from the firm with the largest
effect in the sample. We also show the object function can be equivalently solved by ‘within’
1The LASSO has received much attention in the statistics literature. For example, Wang et al. (2007a)
consider its application to autoregression, Caner (2009) considers generalized methods of moments, Zhu et
al. (2010) consider its application to spatial autoregression, and Lee et al. (2016) consider the selection of
break points in time series. Recently in economics, the shrinkage technique is used in select valid and relevant
moments: Belloni et al (2012), Cheng and Liao (2015), and Caner et al (2016) among others.
2Lu and Su (2016) use the adaptive group LASSO technique to select regressors and factors in the
regression context. If our fixed effects model can be regarded as a special case of a factor error structure
model, then our model and the model in Lu and Su (2016) are closely related. Cheng et al. (2016) use the
LASSO to identify a break in the factor model where they selected a group of factor loadings generated due
to the break in factors, but their model is a pure factor model, and they uses the group LASSO method to
estimate the model.
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transformed versions of estimation. The within transformation eliminates the time-invariant
inefficiencies (and their associate fixed-effects), leading to a two-step revision of the LASSO
estimation.
Asymptotics are for the case (N, T ) _ ∞, where N is the number of firms and T is the
number of time periods in the sample. We show that the proposed estimator possess the
oracle property under regularity conditions. More precisely, the LASSO consistently selects
model coefficients as (N, T )_∞. Conditional on selection consistency, the estimates for the
selected marginal effects and the individual firm inefficiencies are
√
NT - and
√
T -consistent
(respectively) in our setting whereas the estimates from standard estimation procedures, like
LSDV, for common estimates are
√
NT - and
√
T/(log N)2-consistent (respectively) in the
same setting. The efficiency difference in the estimators is more pronounced in the estimation
of the common intercept (the maximum of the individual fixed effects): The LASSO estimator
shows
√
δ0NT consistency, where δ0 is the fixed proportion of fully efficient firms, while the
LSDV estimator exihbits
√
T/(log N)2 consistency.3 Therefore, the LASSO estimator of the
common intercept converges faster. Consequently, the LASSO may outperform LSDV (in
terms of root mean squared error of the estimated common intercept) even when T is small,
and this is borne out in our simulation study.
We apply the LASSO to Indonesian rice farm data previously analyzed by Erwidodo (1990),
and Horrace and Schmidt (1996, 2000) among others. The LASSO selects a subset of maximally
efficient rice farms that is comparable in size and composition to the Gupta subset of Horrace
3The LASSO estimate for the intercept is estimated as a common intercept of the firms categorized as
fully efficient by LASSO technique, so if we know the true model, we can use the δ0NT observations to
estimate the intercept (δ0 is a fixed parameter so it is not relevant when calculating convergence rates. We
intentionally leave it in the expression of the convergence rate for the common intercept to stress out the
role of δ in our estimation. In this case, we may redefine δ0N = Nδ and think Nδ grows proportionally to
N.) However, the convergence rate of the estimate for the intercept in the standard fixed effect SF model
can’t be established clearly because it relies on the maximum value of the estimated fixed effects to estimate
the intercept and the rate the maximum value converges to the true intercept should be determined by the
assumption for the distribution of the inefficiency. Park et al (1998) studies the asymptotic properties of the
estimator for the common intercept in LSDV and shows that it has the convergence rate of Op( logN√T +
1
N
) if a
inefficiency has a shifted half normal or exponential distribution.
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and Schmidt (2000). However, the LASSO does so without multivariate inference on the
efficiency estimates of 171 rice farms and without the distributional assumptions that it
entails.
The technique developed for SF models may be more broadly applicable. Whenever we
have a linear regression model with individual fixed effects, and the ranked fixed effects
contain important information, the LASSO may be applied to produce a subset of the best
(or worst) effects. For example, consider an education outcome function. After controlling
for other factors (i.e. family background and teacher quality), we may want to calculate a
group of the best or worst students based on their individual-specific outcomes. Mutual fund
performance may be another example. Practitioners may conveniently use the LASSO to
calculate subsets of the best funds, based on average returns. Moreover, this type of “best
and the rest" classification may be more important as dataset sizes grow (big data), because
group-level classification may be more useful than individual ranking, when the number of
comparisons is large.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
the adaptive LASSO estimator. Section 3 provides some technical assumptions and derives
the oracle property of the estimator. Section 4 discusses computational issues such as tuning
parameter selection and optimization algorithm. Section 5 and 6 provide simulation and
empirical application results, and section 7 concludes. All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
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3.2 Adaptive LASSO for many efficient firms
3.2.1 Production Function
The fixed effect SF panel data model with time-invariant technical inefficiency due to Schmidt
and Sickles (1984) is,
yit = α0 + x
′
itβ0 + vit − u0,i for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T (3.1)
where yit is the logarithm of scalar output of the i th firm in the tth period, α0 is a scalar
common intercept (common to all firms i), xit is a p×1 input vector, β0 is a p×1 corresponding
parameter vector of marginal effects, and vit is a two sided noise with vit ∼ iid(0,σ20,v) and
vit |= xit . The u0,i are time-invariant firm-specific inefficiencies, which are treated as fixed effects.
We assume ui ≥ 0 and independent of vit and the inputs, but do not impose a distributional
assumption on the inefficiency distribution. In matrix form the model is
Y = α0lNT + X1β0 − X2U0 + v (3.2)
where lNT is NT × 1 vector with ones, X1 = [x ′it ], and X2 = IN ⊗ lT .
Standard LSDV estimation (or equivalent within estimation) proceeds as follows. Rewrite
equation (3.1) as yit = α0,i + x
′
itβ0 + vit , where α0,i = α0− u0,i are firm-specific fixed-effects. If
[X1, X2] is full column rank, then all the parameters of the model are identified, and we regress
Y on X1 and X2 to get ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates βˆ0 and αˆ0,i , respectively. The
OLS estimates are consistent for β0 (as N or T _∞) and α0,i (as T _∞), respectively. Also,
αˆ0 = maxj αˆ0,j is consistent for the common intercept as N and T _∞ because minju0,j _ 0
and maxjα0,j _ α as N _ ∞ as long as the data generating process for u0,i allows u
arbitrarily close to zero with positive density (Greene, 1980; Schmidt and Sickles, 1984).
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The individual firm inefficiencies are accordingly consistently estimated by uˆ0,i = αˆ0 − αˆ0,i
(as N and T _∞). In this case, αˆ0 represents maximal output in the population, and the
individual uˆ0,i are interpretable as absolute inefficiencies.
In practice, there are many reasons why [X1, X2] may not be full column rank, but a leading
case is when X1 contains time-invariant regressors. If so, the marginal effects of time-invariant
regressors and the individual fixed-effects (and also the common intercept) are indecomposable
within the model, which leads to a fundamental identification problem. See Greene (2005)
and Feng and Horrace (2007) for detailed discussions about this issue and potential solutions.
Another interesting case to consider is when X1 contains indicator or categorical variables
that vary over t. If so, the point estimate of α0 will vary with the omitted reference groups
of the categorical variables, but the individual inefficiency estimates will not. In this case
the estimated common intercept still can serve as an instrument to identify the individual
firm-level inefficiencies,4 but the uˆ0,i has to be interpreted as relative efficiencies. In general, it
would take fortuitous circumstances for α0 to be identified, so uˆ0,i is almost always interpreted
as relative efficiency.
For the LASSO version of the fixed effect SF model in equation (3.1), we impose the following
sparsity assumption on θ0 = (α0, β
′
0, U
′
0)
′ .
Sparsity Assumption (i) β0 = (β
′
0,A, β
′
0,Ac )
′ and n(β0,A) = p0 < p = n(β0) where n(M) is
the number of elements in M, A = {j : θ0,j 6= 0} represents the index set for the nonzero
coefficients in θ0, and Ac = {j : θ0,j = 0} is defined similarly so that β0,A represents
the true non-zero input coefficients. (ii) Similarly, U0 = (U
′
0,A, U
′
0,Ac )
′ and n(U0,A) < N.
Denote δ0 =
n(U0,Ac )
N
, then the assumption is equivalently stated by δ0 > 0.5 By construction,
minj∈A|u0,j | = η > 0, however, it is allowed η _ 0 as (N, T )_∞.
4This is related to the identification issue in wage gap decomposition, discussed in Horrace and Oaxaca
(2001). Their concern is identification of the wage gaps across various labor markets, while our concern is
identification of efficiencies across firms.
5For analytic simplicity, without loss of generality, it is assumed the last δ0 × N of firms are fully efficient.
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The sparsity assumption is common in the LASSO literature and implies only a subset of
the regressors are relevant to the true model, which justify the use of penalized technique
to recover the true model. In addition to the sparsity in the regressors as in the literature,
we assume there’s a sparsity in inefficiency. For practical purposes, the assumption will be
met when the population under analysis contains many highly efficient firms. This model
becomes the standard fixed effect SF model if p0 = p and δ0 = 0.6 It becomes the neo-
classic production model, which assume every firm is efficient, if p0 = p and δ0 = 1. We
allow η _ 0 as (N, T )_∞ as we do not restrict the lower bound of inefficiency in SF models.
3.2.2 Adaptive LASSO estimator
The LASSO version of the fixed effect SF model can be estimated by either the “within
estimation" or the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation. We start with the
LSDV and then show it is equivalent to ‘within’ transformed version of estimation with a
two-step procedures.
The adaptive LASSO estimator for θ0 is defined as
θˆ(Λ, Π) = [αˆ(Π), βˆ(Λ)
′
, Uˆ(Π)
′
]
′
= argminα,β,U
{∑
T
∑
N
{yit − α− x ′itβ + ui}2 + Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
}
= argminθ
{
(Y − Xθ)′(Y − Xθ) + Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
}
where ui ≥ 0
(3.3)
where X = [lNT , X1,−X2], and Λ and Π are positive tuning parameters for β and U, re-
spectively. {λˆj}pj=1 are some data-dependent weights for β, which are usually obtained from
6Note that uˆ0,i is estimated from uˆ0,i = αˆ0 − αˆ0,i in the standard SF model where αˆ0 = maxNj=1αˆ0,j . We
always have one relatively 100 % efficient firm from the model, however, it does not mean that it is zero
inefficiency based on a absolute standard. It only become absolute zero inefficiency when N _∞.
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the absolute value of some consistent estimate. In this paper, we set λˆj = |βˆLSDVj |−γβ and
pik = |uˆLSDVk |−γu with some γβ > 0 and γu > 0.7
There are two things to be noted in (3.3). First, we are estimating α and U in one step,
which is not feasible in the standard fixed effect SF model because of identification problem
(theoretically) or perfect multicollinearity (in practice). This is feasible in this model due to
the presence of efficient firms, which allow us to identify α and U separately while avoiding
the multicollinearity problem. Second, it is also notable that we are using two different tuning
parameters, and {βˆLSDVj }pj=1 and {uˆLSDVk }Nk=1 that have different convergence rates. That is,
the former is a
√
NT -consistent estimate of β0,j while the latter is a
√
T/(log N)2-consistent
estimate of u0,k , which will be formally proved in lemma 3.4.1. We use the two tuning
parameters because of the difference in asymptotic behaviors of the two estimator, βˆ(Λ) and
Uˆ(Π), which will be discussed in details in the assumption 3.4.2.
Remark 3.2.1 Our model is related to latent group structure models, in particular, the
model in Su et. al. (2016). In Su et. al. (2016), the regression coefficients are heterogeneous
across groups but homogeneous within a group, and group membership is unknown. Their
methodology forces some of individual coefficients to have the same value by penalizing their
difference from a group-specific coefficient value which is simultaneously estimated within
their model.8 We can show our model has the same features by reparameterizing (3.1) as
yit = α0,i + x
′
itβ0 + vit where α0,i = α0 − u0,i and α0 ≥ α0,i . Then, using a similar penalized
7It should be noted that {βˆLSDVj }pj=1 are from a preliminary estimation but {uˆLSDVk }Nk=1 may be obtained
from the residuals after the first step estimation of (3.5)
8Their methodology (also, our methodology) is related to the fused LASSO proposed by Tibshirani,
Saunders, Rosset, Zhu, and Knight (2005) where the parameters of interest have an order in some meaning
way and some parameters take the same value with the neighboring parameters. The fused LASSO encourages
sparsity of the differences between the neighboring parameters by penalizing the differences. This technique
is in particular useful when there are multiple changes in the parameter values along the natural order of the
parameters (e.g detecting multiple structural changes in the time series setting; Harchaoui and Lévy-Leduc
(2010), Chan, Yau, and Zhang (2014), and Qian and Su (2015)).
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technique, the reparameterized model can be estimated by
[αˆ(Π), αˆI (Π)
′
, βˆ(Λ)
′
] = argminα,αi ,β
{∑
T
∑
N
{yit − αi − x ′itβ}2 + Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |α− αi |
}
(3.4)
where α ≥ αi , αˆI (Π) = [αˆ1(Π), ...αˆN(Π)]. (3.4) is not much different from (3.3) conceptually
and computationally, as the inefficiencies in the fixed effect SF model are nothing but the
distances from the largest fixed effect in the sample.9 We are penalizing the differences
between the largest fixed effect and the firm fixed effects in (3.4) to identify the subset of
best firms, which implies our model has a classification feature similar to the one in Su et.
al. (2016)10. In the same spirit, we can modify the sparsity assumption on inefficiencies: For
α0 ≥ αi ,0, αi ,0 = α0 if i ∈ BS0 where BS0 is the true set of efficient firms who have α0 (the
leading group specific fixed effect) as for their fixed effects and BS0 6= . In this regard, our
model can be viewed as a technique for simultaneous classification and estimation of the
firm-level efficiency.
With some algebra,11 we can concentrate out the α and U in (3.3), which implies the above
problem can be equivalently solved in two steps: In the first step solve
βˆ(Λ) = argminβ
{∑
T
∑
N
{y ∗it − x
′∗
it β}2 + Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |
}
= argminβ
{
(Y − X1β)′Q(Y − X1β) + Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |
} (3.5)
9We may show they possess the same asymptotic properties using similar arguments in our asymptotic
analysis. We verified that they produces similar estimation results in finite sample simulations (the differences
in the estimation results from the two object functions were less than 10−3 in many cases).
10There are two distinct differences between our model and theirs. First, our group membership is determined
by firm fixed effects (or firm-level inefficiencies) whereas it is structural parameters that determine membership
in their paper. Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) consider a latent group structure problem, where group
membership is determined by group specific fixed effects, but their methodology relies on minimization of a
least squares criterion with respect to all possible groupings without the LASSO technique. Moreover, they
don’t require our constraint on the fixed effects. Second, we are not estimating an arbitrary latent group
structure, but we are identifying a “best and the rest" group structure by imposing the constraints α ≥ αi .
11We prove the equivalence between (3.3), and (3.5) - (3.6) in Appendix C.
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where y ∗it = yit − y¯i , x ′∗it = x ′it − x¯i ′ , and Q is a within transformation matrix such that
IN ⊗ (IT − 1T iT i
′
T ). Then the second step is
[αˆ(Π|βˆ(Λ), Uˆ(Π|βˆ(Λ))′]′
= argminα,U
{∑
T
∑
N
{
yit − α− x ′it βˆ(Λ) + ui
}2
+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
}
where ui ≥ 0
= argminα,U
{
(Y − Xθβˆ(Λ))
′
(Y − Xθβˆ(Λ)) + Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
} (3.6)
where θβˆ(Λ) = [α, βˆ(Λ)
′
, U
′
]
′ .12 For notational simplicity, we denote αˆ(Π|βˆ(Λ)) ≡ αˆ(Π) and
Uˆ(Π|βˆ(Λ)) ≡ Uˆ(Π). Figure 1 in chapter 3 of Hastie et al (2009) visually explains how the L1
penalty often leads to zero estimates for some parameters. The LASSO shrinks the estimates
toward 0, as the tuning parameter increases, and leads to exactly zero values for some
parameters, because of a singularity at the origin. The initial LASSO by Tibshirani (1996) has
no weight on its penalty term, so it shrinks each estimate equally, which leads to a trade-off
between consistent estimation and consistent variable selection (Fan and Li, 2001; Zou, 2006).
To address this, Zou (2006) proposes the adaptive LASSO which puts different weights onto
each penalty term for each parameter, enabling adjustment of the degree of shrinkage for
each parameter, using the information from preliminary consistent estimation. He proves the
adaptive LASSO possess the oracle property. In this paper, we set λˆj = |βˆLSDVj |−γβ . If the
true parameter is zero, the |βˆLSDVj | would be close to zero as N _∞ or T _∞, which, in
turn, leads to λˆj _∞, so we would be more likely to have a zero estimate for the parameter
in this case. However, it is impossible to completely remove the bias in nonzero parameter
estimates, so the tuning parameter should be large enough to select the zero parameters but
not too large as to induce bias in the nonzero parameter estimates. Selection of the tuning
parameters and their asymptotic conditions to achieve oracle property will be discussed in
12As we consider a two step procedure, we may adopt the hybrid estimation approach of Efron et. al. (2004)
and Hui et. al. (2015) to reduce the bias from using the shrinkage technique in the first step. That is, instead
of βˆ(Λ), we compute the “within" estimate for β0 under the model selected in the first step and use the
unpenalized estimate for the second step.
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next sections.
3.3 Computation
3.3.1 Optimization algorithm
The L1 penalty term in the object function has no second derivative at the origin, so we can’t
directly apply standard quadratic optimization algorithms (e.g. Newton-Raphson). Many
alternative optimization algorithms have been developed: Least Angle Regression (Efron et.
al., 2004), Local quadratic approximation(Fan and Li, 2001), Coordinate Descent Algorithm
(Friedman et al, 2008), among others. Optimization of (3.5) is a standard LASSO problem,
so we may use one of the algorithms for implementation of the first step.
In the second step, we wish to obtain a result that retains uˆ0,j(Π) ≥ 0 in order to be
consistent with the model assumption of u0,j ≥ 0. Note that, if we impose a positive
constraint on U in optimization procedure, then (3.6) becomes a standard constrained
quadratic optimization problem with no singularity. Therefore, we may use one of the
standard constrained optimization algorithms (e.g. Sequential Quadratic Programming) for
implementation of (3.6). However, this may be computationally costly because the number
of constraints in our problem is N. Alternatively, we propose a coordinate decent algorithm
which produces almost the same estimation results as the standard constrained optimization
but without computational cost. Using preliminary inefficiency ranking information among
the firms from the LSDV estimation, this algorithm allows us to skip a large number of
irrelevant optimization steps. The algorithm is implemented as follows. For a simplicity, we
suppress the (Π) notation.
1. Using ˆβ(Λ) from the first step,13 compute αˆi = 1T
∑
i yit−x
′
it
ˆβ(Λ) and uˆi = maxNj=1αˆj−αˆi
13As mentioned eariler, we may use the “within" estimator for β0 from the model selected in the first step.
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for all i . Let αˆ[1] ≤ αˆ[2] ≤ ... ≤ αˆ[N] be the rankings of the αˆi , so αˆ[N] = maxNj=1αˆj .
Similarly, let uˆ[N] ≤ uˆ[N−1] ≤ ... ≤ uˆ[1] be the rankings of the uˆi , so uˆ[N] = minNj=1uˆj . We
set the initial value for α to αˆ[N]. Denote the current values for uˆ[i ] and αˆ as uˆ
(0)
[i ] and
αˆ(0). Note that as we set αˆ(0) = αˆ[N], we have one fully efficient firm, uˆ
(0)
[N] = 0, now.
2. For a given Π, sequentially check the KKT condition for the second best firm, the third
best firm.... That is, check the sign of ∆[N−i ] = uˆ
(0)
[N−i ] − Π
pˆi[N−i ]
2T
from i = N − 1 to 1.
(a) IF ∆[N−i ] ≤ 0, update uˆ(0)[N−i ] as uˆ[N−i ] = 0, and update αˆ(0) as αˆ = 1i+1
∑i
k=0 αˆ[N−i ].
As we have new αˆ (the frontier parameter), we update the rest of the inefficiencies
(from [N − 1− i ] to [1]) as uˆ[N−i−j ] = uˆ(0)[N−i−j ] − (αˆ(0) − αˆ) for j = 1, ..., N − i − 1.
Then, go back to 2 and check next firm’s KKT condition.
(b) IF ∆[N−i ] > 0, update {uˆ(0)[N−i ], ..., uˆ(0)[1] } as uˆ[N−k] = uˆ(0)[N−k]−Π pˆik2T for k = i , ..., N−1.
Repeat below LOOP until the absolute difference in the estimation results in two
consecutive steps is smaller than a pre-specified threshold and then report the
results.
LOOP
i. Update αˆ(0) as αˆ = αˆ(0) − 1
N
∑N−1
k=i (uˆ
(0)
[N−k] − uˆ[N−k])
ii. Update {uˆ(0)[N−i ], ..., uˆ(0)[1] } as uˆ[N−k] =
(
uˆ
(0)
[N−k] − (αˆ(0) − αˆ)
)
+
for k = i , ..., N−1
where (x)+ = x if x ≥ 0 and = 0 otherwise.
We provide a figure in Appendix C illustrating the above procedure. This coordinate decent
algorithm uses the convexity of the object function and the preliminary inefficiency ranking
at the same time, enabling us to reach the minimum of the object function quickly. We
compare the series of estimation results between this algorithm and the Sequential Quadratic
Programming (SQP) algorithm in Matlab in Appendix C. We find that the two algorithms
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generally produce similar results, but the new algorithm is much faster than SQP.14
In the algorithm, the LOOP is necessary to optimize the object function, however, we can see
that it shrinks αˆ(Π) as well. This is not desirable because it may slow down the convergence
rate of αˆ(Π) and, in turn, it may induce bias on Uˆ(Π) when T is small. In order to prevent this,
we intentionally skip the LOOP in the implementation of our algorithm.15 The asymptotic
results are derived from this modified algorithm and we use it for the simulation study and
empirical exercises.
3.3.2 Tuning parameter
The performance of the adaptive LASSO estimator relies on an appropriate selection of the
tuning parameters, and the CV and AIC criteria have been used in the LASSO literature.
However, they lead to inconsistent model selection; too many nonzero estimates. Wang et
al (2007b) shows that the tuning parameters based on a BIC-type criterion can identify the
true model consistently. Therefore, in this paper, we consider the BIC type criteria for the
selection of the two tuning parameters such that16
(Λ∗, Π∗) = argminΛ,Π log σˆ
2(θˆ(Λ, Π)) +
|βˆ(Λ)| log(NT ) + |Uˆ(Π)| log(T )
NT
(3.7)
where σˆ2(θˆ(Λ, Π)) is the mean squared error based on Λ and Π. The criterion of Wang
et al (2007b) is a special case with T = 1. Equation (3.7) can be implemented using a
two-dimensional grid search: 1) for every possible Λ, implement the first step and compute
14For one replication with a sample size (N, T ) = (20, 10), the new algorithm took on average 1.5 second
whereas the standard algorithm took 345 seconds. This gap will be pronounced as N increases.
15This modification can be viewed as a bias correct procedure. The modified algorithm helps to achieve
better asymptotic and simulation results, which we shall see in subsequent sections.
16We also experimented various types of selection criterions in the simulation study (e.g ERIC: Hui et
al (2015) and ICp1: Bai and Ng (2002)) and found (3.7) worked best in various panel structure. The two
other criterions tended to select more sparse model than (3.7), however, the difference in the model selection
between the criterions were not big.
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βˆ(Λ); 2) with the βˆ(Λ)s, implement the second step and compute Uˆ(Π|βˆ(Λ)); 3) choose Π∗
based on (3.7) for every Λ; and 4) choose Λ∗ based on (3.7) using the results from the previous
step.17
3.4 Asymptotic Theory
Asymptotics are for the case (N, T ) _ ∞. Our analysis below builds on Zou (2006),
and Zou and Zhang (2009), among others. Let LSDV estimates be denoted as θˆ(0) =
[αˆ(0), βˆ(0)
′
, Uˆ(0)
′
]
′ , where αˆ(0) = maxi αˆi(0), αˆi(0) are the LSDV estimates for individual
intercepts, which is (X ′2X2)−1X2(Y − X1βˆ(0))), and uˆi(0) = αˆ(0) − αˆi(0). We now discuss
consistency and the rate of convergence of the LSDV estimator in our setup. For this, we
assume
Assumption 3.4.1 For all i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T , j = 1, ..., P in the model matrix X,
maxit,j |xit,j | < ∞ w.p.a 1. And, for any model ω identified in the interval [Λmin, Λmax ] and
[Πmin, Πmax ], we have c1 ≤ eigmin( 1T X
′
ωXω) < eigmax(
1
NT
X
′
ωXω) ≤ c2 where c1 and c2 are some
positive constants, and eigmin(·) and eigmax(·) denote minimum and maximum eigenvalues of
some positive definite matrices, respectively.
Assumption 3.4.1 requires the regressor matrix to be well behaved. That is, the minimum
eigenvalue grows by T whereas the maximum eigenvalue grows by NT . The assumption
implies c1 ≤ eigmin
(
1
NT
X1,ω
′QX1,ω
) ≤ eigmax ( 1NT X ′1,ωQX1,ω) ≤ c2 because X ′1,ωQX1,ω is a
17One may simplify the computation by using the criteria sequentially such that: For the selection of Λ,
Λ∗ = argminΛ log σˆ
2(βˆ(Λ)) + |βˆ(Λ)| log NT
NT
(3.8)
where σˆ2(βˆ(Λ))’s degree of freedom is N(T − 1). And for the selection of Π,
Π∗ = argminΠ log σˆ
2(Uˆ(Π)|βˆ) + |βˆ(Λ)| log(NT ) + |Uˆ(Π)| log(T )
NT
(3.9)
There may be a loss of precision from this method but it will reduce the computational cost significantly.
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submatrix of X ′ωXω. Usually, the upper bounds of the estimation efficiency of the LASSO
estimator is that of the baseline estimator based on the correct model. However, the adaptive
LASSO estimator and the LSDV estimator in our setup exhibits different convergence rates
for the common intercept and the inefficiency estimates, as will be shown below. First, we
derive the convergence rate for LSDV estimator.
Lemma 3.4.1 Under Assumption 3.4.1, E ((αˆ(0)−α0)2) = O( (logN)2T ), E (||βˆ(0)−β0||22) =
O( 1
NT
), and E ((uˆi(0)− u0,i)2) = O( (logN)2T ) for ∀i as (N, T )_∞.
Proof of this lemma and other lemmas and theorem is contained in Appendix C. Lemma 3.4.1
shows that each element in Uˆ(0) is
√
T/(log N)2 consistent. In the standard fixed effect SF
model, it is not assumed that at least one firm in the sample is efficient, so it requires that
N _∞, to ensure that we sample the first efficient firm. In our setup, we assume that we
have at least one efficient firm, so practically speaking, only T _∞ is necessary. Next, for
the oracle proof, we define
θˆA(Π, Λ) = argminθ
{
(Y − XA · θ)′(Y − XA · θ) + Λ
∑
j∈A
λˆj |βj |+ Π
∑
k∈A
pik |uk |
}
(3.10)
where XA consists of columns of X that correspond to the elements in A.18 We derive the
consistency and rate of convergence of θˆA(Λ, Π) below. We require following assumptions.
Assumption 3.4.2 Denote T ∗ = T
(logN)2
. (i)limT ,N_∞ Λ√NT = 0 and limT ,N_∞ Λ√NT (NT )(γβ)/2 =
∞ with γβ > 0 (ii)limT ,N_∞ Π√T∗ = 0 and limT ,N_∞ Π√T ·T ∗γu/2 =∞ with γu > 0 (iii)β0,A is
bound from below by c >> 0, and U0,A and limT ,N_∞ (√T∗Π )1/γu ·η =∞ where η = min(|u0,k |)
Similar assumptions can be found in Zou (2006), and Zou and Zhang (2009). Assumption 3.4.2
is crucial for the oracle property, because it controls the behavior of the tuning parameters,
Λ and Π, so they can select the zero coefficients properly without producing asymptotic bias
18The two steps implementation can also be applied to this problem (this time, the Q = QA where QA is a
within transformation matrix corresponding X2,A)
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in the nonzero coefficient estimates. Assumption 3.4.2 (ii) implies a condtion that T has
to grow faster than (log N)2 so that (logN)
2
T
_ 0, however, the restriction is not strong as it
covers many panel structure. Assumption 3.4.2 (iii) restricts the convergence speed of the
nonzero coefficients to zero so that they can be distinguished from the zero coefficients by
the estimation procedure. This is important in our context as we do not impose any lower
bound for inefficiencies in the SF literature.
Lemma 3.4.2 Under Assumption 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, E ((αˆ(Π)−α0)2) = O( 1δ0NT ), E (||βˆA(Λ)−
β0,A||22) = O( 1NT ) and E ((uˆA,i(Π)− u0,A,i)2) = O( 1T ) for ∀i as (N, T )_∞.
This Lemma shows that if we select the correct model, the fixed effect LASSO estimator
is an consistent estimator for θ0. The proof of this lemma in Appendix C shows that the
mean square error of the LASSO estimator can be decomposed into two parts: the first part
due to the penalty terms, and the second part due to the two-sided random error. Under
these assumptions, the first part vanishes faster than the second, so estimation consistency is
achieved.
From this lemma, we observe that αˆ(0) and αˆ(Π) have different convergence rates. LSDV
uses only T observation to estimate α0 and the max operator further slows down the rate
(Park et. al., 1998). The αˆ(Π) is estimated as a common intercept of the firms categorized as
efficient by the LASSO, so if we knew the true model, we could use the δ0NT observations to
estimate α0. This result, in turn, leads to the convergence rate difference between Uˆ(0) and
UˆA(Π). However, we need to note that the difference in the convergence rates can only be
observed after achieving selection consistency. That is, only when we can identify the true
group of efficient firms will αˆ(Π) show a faster convergence rate. Otherwise, estimation error
in UˆA(Π) will be transfered into the estimation of α0, and the optimal convergence rate will
not be achieved.
We will proceed to the oracle proof. First, we derive a useful lemma for the oracle of
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θˆ(Λ, Π). Next lemma shows that θˆ(Λ, Π) estimates all the elements in Ac as zero w.p.a 1. as
(N, T )_∞.
Lemma 3.4.3 Under Assumption 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, [αˆ(Π), (βˆA(Λ)
′
, 0
′
), (UˆA(Π)
′
, 0
′
)]
′ is the
solution to the minimization problem of (3.3) w.p.a 1 as (N, T )_∞.
This lemma tells us that asymptotically θˆ(Λ, Π) works as if it knows the true model by
estimating the zero coefficients exactly as zero. As in the proof of this lemma in the Appendix,
the assumptions on Λ, Π, and η are crucial for this asymptotic characteristic of θˆ(Λ, Π).
Assumption 3.4.3 X
′
1,AQX1,A
NT
_p ΣA,1, δ0 l ′δX1,Aδ0NT (X ′1,AQX1,ANT )−1 X ′1,Alδδ0NT _p Σα∗, and the error terms
and regressors satisfy the regularity conditions for Central Limit Theorem.
The next theorem confirms the oracle property of the adaptive LASSO estimator.
Theorem (Oracle Property) Under Assumption 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the LASSO estimator
for θ0, θˆ(Λ, Π), has the oracle property. That is, the estimator satisfies:
1. Consistency in selection: Pr ({j : θˆ(Λ, Π)j 6= 0} = A)_ 1 as (N, T )_∞
2. Asymptotic normality
1)
√
NT (βˆA(Λ)− β0,A)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σ−1A,1)
2)
√
δ0NT (αˆ(Π)− α0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σα)
3)
√
T (uˆi ,A(Π)− ui ,0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0)
w.p.a 1 as (N, T )_∞ where Σα is from 1 + δ0 l ′δX1,Aδ0NT (X ′1,AQX1,ANT )−1 X ′1,Alδδ0NT _p Σα.
This theorem establishes the selection consistency and asymptotic normality of the adaptive
LASSO estimator. In other words, asymptotically speaking, we can select the right model
and identify a set of efficient firms without loss of estimation efficiency in this procedure.
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One interesting thing is that the asymptotic distribution for the estimate of inefficiency is
somewhat different from the one derived in Park et al (1998). Their results are based on the
standard SF model and imply that the asymptotic variance of each inefficiency estimate is at
least 2× σ2v ,0 and there will be more variation due to the uncertainty over whether one of the
firm in the sample achieves full efficiency or not. However, in our model, the assumption of
at least one fully efficient firm 19 and the faster convergence rate of αˆ(Π) than that of uˆi(Π)
significantly reduce uncertainty in the estimation of uˆi(Π).
3.5 Simulations
3.5.1 Setup
In this section, we study the finite sample performance of the estimator. We set up the model
by defining α0 = 1, β0 = [β, β, β, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
′ with β = 1, xit ∼ N(0, Σ) with the (i , j)−th
element of Σ set to 0.5|i−j |, and vit ∼ N(0, 1). We assume 30% of firms in the sample are
fully efficient firms (δ0 = 0.3), and in every simulation each nonzero individual inefficiency is
identically and independently generated from an exponential distribution 1
σu
e−uit/σu .20 We
experiment with σu ∈ {1, 2, 4}. As σu gets smaller, the selection problem becomes more
difficult because the probability of small inefficiency draws will be high, making it more
difficult for the LASSO to distinguish them from zero. This would be particularly difficult
when the sample size is small as it is likely that Assumption 3.4.2 (iii) in the asymptotic
analysis is violated. Figure 3.1 shows the PDFs of inefficiency for each σu value (left) and an
example of draws from each PDF (right). We can clearly see that inefficiencies are densely
packed near zero when σu = 1.
We set γβ = 1 and γU = 2 21, and the optimal tuning parameters are selected by (3.7) from a
19This also allow us to derive a deterministic form of asymptotic distribution for the estimate of α0
20We add an arbitrary small number (e.g. 0.01) to each inefficiency draw to ensure they are not zero.
21We set γU = 2. However, we are free to choose the value of γU as long as it is positive. From the asymptotic
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Figure 3.1: PDFs of inefficiency with different σu values and an example of draws from each
PDF.
two dimensional grid search over 10linspace(log 10(10−4/NT ):1:50)×NT for Λ and 10linspace(log 10(10−4/T ):1:250)×
T for Π where linspace(a : b : c) is a row vector of c evenly spaced points between a and
b.22 We simulate each model 1,000 times with twelve combinations of N ∈ {100, 200, 1000}
and T ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}.
3.5.2 Results
In what follows we only discuss results on Uˆ(Π), because it is our focus. Results on βˆ(Λ) are
in Appendix C. We report two types of statistics:
1. Estimation accuracy: a) square root of mean squared error (RMSE :
√
E (Uˆ(Π)− U0)2),
b) αˆ(Π) and αˆ(0), and c) Rank correlation between U0,A and Uˆ(Π)A.
2. Selection accuracy: a) PrUA , b) PrUAc , c) δˆ0, and d) Max U˜A,
analysis, we can see that setting a higher value for γU ensures the LASSO estimates zero coefficients as zero,
but also increases the probability of estimating (small) nonzero coefficients as zero. Therefore, in empirics γU
should be determined in light of this trade-off.
22We use a denser grid for Π than that for Λ because there are many inefficiency draws close to zero.
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where PrUA is the probability of yielding nonzero estimates for UA23; PrUAc is the probability
of yielding zero estimates for UAc ; δˆ0 is the proportion of the firms estimated as efficient; Max
U˜A is the maximum of UA that are estimated as zero, that represents the worst case selection
error when a model is underfitted.24 Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 present the estimation accuracy
results and Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 present the selection accuracy results.
Est imat i on accuracy of Uˆ(Π): Table 3.1 reports and compares the three types
of estimation accuracy results from LASSO and LSDV. The results can be summarized as
follows:
 As T and σu increase, the RMSE from the LASSO decreases, but the effect of σu on
RMSE is small. This is due to the fact that σu, which determines the frequency of near
zero inefficiencies, significantly affects the selection performance as shown in Table 3.2.
However, it may not be case for the RSME, because small inefficiency draws are already
near zero, so that they do not contribute much to the RMSE.
 The LASSO outperforms LSDV in terms of RMSE. Differences in the estimation error
among the zero inefficiency draws may be one explanation for the difference. However,
the main explanation is the persistent overestimation of α0 in LSDV. Figure 3.2 presents
the distribution of the estimates of α0 from the LASSO (solid line) and LSDV (dashed
line). The distributions from the LASSO over the replications are centered close to
the true value even when T and σu are small, and the variation in the distribution is
decreasing significantly as N or T increase. However, those from LSDV are consistently
displaced away from the true value. This is due to the fact that the LASSO estimator
for α0 converges faster than the LSDV estimator as shown in the asymptotic analysis,
and the max operator that LSDV uses to estimate α0 tends to pick up the most biased
23PrUA is computed from averaging the percentage of nonzero estimates for UA in each replication. PrUAc is
computed from the same manner.
24In the literature, underfitting means the case when we estimate one of the nonzero coefficients as zero.
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individual intercept estimate (αi) of the zero inefficiency firms. In short, in the presence
of a group of zero inefficiency firms, the max operator produces a biased estimate for
α0, which, in turn, leads to a significant bias in the estimation of the inefficiencies in
LSDV.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of estimates for α0 from LASSO and LSDV
 The LASSO and LSDV show similar rank correlation results.25 We need to note that
these results are computed only among the nonzero inefficient firms, and the LASSO
achieves this even after selecting fully efficient firms, which implies the LASSO preserve
the original ranking well when compared to LSDV.
Se l ect i on accuracy of Uˆ(Π): Table 3.2 present the results for PrUA , PrUAc
and δˆ0. For the reader’s convenience, we visualize the selection results in Figure 3.3 using
the results from 12 cases with N = 100. The left panel is for PrUA , and the right panel is for
PrUAc , and the variables on each axises are given by (x , y , z) = (σu, T , probability). Note
25Moreover, the LASSO shows slightly better results in many cases. The rank correlations are computed
only from the nonzero inefficient firms, so the differences only come from the penalized effects. The difference
is the biggest when T and σu are small, which is when we have a large uncertainty in the inefficiency estimates.
This result may imply that the penalized technique may improve estimation of the nonzero inefficiencies as
well, when LSDV is not reliable.
76
that the graph is drawn continuously but the results are not. The continuous planes are
generated from connecting 12 coordinates and we add a color to each probability level to
show the general trend of the selection performance depending on (σu, T ).
We can see that when T and σu are small, the LASSO incorrectly estimates many nonzero
inefficiencies as zeros. However, the under fitting problem gets improved as T or σu increases.
The under fitting or over fitting problem shouldn’t be exaggerated because most of the firms
incorrectly estimated as zero inefficiency would have near zero inefficiency. The small values
of Max U˜A in Table 3.2 imply only the firms near the threshold of zero inefficiency may be
incorrectly categorized as fully efficient. This may not be a serious problem in practice.
More importantly, it is impressive that even when T is small, including the (N, T ) =
(1000, 10) case, the PrUA and PrUAc are close to 1 if σu = 4, which implies selection performance
is more dependent on the distribution of the firms’ inefficiency than the size of T in finite
samples. This gives us an important implication, that our model can be used in various panel
structures, not limited to the case where T is large, as long as there are not too many near
zero inefficiencies, and our primary interest lies in identification of fully efficient firms rather
than individual inefficiency estimates.
Figure 3.3: Visualization of the selection performance (N = 100)
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3.6 Empirical application
3.6.1 Comparison with "Ranking and Selection" (R&S) procedure
In this section, we apply our LASSO model to the rice farm data previously analyzed by
Erwidodo (1990), Horrace and Schmidt (1996) and Horrace and Schmidt (2000), among others.
In our context, the LASSO is designed to select a group of efficient firms, BS0. The idea of
selecting a subset of best firms is related to the R&S literature. R&S proceeds as follows.
Suppose we estimate the LSDV model, and it yields α˜i for i = 1, ..., N. R&S is an inferential
decision rule that selects some subset of the populations that contain the population with
largest (best) value of αi with some pre-specified error rate. If in truth αi = α0 − ui , this is
equivalent to selecting populations with ui closest to zero at the pre-specified error rate. If
so, the connection between the LASSO and the R&S should be clear. The LASSO selects
some subset of ui to be zero in our model, while R&S select some subset of ui closest to zero
in a statistical sense. For more details of R&S procedure and its applications to economic
problems, see Horrace and Schmidt (1996) and Horrace and Schmidt (2000).
To compare the two methodologies, we use data on 171 rice farms in Indonesia, observed
for three wet and three dry seasons from six different villages. For a complete discussion of
the data see Erwidodo (1990, unpublished manuscript). The empirical model is a standard
Cobb-Douglas (loglinear) production function. Inputs to the production of rice included in
the data set are seed (kg), urea (kg), trisodium phosphate (TSP) (kg), labor (labor-hours),
and land (hectares). Output is measured in kilograms of rice. The data also include dummy
variables. DP equals 1 if pesticides were used and 0 otherwise. DV 1 equals 1 if high yield
varieties of rice were planted, and DV2 equals 1 if mixed varieties were planted; the omitted
category represents that traditional varieties were planted. DSS equals 1 if it was a wet season.
Since our focus is on the efficiency estimates, regression results are not presented here (see
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Horrace and Schmidt, 2000).26
Figure 3.4: Distribution of the rice farm inefficiencies
3.6.2 Results
The LASSO estimates 69.6 % of farms (119 out of 171 farms) as efficient.27 The distribution
of the inefficiencies are reported in Figure 3.4. In Figure 3.4, the blue histogram represents the
distribution of the inefficiencies from LSDV and the orange one represents that from LASSO
where the 69.6 % of mass is concentrated at 0. We performed R&S procedure with error rate
of 0.05, and found that 67% of rice farms (115 out of 171 farms) are in the subset of the best
farms. Figure 3.5 matches the firm IDs estimated as fully efficient by LASSO (yellow) and
those included in the best subset by the R&S (red). The result is showing that all of the
farms in the best subset by R&S are estimated as zero inefficiency in the LASSO. This result
implies the two procedures are closely related and can be alternately used depending on the
goals of research. The similarity between the results may be understood by noting that the
two methods are both selecting subsets of the best firms after accounting for the impacts
26As in the simulations, we set γβ = 1 and γu = 2. The model is estimated after standardizing the input
variables.
27The production function is exactly the same as Horrace and Schmidt (2000), and the LASSO selects the
full model.
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of the individual inefficiency estimates on the whole model, which is similar to an F-test
procedure. The only difference is that the LASSO is based on the BIC criterion, whereas
R&S is based on a pre-specified error rate and the multivariate confidence intervals it implies.
The multivariate confidence intervals are based on all N(N − 1) differences, α˜i − α˜i 6=j . If
we use a different BIC criterion or a different error rate, we would get a different set of results. 28
Figure 3.5: Firm IDs estimated as fully efficient by LASSO or included in the best subset by
R&S
3.7 Conclusion
We have shown the proposed adaptive LASSO estimator has the oracle property under
regularity conditions. Moreover, the finite sample simulations demonstrate that the estimator
outperforms LSDV in many aspects. The empirical application shows that our methodology
and the R&S procedure produce similar results. Consequently, there may be scope for using
the LASSO whenever R&S is prescribed. For example, Horrace (2005b) uses R&S to determine
a subset of industries with the largest wage gap. Using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the
28In this application, the absolute values of the individual inefficiencies from the preliminary LSDV
estimation were small whereas the model fit (measured by the mean squared error of the model) was bad,
which leads the LASSO to keep a small number of large inefficiency estimates in the model. For the same
reason, R&S resulted in wide confidence intervals, wide enough for a large portion of farms to be categorized
as the best.
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LASSO could be applied to select these industries.
For future research, it may be interesting to develop a zero inefficiency SF model that allows
the individual inefficiencies to vary over time. The standard fixed effect model can be seen as
a special case of the factor error structure panel data model when the factors are constant
over time. If we assume the variation in the inefficiencies is due to time-varying factors, the
factor error structure model could be a good baseline model for the analysis.29 One way to
apply the zero inefficiency concept to the factor model would be to estimate some individual
factor loadings as zeros using the shrinkage technique as in Cheng et al (2016). However, this
may lead to an unsatisfying result, as some firms will have zero inefficiencies all the time.
We may consider of a model that allows for factor loadings to be zero for some periods but
nonzero for others. However, as shown in Cheng et al (2016), this would make the model
and estimation procedures prohibitively complex. Perhaps, an alternative strategy could be
developed.
29For studies of the factor error structure panel model, see Pesaran (2006), Bai (2009), and Ahn et al
(2013).
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Table 3.1: Estimation accuracy for Uˆ(Π)
RMSE αˆ (α0 = 1) Ranking correlation
(N, T) σu LASSO LSDV LASSO LSDV LASSO LSDV
(100,10) 1 0.2980 0.7591 1.005 1.687 0.92 0.88
(0.0370) (0.1394) (0.097) (0.152) (0.030) (0.033)
(100,30) 1 0.1840 0.4243 0.979 1.382 0.96 0.94
(0.0263) (0.0786) (0.051) (0.087) (0.015) (0.016)
(100,50) 1 0.1456 0.3252 0.977 1.292 0.97 0.96
(0.0214) (0.0599) (0.037) (0.066) (0.010) (0.011)
(100,70) 1 0.1223 0.2777 0.982 1.250 0.98 0.97
(0.0188) (0.0533) (0.032) (0.058) (0.008) (0.009)
(100,10) 2 0.3020 0.7390 1.041 1.665 0.96 0.95
(0.0416) (0.1401) (0.105) (0.155) (0.012) (0.013)
(100,30) 2 0.1762 0.4193 0.994 1.376 0.98 0.98
(0.0218) (0.0795) (0.049) (0.087) (0.005) (0.006)
(100,50) 2 0.1365 0.3219 0.992 1.288 0.99 0.98
(0.0162) (0.0625) (0.036) (0.069) (0.003) (0.004)
(100,70) 2 0.1143 0.2772 0.994 1.249 0.99 0.99
(0.0132) (0.0528) (0.030) (0.058) (0.003) (0.003)
(100,10) 4 0.2997 0.7266 1.062 1.652 0.98 0.98
(0.0429) (0.1417) (0.102) (0.157) (0.004) (0.004)
(100,30) 4 0.1699 0.4211 1.004 1.377 0.99 0.99
(0.0175) (0.0820) (0.046) (0.090) (0.002) (0.002)
(100,50) 4 0.1298 0.3274 1.000 1.294 0.99 0.99
(0.0133) (0.0654) (0.032) (0.071) (0.001) (0.001)
(100,70) 4 0.1102 0.2737 0.995 1.245 0.99 0.99
(0.0120) (0.0529) (0.027) (0.058) (0.001) (0.001)
(200,10) 1 0.2923 0.8240 1.010 1.759 0.92 0.89
(0.0264) (0.1334) (0.075) (0.145) (0.022) (0.022)
(200,70) 1 0.1216 0.3055 0.985 1.281 0.98 0.98
(0.0142) (0.0511) (0.025) (0.055) (0.005) (0.006)
(200,10) 4 0.2939 0.7917 1.060 1.725 0.98 0.98
(0.0263) (0.1294) (0.076) (0.139) (0.003) (0.003)
(200,70) 4 0.1093 0.3046 0.999 1.279 0.99 0.99
(0.0082) (0.0502) (0.020) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000)
(1000,10) 1 0.2867 0.9762 1.017 1.923 0.92 0.89
(0.0133) (0.1130) (0.041) (0.118) (0.011) (0.010)
(1000,10) 2 0.2880 0.9751 1.050 1.921 0.97 0.96
(0.0103) (0.1178) (0.042) (0.124) (0.004) (0.004)
(1000,10) 4 0.2871 0.9696 1.068 1.916 0.99 0.99
(0.0096) (0.1209) (0.039) (0.127) (0.001) (0.001)
NOTE: The entries are the average values for each measure over 1,000 replications
and their corresponding standard deviations in next row in parentheses. Rank
correlations are computed only among the inefficiencies whose true values are
nonzero. That is, Rcorr = corr (R(U0,A), R(Uˆ(Π)A)) where R(·) is a mapping from
estimates to rankings. Similarly for LSDV.
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Appendix A
Stochastic Frontier Models with Network
Selectivity
A.1 Mathematical Derivations
1. h(uist |st < δst)
h(uist |st < δst) =
∫ Zs t
0
h(st , uist)d∫ Zs t
0
∫∞
0
h(st , uist)dud
=
1
1− e−δst
∫ Zs t
0
h(st , uist)d (A.1)
Because
∫ Zs t
0
h(st , uist)d =
1
σu
[e−
uist
σu − κste−κst
uist
σu
−δst ] where κst = 1 + αδst , (A.2)
h(uist |st < δst) = 1
σuPst
[e−
uist
σu − κste−κst
uist
σu
−δst ] where Pst = 1− e−δst (A.3)
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2. E (uist |st < δst)
E (uist |st < δst) =
∫ ∞
0
uisth(uist |st < δst)du = 1
σuPst
∫ ∞
0
uist [e
− uist
σu − κste−κst
uist
σu
−δst ]du
=
σu
Pst
[1− 1
κst
e−δst ]
(A.4)
3. h(µist |st < δst) where µist = vist − uist
vist is independent of uist and st , so h(uist , vist |st < δst) = h(uist |st < δst) 1
σv
φ(
vist
σv
)
where φ(·) is standard normal pdf, then the h(µist |st < δst) will be given by,
(A.5)
h(µist |st < δst) =
∫ ∞
0
h(uist |st < δst) 1
σv
φ(
uist + µist
σv
)du
=
1√
2piσuσvPst
∫ ∞
0
(e−
uist
σu − κste−κst
uist
σu
−δst)e
− (µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
=
1
Pst
[
1√
2piσuσv
∫ ∞
0
e
− uist
σu
− (µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
− 1√
2pi σu
κst
σv
∫ ∞
0
e
−κst uistσu −δst−
(µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
]
Using the result from Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p80),
=
1
σuPst
[
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− σv
σu
)
e
µist
σu
+
σ2v
2σ2u − κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstσv
σu
)
e
κstµist
σu
+
κ2stσ
2
v
2σ2u
]
(A.6)
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4. E (uist |µist , st < δst)
E (uist |µist , st < δst) =
∫ ∞
0
u
h(uist ,µist , st < δst)
h(µist , st < δst)
du =
∫ ∞
0
u
h(uist ,µist |st < δst)
h(µist |st < δst) du
=
1√
2piσv
[ ∫∞
0
ue
− uist
σu
− (µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du − κst
eδst
∫∞
0
ue
−κst uistσu −
(µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
]
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− σv
σu
)
e
µist
σu
+
σ2v
2σ2u︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstσv
σu
)
e
κstµist
σu
+
κ2stσ
2
v
2σ2u︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
Let (1) = Aist(µist |δst ,σu,σv ,α) and (2) = Bist(µist |δst ,σu,σv ,α), then,
=
Aist
Aist − Bist
1√
2piσvAist
∫ ∞
0
ue
− uist
σu
− (µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
− Bist
Aist − Bist
1√
2piσv
eδst
κst
Bist
∫ ∞
0
ue
−κst uistσu −
(µist+uist )
2
2σ2v du
Using the result from Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p82), this reduces to
=
Aist
Aist − Bist
(
Λist + σv
[
φ(−Λist/σv)
Φ(Λist/σv)
])
− Bist
Aist − Bist
(
Λ∗ist + σv
[
φ(−Λ∗ist/σv)
Φ(Λ∗ist/σv)
])
where Λist = −µist − σ
2
v
σu
and Λ∗ist = −µist −
κstσ
2
v
σu
(A.7)
A.2 Three-step Estimation Approach
Three-step estimation proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Compute δˆst = F−1(Pˆst) as in the two-step approach.
Step 2: Do a within transformation on the production function equation 1.2 1 to eliminate
the selection bias, and then run Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimation due to Lee
1Equation 1.2 can be rewritten as Yst = λWstYst + X1,stβ1 + x2,stβ21Nt − E (ust |st < δst) + µ∗st , where
µ∗st = vst − ust + E (ust |st < δst). Then, the within transformation on the equation leads to QYst =
QλWstYst + QX1,stβ1 + Qµ
∗
st , where Q is the within transformation matrix. Now the error term Qµ∗ts has
zero mean by construction
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(2007) or 2SLS to get λˆ and βˆ1.
Using the efficient instruments of IV = (WstX , W 2stX ...) for the right-hand side endogenous
variables, WstYst , is a standard method for 2SLS estimation of λˆ in spatial production
literature. See Anselin (1988) or Kelejian and Prucha (1999). However, the applicability of
this Fixed effect-2SLS methodology heavily depends on the topology of the weight matrix, and
this is closely related to the identification problem in network models. Since Bramoulle et al
(2009) and Cohen et al (2012) extensively studied sufficient identification conditions for various
network models, we won’t discuss them again here, rather we will show how network topology
affects the applicability of the Fixed effect-2SLS. Let’s assume the network of group s in time t
is given by W ∗st =
1
Nt−1 (1Nt1
′
Nt
− INt), and Nt is constant over t, where Nt is the number of the
agents in a chosen group. This weight matrix has been widely used in the spatial autoregressive
model due to its simplicity, however, if we apply a within transformation on the network,
we get QW ∗st = − 1Nt−1 Q, then the set of IVs becomes (QX , QW ∗stX ...) = (QX ,− 1Nt−1 QX ...),
which implies the set of IVs is not full rank and suffers from a perfect multicollinearity
problem as long as Nt doesn’t vary over t, which, in turn, leads to a failure of 2SLS. For this
reason, HLP introduce two heterogeneous weight matrices using exclusion restrictions, W 1st
and W 2st , the same- and different-type weight matrices, respectively, where W 10,st = [w0,ij ,st ] is
an adjacency matrix with w0,ij ,st = 1 if the i th and j th workers in the group s in time t are of
the same type and w0,ij ,st = 0 otherwise. Similarly construct W 20,st , then row-normalize W 10,st
and W 20,st to produce W 1st and W 2st such that W 1st1Nt = W 2st1Nt = 1Nt .
In short, in order to implement 3-step estimation, Nt should vary over t, or the weight
matrices should be different enough from W ∗st . If those issues are addressed, we may apply
CML or 2SLS.
Step 3: Using the estimates, Zˆts , λˆ and βˆ1 from above steps, compute rˆts = Yts − λˆWtsYts −
X1,ts βˆ1, then the consistent estimate for the µts conditional on the x2,ts and β2 is given by
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µˆts = rˆ −x2,tsβ2. Plug the µˆts into the LL in (1.7) without the term
∑
t ln |INt −λWts | because
we already removed endogeneity due to the spatial autoregressive component in the right
side of the production equation from the second step, and run the Pseudo-ML. Here we get
βˆ2, σˆu, σˆv , and αˆ. As in the two step method, we use Murphy and Topel (2002) to correct
the standard errors.
A.3 The partial and the second derivatives of the log-likelihood and
adjustment of the standard error
lnL =
∑
t
∑
i∈s
ln h(st < δst)h(µist |st < δst) =
∑
t
Nt ln
η
σv
+
∑
t
ln |INt − λWst |
+
∑
t
∑
i∈s
ln
[
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− η
)
e
µistη
σv
+ 1
2
η2 − κst
eδst
Φ
(
− µist
σv
− κstη
)
e
κstµistη
σv
+
κ2stη
2
2
]
1. Notation For the simplicity, we use below notation,
ωist = −µist
σv
− η, ωκstist = −
µist
σv
− κstη (A.8)
φist = φ(ωist), φκstist = φ(ω
κst
ist ), Φist = Φ(ωist), Φ
κst
ist = Φ(ω
κst
ist ) (A.9)
τist = e
µistη
σv
+ 1
2
η2 , τκstist = e
κstµistη
σv
+
κ2stη
2
2 (A.10)
Ψist = Φistτist − κst
eδst
Φκstist τ
κst
ist (A.11)
94
2. The first derivatives
∂lnL
∂λ
= −
∑
t
tr [(In − λWt)−1Wt ] +
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wjtyjst)
σv
ξist
Ψist
where ξist = τist(φist − ηΦist)− κst
eδst
τκstist (φ
κst
ist − κstηΦκstist )
(A.12)
∂lnL
∂η
=
∑
t
Nt
η
−
∑
t
∑
i∈s
ξηist
Ψist
where ξηist = τist(ωistΦist + φist)−
κ2st
eδst
τκstist (ω
κst
ist Φ
κst
ist + φ
κst
ist )
(A.13)
∂lnL
∂σv
= −
∑
t
Nt
σv
+
∑
t
∑
i∈s
µist
σ2v
ξist
Ψist
(A.14)
∂lnL
∂β
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
xist
σv
ξist
Ψist
(A.15)
∂lnL
∂α
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
τκstist δst
eδst
ξαist
Ψist
where ξαist = Φ
κst
ist − κstη(ωκstist Φκstist + φκstist )
(A.16)
3. The second derivatives
∂2lnL
∂λ2
= −
∑
t
tr [(In − λWt)−1Wt ]2 −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(∑
j 6=i∈s wtjyjst
σv
)2
{( ξist
Ψist
)2 − τist((µistσv − η)φist + η2Φist)− κsteδst τκstist ((µistσv − κstη)φκstist + κ2stη2Φκstist )
Ψist
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Qist)
(A.17a)
∂2lnL
∂λ1∂λ2
= −
∑
t
tr [(In − λ1W 1t − λ2W 2t )−1W 1t (In − λ1W 1t − λ2W 2t )−1W 2t ]
−
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(∑
j 6=i∈s w
1
tjyjst
∑
j 6=i∈s w
2
tjyjst
σ2v
)
×Qist
(A.17b)
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∂2lnL
∂η2
= −
∑
t
Nt
η2
−
∑
t
∑
i∈s
{( ξηist
Ψist
)2
− τist
(
ωistφist + (ω
2
ist + 1)Φist
)− κ3st
eδst
τκstist
(
ωκstist φ
κst
ist + ((ω
κst
ist )
2 + 1)Φκstist
)
Ψist
} (A.18)
∂2lnL
∂σ2v
= −
∑
t
Nt
σ2v
−
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
µist
σ2v
)2
×Qist (A.19)
∂2lnL
∂ββ ′
= − 1
σ2v
∑
t
∑
i∈s
xistx
′
ist ×Qist (A.20)
∂2lnL
∂α2
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
{(
τκstist δst
eδst
ξαist
Ψist
)2
− τ
κst
ist δ
2
stη
eδst
ωκstist ξ
α
ist + 2φ
κst
ist + Φ
κst
ist (ω
κst
ist − κstη)
Ψist
}
(A.21)
∂2lnL
∂λ∂η
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wtjyjst)
σv{
ξistξ
η
ist
Ψ2ist
+
τist
(
ωistηΦist −Φist + ηφist
)− κ2st
eδst
τκstist
(
ωκstist κstηΦ
κst
ist −Φκstist + κstηφκstist
)
Ψtsi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Rist)
}
(A.22)
∂2lnL
∂λ∂σv
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wtjyjst)
σ2v
{
ξist
Ψist
+
µist
σv
×Qist
}
(A.23)
∂2lnL
∂λ∂β ′
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wtjyjst)x
′
ist
σ2v
×Qist (A.24)
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∂2lnL
∂λ∂α
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wtjyjst)
σv
τκstist δst
eδst{
ξistξ
α
ist
Ψ2ist
− φ
κst
ist (1 + κstη
2) + Φκstist (κ
2
stω
κst
ist η
2 − 2κstη)
Ψist︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Sist)
} (A.25)
∂2lnL
∂η∂σv
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
µist
σ2v
× Rist (A.26)
∂2lnL
∂η∂β ′
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
x
′
ist
σv
× Rist (A.27)
∂2lnL
∂η∂α
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
τκstist δst
eδst
{
ξαistξ
η
ist
Ψ2ist
− κst ω
κst
ist ξ
α
ist + 2φ
κst
ist + Φ
κst
ist (ω
κst
ist − κstη)
Ψist
}
(A.28)
∂2lnL
∂σv∂β
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
xist
σ2v
{
ξist
Ψist
+
µist
σv
×Qist
}
(A.29)
∂2lnL
∂σv∂α
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
µist
σ2v
τκstist δst
eδst
× Sist (A.30)
∂2lnL
∂β∂α
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
xist
σv
τκstist δst
eδst
× Sist (A.31)
4. Adjustment of the Hessian for multi-step estimation
Following Murphy and Topel (2002), the adjusted standard error is given by,
Σ = R−12 + R
−1
2 [R
′
3R
−1
1 R3 − R
′
4R
−1
1 R3 − R
′
3R
−1
1 R4]R
−1
2
(A.32)
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R1 = −E ∂
2lnL1
∂θ1∂θ
′
1
R2 = −E ∂
2lnL2
∂θ2∂θ
′
2
R3 = −E ∂
2lnL2
∂θ1∂θ
′
2
R4 = E
∂lnL1
∂θ1
(
∂lnL2
∂θ2
)′
(A.33)
where lnL1, and θ1 are the log-likelihood and the parameters from the first step, and the lnL2,
and θ2 are the log-likelihood and the parameters from the second step. R1 and R2 can be
obtained from the Hessian matrix of the conditional logit model and the second derivatives
in subsequent derivations. As the log-likelihood for the first step is given by,
lnL1 =
∑
t
(
Zstγ − ln
∑
j∈At
eZjtγ
)
+ C (A.34)
where γ is the parameter in the first step, Zst is explanatory variable for line-up s in time t,
At is the set of possible line-ups in t, and C is the constant which does not depend on the γ,
the first derivative of the first selection model is given by,
∂lnL1
∂γ
=
∑
t
(
Zst −
∑
j∈At
PjtZjt
)
(A.35)
where Pjt is given by Pjt = e
Zjtγ∑
k∈At e
mktγ
. Then R4 can be computed from (A.35) and the earlier
first derivatives. For R3, using ∂δst∂γ =
∂F−1(Pst)
∂γ
= 1
e−δst Πst where Πst = Pts(mts−
∑
j∈At Ptjmtj),
we have,
∂lnL2
∂γ
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πst
τκstist (αξ
α
ist − κstΦκstist )
Ψist
(A.36)
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Then, the cross derivatives are given by,
∂2lnL2
∂γ∂λ
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πts
(
∑
j 6=i∈s wtjytsj)
σv
τκstist{
(αξαist − κstΦκstist )ξist
Ψ2tsi
+
ακstηξ
α
ist − κstη(κstΦκstist − αΦκstist ) + κstφκstist − αφκstist
Ψtsi
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Tist)
(A.37)
∂2lnL2
∂γ∂η
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πtsτ
κst
ist{
(αξαist − κstΦκstist )ξηist
Ψ2tsi
− κst αω
κst
ist ξ
α
ist −Φκstist ωκstist κst − κstφκstist + α(2φκstist + ωκstist Φκstist − ηκstΦκstist )
Ψtsi
}
(A.38)
∂2lnL2
∂γ∂σv
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πts
µist
σ2v
τκstist Tist (A.39)
∂2lnL2
∂γ∂β ′
=
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πts
x
′
ist
σv
τκstist Tist (A.40)
∂2lnL2
∂γ∂α
= −
∑
t
∑
i∈s
Πtsτ
κst
ist
{
τκstist δst
eδst
(αξαist − κstΦκstist )ξαist
Ψ2tsi
+
ξαist(1− αωκstist δstη) + δstηΦκstist (ωκstist κst − αωκstist + αηκst) + δstηφκstist (κst − 2α)− δΦκstist
Ψtsi
}
(A.41)
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Appendix B
Network Competition and Team Chemistry
in the NBA
B.1 GMM for the heterogeneous network interaction model
Here, we provide a sketch of the GMM method for the R = 2 case. With slightly modified
notation for the simplicity of the case, the model is
Y =
4∑
r=1
λrGrY + Xβ + A + U
∗ (B.1)
where G1 =
[
W11 0
0 0
]
, G2 =
[
0 W12
0 0
]
, G3 =
[
0 0
W21 0
]
, G4 =
[
0 0
0 W22
]
. To eliminate the network
specific fixed effects, we premultiply by JQ ,
JQY =
4∑
r=1
λrJQGrY + JQXβ + JQU (B.2)
Kelejian and Prucha (1999, 2001) introduce a method of moments (MOM) estimator for the
SAR disturbance model, and Lee (2001a, 2002b, 2007b) develop it within a general GMM
estimation framework and propose a GMM method which explores both IV (linear) as well
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as quadratic moment functions.1 They derive a best GMM estimator (BGMME) and show it
to have the same limiting distribution as the MLE or QML estimator. Lee and Liu (2010)
extend the GMM methodology to the higher-order SAR model.
We assume that each element in U is i .i .d .N(0,σ2) to simplify the estimation.2 Following
Lee’s methodology, the i .i .d .N(0,σ2) disturbances imply two sets of moment conditions:
linear and quadratic
g(θ) =

Z ′JQU(θ)
U
′
(θ)JQF1JQU(θ)
...
U
′
(θ)JQFrJQU(θ)

JQZ is a matrix instrument for the linear moments, and FrJQU(θ) is for the quadratic
moments, where Fr is an n×n matrix such that tr (FiJQ) = 0, and U(θ) = Y −
∑4
i=1 λiGiY +
Xβ with θ = (λ′, β ′)′ .3 At θ0, E (g(θ0)) = 0 as E (Z ′JQU) = 0 and E (U
′
JQFi jQU) =
σ2tr (FiJQ) = 0 for i = 1...m. We can find the intuition for the use of quadratic moments in
addition to the linear moments from Lee (2001a, 2001b). In (B.2), each JQGiY can be expressed
as JQGi(In−
∑4
i=1 λiGi)
−1Xβ+JQGi(In−
∑4
i=1 λiGi)
−1U, which has the deterministic part and
the stochastic part. Then, when we construct moment conditions for the endogenous variables,
JQGiY , we can use the function of the exogenous variables, X , for the approximation of the
deterministic part (linear moments) while using the quadratic moments for the stochastic
part as long as the FiJQU and the stochastic part are correlated.
The GMM estimator θˆ follow from arg minθ g
′
(θ)Hg(θ), where H is a distance matrix (or
1See Lee and Lin (2010), Lee et al (2010B), Lee and Yu (2014) for additional details.
2The normality assumption is for the simpler forms of the Best IVs and the corresponding estimators’
asymptotic distribution later. We can relax the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions in the error
terms as long as there is no correlation between the error terms to apply the Lee’s methodology. See Lee et al
(2010b) for non-normality assumption, and Lee and Lin (2010) for the heteroskedastic specification.
3If there is a time dimension of 1...T , Z = (Z
′
1, ..., Z
′
T )
′
, U = (U
′
1, ..., U
′
T )
′
, JQ,T = IT ⊗ JQ , and Fi ,T =
IT ⊗ Fi .
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weighting matrix) for the system of equations. In practice, we need to select specific Z , Fi ’s,
and H to implement the GMM. The choice of H would be rather easy because, following
Hansen’s setting and approach (1982), the optimal H will be the inverse of the variance
matrix of the moment conditions with the chosen Z , Fi ’s.4 For Z , Fi ’s, we may consider of
the Lee(2007b)’s best Z and Fi ’s which has the least variance in the asymptotic distribution
of θˆ. For our model, these are
 JQZ = [JQX , JQC1X βˆ, ..., JQC4X βˆ] where Ci = Gi(In −
∑4
i=1 λˆiGi)
−1 where λˆi and βˆ
are the preliminary estimates for λ and β.
 F = (Fi) for i = 1...4 where Fi = Ci − tr(CiJQ)n−2 JQ
We denote this as GMMLee . The derivation of the best Z , Fi ’s and the asymptotic distribution
of the estimators can be found in Appendix B.4. GMMLee requires the preliminary estimates
of λˆi ’s and βˆ as well as the estimate of the variance matrix of the moment conditions. So,
alternatively, we may also think of simpler Kelejian and Prucha (2004)’s linear moments and
their corresponding quadratic moments (GMMKP) as below5
 JQZ = [JQX , JQG1X , JQG2X , ..., JQG s11 G
s2
2 G
s3
3 G
s4
4 X ] s1, s2, s3, s4,≥ 0
 F = (Fi) for i = 1...m where Fi = Hi− tr(HiJQ)n−2 JQ where Hi = G s11 G s22 G s33 G s44 , s1, s2, s3, s4,≥
0
In order to reduce the number of parameters in g′(θ)Ωˆ−1g(θ) where θ = (λ′, β ′)′ , we may
replace β with consistent estimator, βˆ(λ) = [X ′JQX ]−1X
′
JQ(In −
∑4
i=1 λiGi)Y . Lee (2007c)
analyzes the effect of this modification on the asymptotic distribution of the estimators.
4This should be estimated from the estimated residuals of U from an initial consistent estimate of θ.
5The asymptotic distribution for this estimator can be established similarly as in the Appendix B.4
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B.2 Identification condition for the equation (2.11)
Proposition B.2.1 The equation (2.11) is identified if [JQ,mXk,m, JQ,mΘk,1,m, ..., JQ,mΘk,nm,m]
has a full rank for ∀k = 1, ..., nm in some m where Θi ,j ,m = Gi ,j ,mS−1m XmB.
Proof Denote Sm = INm −
∑nm
k=1
∑nm
l=1 λk,lGk,l ,m. As S
−1
m = INm +
∑nm
k=1
∑nm
l=1 λk,lGk,l ,mS
−1
m
and JQ,mY = JQ,mS−1m XmB + JQ,mS−1m U∗m,6 the equation (2.11) can be written as
JQ,mYm = JQ,mS
−1
m XmB + JQ,mS
−1
m U
∗
m
=
nm∑
k=1
nm∑
l=1
λk,lJQ,mGk,l ,mS
−1
m XmB + JQ,mXmB + JQ,mS
−1
m U
∗
m
(B.3)
Denote Θi ,j ,m = Gi ,j ,mS−1m XmB, then, we can see (B.3) will be identified as long as
[JQ,mXm, JQ,mΘ1,1,m, ..., JQ,mΘ1,nm,m, ..., JQ,mΘnm,1,m, ...JQ,mΘnm,nm,m] (B.4)
has a full rank. Due to the structures of the network matrices, the rank condition is equivalent
to that
[JQ,mXk,m, JQ,mΘk,1,m, ..., JQ,mΘk,nm,m] (B.5)
has a full rank for ∀k = 1, ..., nm in some m where Xk,m is a Nm × p matrix whose entries in
the position (
∑i−1
k=1 nk,m + 1 :
∑i
k=1 nk,m, 1 : p) is given by xi ,m but the rest entries are zeros
so that
∑nm
k=1 Xk,m = (x
′
1,m, ..., x
′
nm,m
)
′ where (a : b, c : d) means entries from the ath row to
bth row and from c th column to d th column. This condition is generally satisfied because
we have multiple sets of network matrices and exogenous regressors for each group which
produces enough variations to identify the coefficients in our model. 
6Note that JQ,mGk,l ,mJQ,m = JQ,mGk,l ,m ∀ k,j, which leads that JQ,mS−1m JQ,m = JQ,mS−1m
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B.3 Lemma B.3.1
Lemma B.3.1 Let the orthonormal matrix of Qi ,m be [Pi ,m, lni ,m/
√
ni ,m]. The columns in
Pi ,m are eigenvectors of Qi ,m corresponding to the eigenvalue one, such that P
′
i ,mlni ,m = 0,
P
′
i ,mPi ,m = Ini ,m−1 and Pi ,mP
′
i ,m = Qi ,m. Denote J
′
P,m = Diag(P
′
1,m, ..., P
′
nm,m
) and G¯i ,j ,m =
J
′
P,mGi ,j ,mJP,m, then, ln |S¯m| = − ln f (Λ) + ln |Sm| where S¯m = INm−nm −
∑nm
k=1
∑nm
l=1 λk,l G¯k,l ,m,
Sk,m = INm −
∑nm
k=1
∑nm
l=1 λk,lGk,l ,m and f (Λ) is some function of Λ.
Proof Here, we show that this lemma holds for two networks case. From this, we can easily
see that the Lemma holds for any number of networks case. We suppress m here. Define
H =
[P1, ln1√n1 ] 0
0 [P2,
ln2√
n2
]
. Then, we can show that |H ′(IN − ∑2k=1∑2l=1 λk,lGk,l)H| =
|H ′H||IN −
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,lGk,l | = |IN −
∑
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,lGk,l | as |H
′
H| = 1. Next, we show
H
′
(IN −
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
λk,lGk,l)H =
[P1, ln1√n1 ]′ 0
0 [P2,
ln2√
n2
]
′

In1 − λ1,1W1,1 −λ1,2W1,2
−λ2,1W2,1 In2 − λ2,2W22

[P1, l1√n1 ] 0
0 [P2,
l2√
n2
]

as P
′
i Wi ,j lj = 0 and l
′
ni
Wi ,j lnj = ni for i,j=1,2
but l
′
ni
Wi ,jPj may not be zero because Wi ,j is not necessarily symmetric
=

P
′
1(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1 0 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2 0
l
′
n1√
n1
(In1 − λ1,1W11,)P1 1− λ1,1
l
′
n1√
n1
(−λ1,2W1,2)P2 −
√
n1
n2
λ1,2
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 0 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2 0
l
′
n2√
n2
(−λ2,1W2,1)P1 −
√
n2
n1
λ2,1
l
′
n2√
n2
(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2 1− λ2,2

(B.6)
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Then, from the Laplace’s formula, |H ′(IN −
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,lGk,l)H| is given by
|H ′(IN −
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
λk,lGk,l)H|
= (1− λ1,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2 0
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2 0
l
′
n2√
n2
(−λ2,1W2,1)P1 l
′
n2√
n2
(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2 1− λ2,2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ (−1)n2(−
√
n2
n1
λ2,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2 0
l
′
n1√
n1
(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1
l
′
n1√
n1
(−λ1,2W1,2)P2 −
√
n1
n2
λ1,2
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (1− λ1,1)(1− λ2,2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ1,11W1,1)P1 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− λ1,2λ2,1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
(
(1− λ1,1)(1− λ2,2)− λ1,2λ2,1
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ1,1W1,1)P1 −λ1,2P ′1W1,2P2
−λ2,1P ′2W2,1P1 P ′2(In2 − λ2,2W2,2)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
#
(B.7)
As # = |J ′P(IN−
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,lGk,l)JP | = |IN−2−
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,l G¯k,l |, |IN−
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,lGk,l | =(
(1− λ1,1)(1− λ2,2)− λ1,2λ2,1
)
|IN−2 −
∑2
k=1
∑2
l=1 λk,l G¯k,l |. The Lemma holds for two net-
work group case. From this (in particular, from the matrix (B.6)), we can easily see that the
Lemma holds for any number of networks case. For example, when there are three network
groups, f (Λ) = (1− λ1,1)(1− λ2,2)(1− λ3,3)− (1− λ1,1)λ2,3λ3,2 − (1− λ2,2)λ1,3λ3,1 − (1−
λ3,3)λ2,1λ1,2 − λ1,3λ2,1λ3,2
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B.4 Derivation of the best IV and the Fis, and its asymptotic distribution
For the best IV and the corresponding Fi , we first derive the covariance matrix for the moment
conditions such that var (g(θ)) = Ω where
Ω =
σ2Z ′JQZ µ3Z ′JQωD
µ3ω
′
DJQZ (µ4 − 3σ4)ω′DωD + σ4∆
 (B.8)
with ωD = [vecD(JQF1JQ)...vecD(JQFmJQ)], and ∆ = [vec(JQF
′
1JQ)...vec(JQF
′
mJQ)]
′
[vec(JQF
s
1 JQ)...
vec(JQF
s
mJQ)]. Because, in our model, the error terms are normally distributed which implies
µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 3σ4 so simply Ω =
σ2Z ′JQZ 0
0 σ4∆
. It should be noted that the two
types of moments, linear and quadratic, are not correlated when the error are normally
distributed, which allows us to choose the best linear moments and the quadratic moments
independently; in other words, when we have an optimal Z , they are still optimal given the
quadratic moments with Fis.
We know that following the Hansen setting and approach (1982), the asymptotic distribution
of the GMM estimator with the inverse of the variance matrix of the moment conditions,
Ω−1, as for its distance (weighting) matrix, is given by
√
n(θˆGMM − θ0) D−_ N(0, ( lim
n_∞
1
n
D
′
Ω−1D)−1) (B.9)
where D = ∂E(g(θ0))
∂θ′ . In our model, as JQGiY = JQGi(In −
∑4
i=1 λiGi)
−1Xβ + JQGi(In −
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∑4
i=1 λiGi)
−1U,
D =
∂E (g(θ0))
∂θ′
=

Z
′
JQG1(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1Xβ0 ... Z
′
JQG4(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1Xβ0 Z
′
JQX
σ20tr (JQF
s
1 JQG 1(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1) ... σ20tr (JQF
s
1 JQG4(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1) 0
... ...
...
...
σ20tr (JQF
s
mJQG 1(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1) ... σ20tr (JQF
s
mJQG4(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
−1) 0

=
Z ′JQD11 Z ′JQX
σ20D21 0

(B.10)
where D11 = [C 01 Xβ0, ..., C 04 Xβ0] with C 0i = Gi(In −
∑4
i=1 λ
0
i Gi)
and D21 =

tr (JQF
s
1 JQC
0
1 ) ... tr (JQF
s
1 JQC
0
4 )
... ...
...
tr (JQF
s
mJQC
0
1 ) ... tr (JQF
s
mJQC
0
4 )

Then, under certain regularity conditions as in Lee (2007b) and Lee and Liu (2010), the
asymptotic distribution of the estimators, θ, derived from minθ g(θ)
′
Ωˆ−1g(θ), is given by
√
n(θˆGMM − θ0) D−_ N(0, ( lim
n_∞
1
n
Σ)−1)
where Σ = D
′
Ω−1D
=
D ′11JQZ σ20D ′21
X
′
JQZ 0

 1σ2 (Z ′JQZ )−1 0
0 1
σ4
∆−1

Z ′JQD11 Z ′JQX
σ20D21 0

=
D ′21∆−1D21 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+
1
σ2
[D11, X ]
′
JQZ (Z
′
JQZ )
−1Z
′
JQ [D11, X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
(B.11)
We can notice that the asymptotic variance is the sum of the two parts, (1) that is affected by
the choice of Fis, and (2) that is affected by the choice of Z , and the two are independent which
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is due to the normality assumption in the error terms. Then, by the generalized Schwartz
inequality, the best linear IV will be JQZB = JQ [D11, X ] = JQ [C 01 Xβ0, ..., C 04 Xβ0, X ], which
reduce (2) to 1
σ2
(Z
′
BJQZB). And for the best quadratic moments, as vec
′
(A
′
)vec(Bs) =
tr (ABs) = 1
2
tr (AsBs) = 1
2
vec
′
(As)vec(Bs) for any conformable matrix A and B, and
tr (JQF
s
i JQC
0
i ) = tr (JQF
s
i JQC
0
i JQ) = tr (JQF
s
i JQ (C
0
i −
tr (C 0i JQ)
n − 2 JQ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
JQ) =
1
2
tr (JQF
s
i JQ(C
0
i −
tr(C0i JQ)
n−2 JQ)
sJQ) =
1
2
vec
′
(JQF
s
i JQ)vec(JQ(C
0
i − tr(C
0
i JQ)
n−2 JQ)
sJQ), ∆ and D21 can be rewritten as
∆ = 1
2
[vec(JQF
s
1 JQ)...vec(JQF
s
mJQ)]
′
[vec(JQF
s
1 JQ) ...vec(JQF
s
mJQ)] and D21 =
1
2
[vec(JQF
s
1 JQ)...vec(JQF
s
mJQ)]
′
[vec(JQ(C
0
1−
tr(C01 JQ)
n−2 JQ)
sJQ), ..., vec( JQ(C
0
4 − tr(C
0
4 JQ)
n−2 JQ)
sJQ)]. We need to note that (3) allow us to trans-
form the D21 to the form where we can use the generalized Schwartz inequality while satisfying
tr (FiJQ) = 0 when we set Fi = (3). Then, by the generalized Schwartz inequality, the best FB
is given by FB = (FB,i) = (C 0i − tr(C
0
i JQ)
n−2 JQ) for i = 1, ..., 4, which leads to the maximum value
for D ′21∆−1D21 =
1
2
[vec(JQF
s
B,1JQ)...vec(JQF
s
B,4JQ)]
′
[vec(JQF
s
B,1JQ)...vec(JQF
s
B,4JQ)] =
1
2
(tr (JQF
s
B,iJQF
s
B,j))i ,j = (tr (JQF
s
B,iJQFB,j))i ,j = (tr (JQF
s
B,i JQC
0
j ))i ,j for i , j = 1, ..., 4. Then,
the asymptotic distribution of the Best GMM (BGMM) with the FB , ZB and the distance
matrix of Ω−1 is given by
√
n(θˆBGMM − θ0) D−_ N(0, ( lim
n_∞
1
n
Σ)−1)
where Σ =
Σ11 0
0 0
+ 1
σ2
(Z
′
BJQZB) and Σ11 = (tr (JQF
s
B,iJQC
0
j ))i ,j for i , j = 1, ..., 4
(B.12)
We can show that, under the regularity conditions, this asymptotic variance is equivalent
with the one from MLE (Lee, 2007b).
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B.5 Descriptive Statistics for NBA Data
Descriptive statistics for each team in each season are in Table B.1 - B.3. Teams in tables are
ranked based on the estimated peer-effect in Table 2.1. For each team we present the mean
and standard deviations of wins produced per minute (Wins), player experience (Experience),
and fatigue (Fatigure) in Tables B.1 - B.3. Experience is minutes played from the start of the
game to the end of the last period, and Fatigue is minutes continuously played until the end
of the last period. Each team played 82 games in each season. We also report the number of
periods(Periods), observations (Observations = 5 ∗Periods) and average duration per period
(ADP).
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Table B.1: Season 2013-14
Wins (wins/min) Experience (mins) Fatigue (mins)
Team Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Games Periods Observations ADP
UTA 0.0049 0.0248 13.794 9.0010 5.2439 4.7098 82 1,826 9,130 1.8223
BOS 0.0050 0.0251 13.860 9.2391 4.6564 4.3956 82 1,858 9,290 1.7856
PHX 0.0064 0.0257 13.735 8.9724 5.0906 4.5023 82 1,820 9,100 1.8456
WAS 0.0055 0.0250 14.594 9.6572 4.9988 4.6697 82 1,763 8,815 1.8678
IND 0.0058 0.0243 14.287 9.4832 5.1662 4.8740 82 1,726 8,630 1.9308
MIN 0.0062 0.0257 13.739 9.4149 5.4394 5.0011 82 1,736 8,680 1.9257
DAL 0.0063 0.0256 13.389 8.9545 3.6121 3.6704 82 2,021 10,105 1.6514
OKC 0.0070 0.0257 13.146 9.0519 5.1941 5.0077 82 1,817 9,085 1.8307
SAS 0.0071 0.0258 12.257 8.1465 4.0379 3.8646 82 1,887 9,435 1.7790
TOR 0.0061 0.0253 14.235 9.4367 4.7076 4.3403 82 1,873 9,365 1.7760
BKN 0.0055 0.0237 12.717 8.5106 4.7137 4.2582 82 1,780 8,900 1.9225
CLE 0.0050 0.0247 13.731 9.1616 4.8408 4.5234 82 1,821 9,105 1.8339
PHI 0.0049 0.0259 13.491 9.0089 4.0930 3.9932 82 1,908 9,540 1.7361
NOP 0.0061 0.0253 13.406 9.0509 4.7968 4.5722 82 1,878 9,390 1.7740
DET 0.0061 0.0254 14.905 9.6595 5.4940 5.0559 82 1,811 9,055 1.8297
MIL 0.0051 0.0249 13.876 9.0502 4.8941 4.6383 82 1,835 9,175 1.8135
LAL 0.0058 0.0253 13.916 9.0277 5.1118 4.6862 82 1,783 8,915 1.8878
NYK 0.0054 0.0243 14.462 9.4261 5.0768 4.7384 82 1,810 9,050 1.8432
DEN 0.0062 0.0262 13.251 8.7821 4.8769 4.5826 82 1,909 9,545 1.7564
GSW 0.0067 0.0262 14.840 9.9523 5.3323 5.5644 82 1,816 9,080 1.8174
MEM 0.0057 0.0239 13.626 9.0649 4.9568 4.6083 82 1,779 8,895 1.8466
CHA 0.0055 0.0247 13.286 8.7265 4.7021 4.4664 82 1,780 8,900 1.8933
SAC 0.0059 0.0251 14.008 9.3787 5.4816 5.3535 82 1,821 9,105 1.8184
HOU 0.0071 0.0259 14.571 9.6148 5.3114 5.0911 82 1,768 8,840 1.8993
ORL 0.0052 0.0245 13.862 9.1897 5.0372 4.7521 82 1,711 8,555 1.9501
ATL 0.0058 0.0254 13.558 8.8973 4.1517 3.8550 82 1,848 9,240 1.8068
LAC 0.0068 0.0263 14.621 9.8490 5.0150 4.7810 82 1,867 9,335 1.7628
POR 0.0062 0.0255 14.455 9.5653 4.6440 4.5626 82 1,752 8,760 1.9005
CHI 0.0053 0.0237 15.545 9.8489 6.5129 5.6085 82 1,644 8,220 2.0183
MIA 0.0064 0.0245 13.522 8.8854 4.7217 4.3458 82 1,814 9,070 1.8506
ADP: the average duration per period
110
Table B.2: Season 2014-15
Wins (wins/minute) Experience (mins) Fatigue (mins)
Team Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Games Periods Observations ADP
IND 0.0058 0.0256 13.037 8.2898 4.5181 4.0489 82 1,824 9,120 1.8057
PHX 0.0060 0.0256 14.016 9.0446 4.9225 4.3733 82 1,876 9,380 1.7743
UTA 0.0059 0.0261 13.820 8.8752 3.9650 3.8336 82 2,039 10,195 1.6217
PHI 0.0048 0.0265 13.140 8.4847 3.6735 3.6020 82 2,000 10,000 1.6325
MIN 0.0054 0.0252 14.878 9.6813 5.3879 4.9777 82 1,882 9,410 1.7740
CLE 0.0064 0.0254 14.379 9.4663 4.8025 4.5130 82 1,871 9,355 1.7734
WAS 0.0059 0.0252 13.231 8.7861 4.8437 4.4499 82 1,797 8,985 1.8423
LAC 0.0068 0.0258 14.355 9.6817 4.9482 4.6120 82 1,800 9,000 1.8181
ORL 0.0052 0.0244 14.011 9.4634 4.7217 4.4842 82 1,808 9,040 1.8398
SAC 0.0057 0.0254 13.775 9.1679 4.8073 4.4546 82 1,885 9,425 1.7640
SAS 0.0066 0.0254 12.364 8.2696 3.7030 3.6057 82 1,968 9,840 1.6986
MEM 0.0058 0.0240 13.292 8.8446 4.9134 4.4669 82 1,836 9,180 1.8094
BKN 0.0052 0.0245 13.785 9.1974 5.0943 4.6681 82 1,869 9,345 1.7900
NOP 0.0062 0.0255 14.415 9.4324 5.0235 4.6812 82 1,837 9,185 1.7978
DEN 0.0056 0.0260 13.238 9.0719 4.9736 4.7908 82 1,880 9,400 1.7684
TOR 0.0064 0.0258 13.799 8.6910 4.5766 4.1246 82 1,874 9,370 1.7762
CHA 0.0055 0.0247 13.205 8.7309 4.6170 4.2395 82 1,775 8,875 1.8785
DAL 0.0063 0.0265 13.168 8.7553 3.9218 3.8520 82 2,040 10,200 1.6504
MIL 0.0057 0.0247 13.076 8.4892 4.8779 4.3510 82 1,857 9,285 1.8245
ATL 0.0062 0.0263 13.310 8.7269 3.6930 3.5976 82 1,954 9,770 1.6949
HOU 0.0064 0.0263 14.511 9.3455 4.6074 4.4417 82 1,862 9,310 1.7910
LAL 0.0055 0.0251 13.234 8.4778 5.2972 4.9816 82 1,692 8,460 1.9895
POR 0.0063 0.0251 13.768 9.3065 4.3383 4.1583 82 1,764 8,820 1.8839
CHI 0.0064 0.0252 15.114 9.4816 5.4462 4.9676 82 1,728 8,640 1.9041
MIA 0.0054 0.0251 13.764 8.9606 4.7052 4.4468 82 1,934 9,670 1.7300
DET 0.0056 0.0253 13.792 8.7494 5.0442 4.4047 82 1,783 8,915 1.8634
OKC 0.0064 0.0265 13.714 9.2057 5.1044 4.6884 82 1,933 9,665 1.7424
GSW 0.0076 0.0261 13.260 8.7507 4.7493 4.3759 82 1,845 9,225 1.7982
NYK 0.0048 0.0244 12.849 8.5494 4.3007 4.1936 82 1,906 9,530 1.7674
BOS 0.0055 0.0254 13.221 8.4947 4.2091 3.9081 82 1,963 9,815 1.6984
ADP: the average duration per period
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Table B.3: Season 2015-16
Wins (wins/min) Experience (mins) Fatigue (mins)
Team Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Games Periods Observations ADP
CHI 0.0059 0.0249 13.443 8.8153 4.6841 4.4133 82 1,793 8,965 1.8500
SAS 0.0072 0.0253 12.260 8.2964 3.8246 3.6986 82 1,878 9,390 1.7312
MIN 0.0058 0.0253 13.162 8.9522 4.8360 4.3706 82 1,891 9,455 1.7825
MIL 0.0055 0.0242 14.327 9.5646 5.5877 5.3570 82 1,786 8,930 1.8766
MEM 0.0056 0.0252 13.569 8.8102 4.8904 4.4279 82 1,855 9,275 1.7359
ORL 0.0060 0.0249 13.366 9.1810 5.1182 4.9035 82 1,815 9,075 1.8481
BKN 0.0053 0.0252 13.583 8.9497 4.5742 4.2478 82 1,838 9,190 1.7807
DET 0.0059 0.0257 14.666 9.4099 4.8601 4.5260 82 1,754 8,770 1.9050
SAC 0.0064 0.0261 14.171 9.0768 4.8797 4.5854 82 1,957 9,785 1.7061
POR 0.0066 0.0261 13.415 8.7288 4.6371 4.1711 82 1,839 9,195 1.8099
BOS 0.0061 0.0266 13.568 8.7688 4.5319 4.1359 82 1,894 9,470 1.6840
TOR 0.0068 0.0254 13.991 8.9852 4.8002 4.2214 82 1,802 9,010 1.8506
UTA 0.0059 0.0256 13.565 8.9888 3.8109 3.7618 82 2,035 10,175 1.6233
CLE 0.0066 0.0264 13.731 9.0387 4.5803 4.2359 82 1,883 9,415 1.7611
HOU 0.0063 0.0269 13.822 9.4650 4.4653 4.7234 82 1,964 9,820 1.7123
CHA 0.0068 0.0254 13.590 8.9516 4.9244 4.5149 82 1,741 8,705 1.9243
ATL 0.0063 0.0264 13.145 8.6175 3.3534 3.3129 82 2,021 10,105 1.6391
PHX 0.0053 0.0261 13.941 9.4149 5.2119 5.0957 82 1,821 9,105 1.8327
LAL 0.0056 0.0256 12.758 8.3083 4.9857 4.4327 82 1,752 8,760 1.9016
WAS 0.0061 0.0257 13.714 9.0765 4.7863 4.4908 82 1,914 9,570 1.7293
NYK 0.0058 0.0251 13.252 8.9107 4.4921 4.3276 82 1,847 9,235 1.8075
OKC 0.0073 0.0265 13.545 8.9972 4.5932 4.3073 82 1,857 9,285 1.7843
LAC 0.0065 0.0263 13.064 8.7264 4.6467 4.2978 82 1,862 9,310 1.7728
MIA 0.0065 0.0253 14.409 8.8739 4.7797 4.2856 82 1,847 9,235 1.8138
NOP 0.0060 0.0252 14.227 9.1684 5.0658 4.5300 82 1,875 9,375 1.7772
PHI 0.0051 0.0265 13.129 8.5196 3.6186 3.5643 82 2,061 10,305 1.6193
GSW 0.0081 0.0268 13.157 9.1074 4.2704 4.0395 82 1,892 9,460 1.7745
DAL 0.0058 0.0257 13.475 8.8809 4.0182 3.9327 82 1,968 9,840 1.7049
IND 0.0061 0.0255 13.900 8.9143 4.6639 4.1757 82 1,839 9,195 1.8162
DEN 0.0058 0.0257 13.450 8.7122 5.0957 4.6100 82 1,843 9,215 1.8071
ADP: the average duration per period
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B.6 Estimation results
The estimation results for the main equation are in Tables B.4 - B.6 for each team in each
season. As the focus is the peer-effects and not the marginal effects of other important
variables, we only estimate the main equation after the within transformation. Therefore,
only the marginal effects for variables that vary at the player-level are identified. Teams in
tables are ranked based on the estimated peer-effect in Table 2.1.
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Table B.4: 2013-14 Season Estimates.
Parameter values T statistics
Team λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2 λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2
UTA 0.0446 0.0565 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 3.529 2.285 -0.390 1.826 57.032
BOS 0.0442 0.0009 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 3.531 0.038 -0.216 2.541 57.536
PHX 0.0410 -0.0519 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 2.807 -1.925 -0.100 1.083 55.746
WAS 0.0314 -0.0052 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 2.219 -0.204 2.056 1.840 55.166
IND 0.0274 0.0317 0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 2.189 1.292 2.798 0.392 55.514
MIN 0.0259 -0.0399 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 2.228 -1.700 2.211 1.576 56.086
DAL 0.0223 -0.0269 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 1.846 -1.267 -0.163 0.896 59.684
OKC 0.0208 -0.0119 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 1.656 -0.505 -0.281 1.529 56.664
SAS 0.0206 0.0214 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 1.880 0.944 2.098 0.659 58.502
TOR 0.0198 0.0279 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 1.708 1.176 -0.870 3.007 57.956
BKN 0.0186 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 1.484 -0.037 1.565 0.840 56.151
CLE 0.0175 0.0355 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 1.531 1.669 0.780 1.607 57.284
PHI 0.0171 0.0544 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 1.511 2.438 0.224 -0.202 58.547
NOP 0.0165 -0.0103 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 1.515 -0.459 1.248 1.492 58.348
DET 0.0150 -0.0376 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 1.305 -1.628 -1.320 1.542 57.084
MIL 0.0142 -0.0351 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0006 1.262 -1.604 0.472 -0.821 57.553
LAL 0.0133 0.0037 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 1.169 0.167 -1.942 3.631 56.738
NYK 0.0089 -0.0057 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.801 -0.253 -1.233 0.750 57.172
DEN 0.0089 -0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.818 -0.311 -0.514 0.519 58.687
GSW 0.0069 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.563 0.429 0.246 -0.396 56.670
MEM 0.0056 -0.0188 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.493 -0.846 0.284 0.616 56.570
CHA 0.0044 -0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.393 -0.363 0.265 -0.260 56.612
SAC 0.0004 0.0087 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.037 0.376 -1.319 0.630 56.879
HOU -0.0020 -0.0272 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 -0.180 -1.209 0.808 1.433 56.330
ORL -0.0038 0.0320 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 -0.333 1.368 0.494 2.137 55.395
ATL -0.0052 0.0205 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -0.463 0.943 0.761 0.808 57.438
LAC -0.0090 0.0163 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 -0.823 0.729 0.677 0.097 57.822
POR -0.0102 -0.0184 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 -0.879 -0.781 0.787 2.684 55.849
CHI -0.0171 0.0057 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0006 -1.438 0.249 -3.000 1.413 54.035
MIA -0.0193 -0.0214 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 -1.713 -0.953 -2.037 2.822 56.740
λrr is the peer-effect; λrk is the competator effect. Exper. is Experience.
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Table B.5: 2014-15 Season Estimates.
Parameter values T statistics
Team λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2 λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2
IND 0.0541 -0.0025 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 3.702 -0.099 0.501 0.637 55.924
PHX 0.0328 -0.0040 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 2.501 -0.169 -1.854 1.815 57.282
UTA 0.0321 0.0440 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 2.746 1.903 -0.424 1.329 60.277
PHI 0.0232 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 1.711 -0.073 -0.155 1.981 58.458
MIN 0.0204 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 1.805 0.099 0.546 -0.094 58.243
CLE 0.0182 -0.0051 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 1.570 -0.219 2.855 1.785 57.901
WAS 0.0181 -0.0383 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 1.411 -1.594 -0.762 0.742 56.184
LAC 0.0167 -0.0212 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 1.530 -0.911 1.598 1.609 57.229
ORL 0.0140 0.0209 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 1.264 0.929 0.893 -0.241 57.247
SAC 0.0107 0.0235 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.946 1.047 -1.032 1.988 58.183
SAS 0.0088 -0.0144 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.808 -0.654 0.796 -0.072 59.502
MEM 0.0076 -0.0176 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.686 -0.808 -1.344 2.308 57.579
BKN 0.0066 -0.0169 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.607 -0.824 -1.832 2.329 58.122
NOP 0.0056 0.0505 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.505 2.277 0.299 1.581 57.514
DEN 0.0021 -0.0202 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.188 -0.898 1.038 0.914 57.984
TOR 0.0017 -0.0103 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.153 -0.456 1.648 1.147 58.061
CHA 0.0014 0.0112 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006 0.123 0.486 2.568 0.590 56.524
DAL 0.0011 0.0425 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.101 1.931 0.885 0.706 60.477
MIL 0.0005 -0.0092 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.049 -0.429 1.655 -0.286 57.768
ATL 0.0000 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.003 0.977 0.068 0.256 58.461
HOU -0.0011 0.0383 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 -0.098 1.662 0.078 2.659 57.834
LAL -0.0022 0.0281 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -0.180 1.061 -0.721 1.722 54.723
POR -0.0031 0.0449 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.274 1.941 -0.113 -1.771 56.223
CHI -0.0038 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 -0.321 -0.049 -0.314 0.820 55.533
MIA -0.0054 -0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 -0.490 -0.319 -0.242 0.608 58.726
DET -0.0064 -0.0734 0.0000 0.0004 0.0006 -0.550 -3.163 0.011 4.188 56.296
OKC -0.0071 0.0082 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.645 0.368 2.787 -1.089 58.760
GSW -0.0219 0.0569 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 -2.009 2.378 0.766 0.250 57.356
NYK -0.0254 -0.0028 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0006 -2.333 -0.129 2.362 -1.215 58.137
BOS -0.0261 -0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 -2.411 -0.313 0.239 0.376 58.933
λrr is the peer-effect; λrk is the competator effect. Exper. is Experience.
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Table B.6: 2014-15 Season Estimates.
Parameter values T statistics
Team λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2 λrr λrk Exper. Fatigue σ2
CHI 0.0648 -0.0635 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 4.120 -2.598 0.580 1.143 54.955
SAS 0.0522 0.0112 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 3.607 0.460 -0.555 2.302 56.670
MIN 0.0489 0.0049 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 3.592 0.212 0.457 1.238 57.368
MIL 0.0457 0.0135 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 3.418 0.578 1.065 -0.104 56.079
MEM 0.0452 0.0174 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 2.975 0.729 -0.136 0.789 55.853
ORL 0.0365 0.0195 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 2.606 0.812 0.840 -0.476 55.983
BKN 0.0350 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 2.747 0.028 0.717 -1.356 57.035
DET 0.0296 0.0107 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 2.233 0.428 -0.593 2.227 55.515
SAC 0.0277 -0.0221 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 2.188 -0.963 0.299 0.769 58.562
POR 0.0269 -0.0150 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 2.430 -0.686 0.695 1.103 57.871
BOS 0.0218 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007 1.802 -0.035 1.891 0.262 57.979
TOR 0.0200 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 1.761 0.026 0.470 2.054 57.081
UTA 0.0157 0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 1.301 0.038 1.094 2.809 59.773
CLE 0.0155 0.0273 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 1.368 1.184 -2.002 4.074 58.195
HOU 0.0137 0.0060 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 1.223 0.264 0.250 2.353 59.343
CHA 0.0113 -0.0126 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.943 -0.490 -0.226 1.570 55.771
ATL 0.0084 0.0495 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0007 0.734 2.318 2.763 -0.485 59.825
PHX 0.0037 -0.0365 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.319 -1.564 -0.752 0.151 57.007
LAL 0.0011 0.0548 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.091 2.233 0.415 1.523 55.910
WAS 0.0000 -0.0075 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.001 -0.344 -0.309 0.689 58.429
NYK -0.0001 0.0506 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -0.011 2.300 0.773 1.489 57.557
OKC -0.0020 -0.0506 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 -0.179 -2.257 -0.869 1.866 57.668
LAC -0.0045 0.0170 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 -0.409 0.767 -1.990 2.648 57.780
MIA -0.0071 0.0267 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 -0.590 1.199 0.051 1.191 57.004
NOP -0.0111 0.0085 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -0.920 0.387 1.281 1.563 57.313
PHI -0.0139 -0.0246 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 -1.208 -1.128 0.981 1.278 59.984
GSW -0.0144 -0.0203 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 -1.336 -0.858 0.899 0.403 58.161
DAL -0.0163 -0.0089 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 -1.415 -0.412 1.531 -0.650 58.744
IND -0.0175 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 -1.457 -0.024 0.665 0.792 56.736
DEN -0.0282 -0.0123 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -2.247 -0.552 1.329 1.233 56.321
λrr is the peer-effect; λrk is the competator effect. Exper. is Experience.
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Appendix C
Adaptive LASSO for Stochastic Frontier
Models with Many Efficient Firms
C.1 Proofs of the lemmas and the theorem
We denote
 LSDV estimates for individual intercepts : αˆi(0) for i = 1, ..., N
 LASSO estimates for individual intercepts : αˆi(Π)(= αˆ(Π)− uˆ(Π)i) for i = 1, ..., N
Lemma 3.4.1 Under the assumption 3.4.1, we have E ((αˆ(0)−α0)2) = O( (logN)2T ), E (||βˆ(0)−
β0||22) = O( 1NT ), and E ((uˆi(0)− u0,i)2) = O( (logN)
2
T
) for ∀i as (N, T )_∞
Proof E (||βˆ(0)− β0||22) = O( 1NT ) can be easily proved as it is a standard fixed effect panel
data model problem in the literature. We only prove E ((αˆ(0) − α0)2) = O( (logN)2T ) and
E ((uˆi(0)− u0,i)2) = O( (logN)2T ) here.
It is easy to show (αˆi(0)− α0,i)2 = O( 1T ) for ∀i from αˆ(0)i = 1T
∑T
t=1(yit − x
′
it βˆ(0)) which
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implies
αˆi(0)− α0,i = 1
T
T∑
t=1
x
′
it(β0 − βˆ(0)) +
1
T
T∑
t=1
vit ⇒ E ((αˆi(0)− α0,i)2) = O( 1
T
) (C.1)
due to E (||βˆ(0) − β0||22) = O( 1NT ). Then, using the results from Theorem 3.2 (ii) of Park,
Schmidt and Simar (1998), we can show
αˆ(0)− α0 = Op
(
log N√
T
)
⇒ E ((αˆ(0)− α0)2) = O
(
(log N)2
T
)
(C.2)
which is due to Emaxi | 1√T
∑
i vit | = O(log N). Next, we derive the convergence rate of uˆi(0).
By definition, uˆi(0) = αˆ(0)− αˆi(0). Then, from above results, we have
uˆi(0) = α0 + Op
(
log N√
T
)
−
(
α0,i + Op(
1√
T
)
)
⇒ sup |uˆi(0)− (α0 − α0,i)| = Op
(
log N√
T
)
⇒ E ((uˆi(0)− u0,i)2) = O
(
(log N)2
T
)
(C.3)
The lemma is proved. 
Lemma 3.4.2 Under the assumption 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we have (i) E ((αˆ(Π)−α0)2) = O( 1δ0NT ),
(ii) E (||βˆA(Λ)− β0,A||22) = O( 1NT ), (iii) E ((uˆA,i(Π)− u0,A,i)2) = O( 1T ) for ∀i (N, T )_∞
Proof (ii) has been proved in the literature. It can be proved similarly using the first
step equation of (3.10). To prove (i), we use the coordinate decent algorithm in 3.3.1. The
algorithm implies that αˆ(Π) is estimated as a common intercept of the firms categorized as
fully efficient by LASSO technique. Therefore, if we know the true model, αˆ(Π) is given by
αˆ(Π) = 1
δ0NT
l
′
NT ,δ(Y −X1,AβˆA(Λ)) where lNT ,δ a vector with ones at the observations with zero
inefficiency and zero at the others. From the model assumption and E (||βˆA(Λ)− β0,A||22) =
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Op(
1
NT
), we have
(αˆ(Π)− α0) = 1
δ0NT
l
′
NT ,δX1,A(β0,A − βˆA(Λ)) +
1
δ0NT
l
′
NT ,δv ⇒ E (αˆ(Π)− α0)2 = O
(
1
δ0NT
)
(C.4)
Next, we prove (iii). The algorithm gives us
uˆA,i(Π) = αˆ(Π)− αˆi(0)− Πpii
2T
= α0 + Op
(
1√
δ0NT
)
−
(
α0,i + Op(
1√
T
)
)
− Πpii
2T
(C.5)
which implies
sup |uˆA,i(Π)− u0,i | = Op( 1√
T
)− Πpii
2T
≤ Op( 1√
T
)−Op( 1
2
√
T log N
)
Π√
T ∗
η−γu
(
ηˆ
η
)−γu
(C.6)
where η = mini(|u0,i |) and ηˆ = mini(|uˆi(Π)|) and T ∗ = T(logN)2 . We show that
E
[(
ηˆ
η
)2]
= E
[(
ηˆ − η + η
η
)2]
≤ 2
η2
E
[
(ηˆ − η)2]+ 2
≤ 2 · E (|uˆa(0)− u0,a|
2) + 2E (|uˆb(0)− u0,b|2)
η2
+ 2 =
2
η2
O
(
(log N)2
T
)
+ 2 = O(1)
(C.7)
where a and b is defined from η = |u0,a| and ηˆ = |uˆb(Π)|. The second inequality is straight-
forward if a = b. Even if not, when ηˆ > η, E
[
(ηˆ − η)2] < E (|uˆa(0)− u0,a|2) and when ηˆ < η,
E
[
(ηˆ − η)2] < E (|uˆb(0) − u0,b|2) so the inequality holds. The next equality is due to the
fact that the convergence rate for the individual LSDV estimator is Op
(
(logN)2
T
)
. The last
equality holds because
O
(
(log N)2
T
1
η2
)
= O
(
(
Π√
T ∗
η−γu)2/γu(log N · Π√
T
· T ∗γu/2)−2/γu
)
= o(1) (C.8)
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due to the assumption 3.4.2. Therefore, C.7 gives us
sup |uˆA,i(Π)− u0,i | ≤ Op( 1√
T
)−Op( 1√
T log N
)op(1) = Op(
1√
T
) (C.9)
which implies E ((uˆA,i(Π)− u0,A,i)2) = O( 1T ) for ∀i 
Lemma 3.4.2 B Under the assumption 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the adaptive LASSO estimator
for β0, βˆ(Λ), has the oracle property; that is, the estimator satisfy:
1. Consistency in selection: Pr ({j : βˆ(Λ)j 6= 0} = A)_ 1
2. Aysmptotic normality:
√
NT (βˆ(Λ)− β0)_d N(0,σ2Σ−11,A)
Proof See Zou (2006) for proof. Only difference is the regressors in our problem involves a
within transformation.
Lemma 3.4.3 Under the assumption 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, [αˆ(Π), (βˆA(Λ)
′
, 0
′
), (UˆA(Π)
′
, 0
′
)]
′ is the
solution to the minimization problem of (3.3) w.p.a 1 (N, T )_∞
Proof By the lemma 3.4.2 B, the selection consistency of βˆ(Λ) is already proved. To show
(UˆA(Π)
′
, 0
′
) is the solution to the minimization problem of (3.3) w.p.a 1, we need to show it
satisfies 1
P
{
For j ∈ Ac , |2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| ≤ Π · pij
}_ 1
or equivalently,
Ψj ≡ P
{
For j ∈ Ac , |2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij
}_ 0 (C.10)
1Zou and Zhang (2009) considers the selection consistency for all the coefficients at the same time, but in
our problem, even though there is an infinite number of inefficiency terms in the limit, they are independent
due to the independency between the dummy variables, therefore it is suffice to consider of the selection
consistency individually.
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With some set theorems, we have
Ψj ≡ P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij
}
= P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij and ηˆ > η/2
}
+ P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pijand ηˆ ≤ η/2
}
≤ P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij , ηˆ > η/2
}
+ P {ηˆ ≤ η/2}
(C.11)
As in (C.7), a and b is defined from η = |u0,a| and ηˆ = |uˆb(Π)|, then, we can show
P {ηˆ ≤ η/2} ≤ P {|uˆa(0)− u0,a| ≥ η/2}+ P {|uˆb(0)− u0,b| ≥ η/2}
≤ E (|uˆa(0)− u0,a|
2) + E (|uˆb(0)− u0,b|2)
η2/4
= O
(
(log N)2
T
)
· 1
η2
(C.12)
w.p.a 1. The first inequality is due to that if a = b = e∗, ηˆ ≤ η
2
implies |ηˆ − η| =
|uˆe∗(0) − u0,e∗| ≥ η2 . Similiarly, if a 6= b, ηˆ ≤ η2 implies |ηˆ − u0,b| ≥ |ηˆ − η| ≥ η2 due to
|u0,b| > η by definition of η. So the inequality holds. Let M =
(
Π
T/ logN
)1/(1+γu)
, then, we can
show
P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij , ηˆ > η/2
}
≤ P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π · pij , ηˆ > η/2, |uˆj(0)| ≤ M
}
+ P {|uˆj(0)| > M}
≤ P
{
|2x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))| > Π ·M−γu , ηˆ > η/2
}
+ P {|uˆj(0)| > M}
≤ 4M
2γu
Π2
· E
[
|x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2 · Iηˆ>η/2
]
+
1
M2
· E [|uˆj(0)|2]
≤ 4M
2γu
Π2
· E
[
|x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2 · Iηˆ>η/2
]
+
1
M2
· E (|uˆj(0)− u0,j |2) due to u0,j ∈ Ac
= 4
M2γu
Π2
· E
[
|x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2 · Iηˆ>η/2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
1
M2
·O
(
(log N)2
T
)
w.p.a 1 by the lemma 3.4.1
(C.13)
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Next, we derive a upper bound of (A). By the model assumption, we have
E
[
|x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2
]
= E
[
|x ′j (XA · θ0 + v − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2
]
≤ 2 · E
[
|x ′j · XA(θ0 − θˆA(Λ, Π))|2
]
+ 2 · E
[
|x ′j v |2
] (C.14)
Due to j ∈ Ac , there’s no inefficiency estimate and parameter in this firm, therefore, we have
≤ 2 · E (|x ′j X1,A(β0 − βˆA(Λ)) + x
′
j lNT (a0 − aˆ(Π))|2) + 2 · T · σ2
≤ 4T · E (||X1,A(β0 − βˆA(Λ))||22) + 4 · T 2 · E (|a0 − aˆ(Π))|2) + 2 · T · σ2
≤ 4 · BNT 2 · E (||β0 − βˆA(Λ)||22) + 4 · T 2 · E (||a0 − aˆ(Π)||22) + 2 · T · σ2
≤ 4B · NT 2 ·
{
E (||a0 − aˆ(Π)||22) + E (||β0 − βˆA(Λ)||22)
}
+ 2 · T · σ2
(C.15)
Then, C.14 and C.15 give us the inequality
E
[∑
j∈Ac
|x ′j (Y − XA · θˆA(Λ, Π))|2 · Iηˆ>η/2
]
≤ 4BNT 2 ·
{
E (||a0 − aˆ(Π)||22 · Iηˆ>η/2) + E (||β0 − βˆA(Λ)||22 · Iηˆ>η/2)
}
+ 2T · σ2
(C.16)
Combining the above results and by the lemma 3.4.2, we have the upper bound of Ψj as
Ψj ≤ 4M
2γu
Π2
· (4BNT 2 ·O( 1
NT
) + 2Tσ2) +
1
M2
·O
(
(log N)2
T
)
+ O
(
(log N)2
T
)
· 1
η2
≡ Ψj ,1 + Ψj ,2 + Ψj ,3
(C.17)
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w.p.a 1. Under the assumption 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, and due to C.8 we can show
Ψj ,1 = O
(
M2γu
Π2
· T
)
= O
((
Π√
T
· T ∗γu/2
)−2/(1+γu))_ 0
Ψj ,2 = O
(
1
M2
· 1
T ∗
)
= O
((
Π√
T
· T ∗γu/2
)−2/(1+γu))_ 0
Ψj ,3 = O(
1
T ∗
1
η2
) = O
((
Π√
T ∗
η−γu
)2/γu (
log N
Π√
T
· T ∗γu/2
)−2/γu)_ 0
(C.18)
Thus, the proof is complete 
Theorem (Oracle Property) Under the assumption 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the LASSO esti-
mator for θ0, θˆ(Λ, Π), has the oracle property; that is, the estimator satisfy:
1. Consistency in selection: Pr ({j : θˆ(Λ, Π)j 6= 0} = A)_ 1 as (N, T )_∞
2. Asymptotic normality
1)
√
NT (βˆA(Λ)− β0,A)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σ−1A,1)
2)
√
δ0NT (αˆ(Π)− α0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σα)
3)
√
T (uˆi ,A(Π)− ui ,0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0)
w.p.a 1 as (N, T )_∞ where Σα = 1 + δ0 l ′δX1,Aδ0NT (X ′1,AQX1,ANT )−1 X ′1,Alδδ0NT .
Proof Using Lemma 3.4.2 B and 3.4.3, we only need to show P{mini∈Auˆi(Π) > 0}_ 1. We
can show that
uˆa(Π) > mini∈Au0,i − |uˆa(Π)− u0,a| (C.19)
where a is the index for uˆa(Π) = mini∈Auˆi(Π). The inequality is straightforward if uˆ(Π)a >
mini∈Au0,i . When uˆa(Π) < mini∈Au0,i , it implies uˆa(Π) < mini∈Au0,i < u0,a, which in turn
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implies uˆa(Π)−mini∈Au0,i > −|uˆa(Π)− u0,a|. Then, due to the Lemma 3.4.2, we have
minj∈Auˆ(Π)j > η −Op(
√
1
T
) (C.20)
The proof is complete because we have already shown that
√
(logN)2
T
converges to zero faster
than η by C.8.
Next, we prove the asymptotic normality. From the selection consistency, we only have nonzero
coefficients now. Then, each estimators’ asymptotic distribution will be given as follows:
First, we already showed that
√
NT (βˆA(Λ)− β0,A)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σ−1A,1) from Lemma 3.4.2 B.
Second, as we’ve seen in the Lemma 3.4.2, we have (αˆ(Π)− α0) = 1δ0NT l
′
δ(Y − X1,AβˆA(Λ)).
As (N, T )_∞, we will have βˆA(Λ) = (X ′1,AQX1,A)−1X ′1,AQY w.p.a 1. Then, we can show
√
δ0NT (αˆ(Π)− α0) = 1√
δ0NT
l
′
δ(v − X1,A(X
′
1,AQX1,A)
−1X
′
1,AQv )
=
1√
δ0NT
l
′
δv −
√
δ0
l
′
δX1,A
δ0NT
(
X
′
1,AQX1,A
NT
)−1
1√
NT
X
′
1,AQv
(C.21)
where we omit the inefficiency terms as they will be removed eventually. By CLT, we can
show √
δ0NT (αˆ(Π)− α0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0Σα) (C.22)
where
(
1√
δ0NT
l
′
δ −
√
δ0
l
′
δX1,A
δ0NT
(
X
′
1,AQX1,A
NT
)−1 1√
NT
X
′
1,AQ
)(
1√
δ0NT
l
′
δ −
√
δ0
l
′
δX1,A
δ0NT
(
X
′
1,AQX1,A
NT
)−1 1√
NT
X
′
1,AQ
)′ _p
Σα. This reduces to 1 + δ0
l
′
δX1,A
δ0NT
(
X
′
1,AQX1,A
NT
)−1
X
′
1,Alδ
δ0NT
_p Σα due to Qlδ = 0
Lastly, for each nonzero inefficiencies, we have F.O.C as
i∑
(yit,A − αˆ(Π)− xit,1,A · βˆA(Λ) + uˆi ,A(Π)) + Π
2
· pii = 0 for uˆi ,A(Π) > 0 (C.23)
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w.p.a 1. This leads to
√
T (uˆi ,A(Π)−ui ,0) =
√
T (αˆ(Π)− α0) + 1√
T
∑
i
xit,1,A(βˆA(Λ)− βA,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− 1√
T
i∑
vit− Π
2
√
T
· pii︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
(C.24)
As (1) = op(1) and (2) = op(1), by CLT, we have
√
T (uˆi ,A(Π)− ui ,0)_d N(0,σ2v ,0) (C.25)
w.p.a 1 as (N, T )_∞. This completes the proof. 
C.2 The equivalence between the one step estimation of (3.3) and the two
step estimation of (3.5) and (3.6)
In order to show the equivalence between the one step estimation of (3.3) and the two step
estimation of (3.5) and (3.6), we first derive the F.O.C for Uˆ(Π) in (3.3), which gives us the
close form solution for Uˆ(Π) such that
Uˆ(Π) =
[
(X
′
2X2)
−1
(
−X ′2(Y − α · lNT − X1β)− Π · iN(
pii
2
)
)]
+
(C.26)
where (x)+ = x if x ≥ 0 and = 0 otherwise and iN(pii) is N × 1 vector with pii for i th element.
Plugging this result into (3.3) give us the equation
{
Q · (Y − α · lNT − X1β)− X2Π · iN
(
pii
2T
+ i
)}′
{...}+ Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
=
{
Q · (Y − X1β)− X2Π · iN
(
pii
2T
+ i
)}′
{...}+ Λ
p∑
j=1
λˆj |βj |+ Π
N∑
k=1
pik |uk |
(C.27)
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where i is for removing the positive constraints on the inefficiency estimates so β has no
corresponding constraint in (C.27). The equality is due to Q · lNT = 0. Next we derive the
F.O.C for β in (C.27), which is given by
− 2 · X ′1Q
{
Q · (Y − X1β)− X2Π · iN
(
pii
T
+ i
)}
+ Λ · ip(λˆi)
= −2 · X ′1Q (Y − X1β) + Λ · ip(λˆi)
(C.28)
This equality is due to Q ·Q = Q and Q · X2 = 0. This is the same with the F.O.C for β in
(3.5) so we show the equivalence between the two. 
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C.3 The proximity of the new algorithm and the standard constrained
optimization algorithm
The basic set up here is the same with that in the simulation exercise. We compare the
series of estimation results on ˆU(Π) (RMSE, PrUA, αˆ, Sum of squared error) from the new
algorithm (NA) and one of the standard constrained algorithm (SA) (SQP in Matlab) in the
20 replications of two models: (1) (N,T)=(20,10), σu = 1, and (2) (N,T)=(10,20) σu = 2.
Figure C.1 is from model (1) and Figure C.2 is from model (2). The black dashed line is
from NA and the red dotted line is from SA. In model (1), there are one or two replications
showing the two algorithms produced slightly different results, but the differences are small
enough to conclude that the two algorithms generally produce very similar results. In model
(2), the two produced almost identical results in every replication. The new algorithm is
incomparably faster than SA in estimation. For one replication, the new algorithm took on
average 1.5 second whereas the standard algorithm took 345 seconds. This difference will be
pronounced as the sample size increases.
Figure C.1: Model (1)
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Figure C.2: Model (2)
C.4 New algorithm
 Using ˆβ(Λ) from the first step, compute αˆi = 1T
∑
i yit−x
′
it
ˆβ(Λ) and uˆi = MaxNj=1αˆj− αˆi
for all i . Let αˆ[1] ≤ αˆ[2] ≤ ... ≤ αˆ[N] be the rankings of the αˆi , so αˆ[N] = MaxNj=1αˆj .
Similarly, let uˆ[N] ≤ uˆ[N−1] ≤ ... ≤ uˆ[1] be the rankings of the uˆi , so uˆ[N] = MinNj=1uˆj . We
set the initial value for α as αˆ[N]. Denote the current values for uˆ[i ] and αˆ as uˆ
(0)
[i ] and
αˆ(0), then we have below initial settings. Note that as αˆ(0) = αˆ[N], we have one fully
efficient firm, uˆ(0)[N] = 0, now.
αˆ[N] αˆ[N−1] αˆ[N−2] αˆ[N−3]
uˆ
(0)
[N−1] uˆ(0)[N−2] uˆ(0)[N−3]
αˆ(0) = αˆ[N], uˆ
(0)
[N] = 0
 For a given Π, check the KKT condition for the second best firm( =[N − 1]), that is,
check the sign of ∆[N−1] = uˆ
(0)
[N−1] − Π
pˆi[N−1]
2T
1. ∆[N−1] ≤ 0, update uˆ(0)[N−1] as uˆ[N−1] = 0, and update αˆ(0) as αˆ = 12 (αˆ[N] + αˆ[N−1]).
As we have a new frontier (=αˆ), we update the rest of the inefficiencies (from
[N − 2] to [1]) as below.
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αˆ[N] αˆ[N−1] αˆ[N−2] αˆ[N−3]
uˆ[N−2] uˆ[N−3]
αˆ(0) αˆ
(a) Check the KKT condition for the third best firm( =[N−2]), and if ∆[N−2] ≤ 0,
update uˆ(0)[N−2] as uˆ[N−2] = 0, and update αˆ
(0) as αˆ = 1
3
(αˆ[N] + αˆ[N−1] + αˆ[N−2]),
and update the rest of the inefficiencies (from [N − 3] to [1]) as below.
αˆ[N] αˆ[N−1] αˆ[N−2] αˆ[N−3]
uˆ[N−3]
αˆ(0) αˆ
(b) if ∆[N−2] > 0, do some minor updating for αˆ and uˆ[i ] for i = N −2, N −3, ..., 1
as 2. (b) of the algorithm in 3.3.1 and report the results.
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C.5 Simulation results for β
Table C.1: Simulation results for β
Estimation accuracy: RMSE Selection accuracy
(N, T, σu ) LASSO Oracle LSDV |βˆA| |βˆAc |
(100,10,1) 0.023 0.013 0.040 3 4.92
(0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0) (0.265)
(100,50,1) 0.009 0.005 0.017 3 4.97
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0) (0.146)
(200,50,4) 0.006 0.004 0.012 3 4.98
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0) (0.117)
The numbers in main entries are the average RMSE over 1,000
replications and |βˆA| represents the average number of nonzero
estimate for βA (the true = 3) over the replications, and | ˆβAc |
represents the average number of zero estimate for βAc (the true =
5). The corresponding variances of each measures are in next row
in parentheses. The oracle is the RMSE calculated from when we
know the true model and apply LSDV estimation to the model.
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